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This book originated in a roundtable discussion at the annual conven-
tion of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), in Washington, DC, 
in November 2014. The roundtable itself was an attempt to apply social 
movement theory to the 2011 Arab uprising, as well as to bring the Arab 
uprisings into social movement theory. Charlie Kurzman and Frédéric Volpi 
were the initial instigators, soon joined by Jim Jasper, Jeff Goodwin, Farhad 
Khosrokhavar, and Wendy Pearlman.
The lively and productive dialogue at the MESA conference encouraged us 
to develop this project further. The roundtable revealed the widespread dis-
satisfaction – among both speakers and the audience – with the way that crude 
structural models of social mobilization were commonly invoked to explain 
protest mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings. This initial dis-
satisfaction turned into an effort to outline more useful alternative approaches.
While not all of the participants to the roundtable were able to contribute to 
this edited volume, other scholars who had not attended the initial conference 
came on board, namely Jillian Schwedler, John Chalcraft, and Youssef El Chazli.
Through our joint efforts, we hope to provide signposts for theories of 
mobilization that ground themselves on microinteractions between pro- and 
anti-regime actors. The contributions to the book thus capture and analyze 
very specif ic episodes of contestation in different parts of the Middle East 
since 2011. While the book explicitly seeks to deepen the relationship be-
tween social movement perspectives and Middle Eastern specialism, it is 
also designed to show the general conceptual and analytical relevance of 
these perspectives for the study of social mobilization and political change.
To stress the multifaceted relevance of this microinteractionist approach, 
the chapters were not compiled as a systematic account of protest events in 
the countries of the Middle East at the time of the Arab uprisings. Instead, we 
selected different types of protest mobilization, whether successful or not, 
by different types of players, within and across the countries of the region.
Rather than provide a review of signif icant protest movements in the 
Middle East, we sought to illustrate and analyze how social mobilization was 
constructed (and deconstructed) by the players in different political arenas. 
We illustrate the dynamics of how authoritarianisms were challenged by 
both strategic and accidental interactions between multiple players during 
the crisis events that constitute the Arab uprisings.
Frédéric Volpi and James M. Jasper
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Rethinking Mobilization after the Arab Uprisings1
James M. Jasper and Frédéric Volpi
Volpi, Frédéric and James M. Jasper, eds, Microfoundations of the Arab 
Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters. Amster-
dam University Press, 2018
doi: 10.5117/9789462985131/intro
Abstract
This introduction critically reviews the insights provided by mainstream 
social movement theory on the mobilization processes of the Arab upris-
ings. To address their limitations, the chapter outlines an interactionist 
perspective grounded in the relationship between pro- and anti-regime 
players across different arenas. This focus on the microfoundations of 
political action documents how the different players involved viewed 
their actions and that of others. In this perspective, addressing the in-
teractions between players requires considering a wide range of factors, 
from emotional reactions to confusion, that shape strategic choices. Con-
structing an explanation from the ground up enables us to explain more 
systematically the patterns of social mobilization and state responses 
observed during such waves of protests.
Keywords: social movement theory, players and arenas, microfoundations 
of political action, Middle East politics, Arab uprisings
“Opportunities multiply as they are seized.”
– Sun Tzu
1 We thank John Chalcraft, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Teije Hidde Donker, Charlie Kurzman, 
and Jillian Schwedler for comments on earlier drafts.
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The protests that spread across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 
were one of the great explosions of political activity in modern history, 
comparable to 1848 or 1989. The world watched as regimes were overthrown 
in four countries, and extensive protests occurred in a dozen more. Hope-
fully dubbed the “Arab Spring,” most of these movements have been deeply 
disappointed and some violently repressed. Even today several countries 
continue to be devastated by civil wars. The democratic transition in Tunisia 
is the only clear political advance so far.
The world’s fascination is proven by hundreds of articles and books, 
published in dozens of languages, about the uprisings and their outcomes. 
Many are broad overviews, often written in the f irst f lush of excitement 
in or after 2011, which tried to make sense of events by placing them in 
grand metanarratives of history or general theories of social change and 
revolution. Most of the early work was written by popular journalists, or by 
scholars writing popular journalism. Outside observers initially attributed 
the uprisings to broad structural developments such as food insecurity 
(Harrigan 2014), overeducated and underemployed youth (Murphy 2012), 
neoliberalism (Talani 2014), or information and communication technolo-
gies (Hussain and Howard 2013).
Enough time has passed for us to dig deeper, using the research tools 
of social science to pinpoint specif ic causal dynamics of the uprisings. 
Careful interviews, surveys, and ethnographic immersion can be linked 
to sophisticated theories of human action and politics. In most cases, f ine-
grained micro-level descriptions can and should replace crude macro-level 
correlations (Schwedler 2015). Historians of political science will recognize 
echoes of the behavioral revolution of the 1950s, although that effort was 
limited by the crude theories of emotion, cognition, and culture available at 
the time (Dahl 1961). Revolutions in each of those fields have provided us with 
a wealth of new conceptual tools for understanding the microfoundations 
of political action.
The evidence obtained during or just after the Arab uprisings can shed 
light on scholarly theories of protest, revolution, and democratization. Every 
great wave of activity forces us to refashion our theories. Just as 1848 gave us 
crowd theories, fascism inspired mass-society theories, and 1968 suggested 
new-social-movement theory, so scholars must pour over what we know 
about the Arab uprisings in order to revise our own theories of politics. We 
hope this book can at least cheer on that long process, pointing in some 
directions it is already taking.
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From Structures to Arenas
Twenty years ago there was more consensus, at least in the United States, 
over how to study protest and political contention. The political-process 
paradigm of social movements reached its peak in 1996, with the publica-
tion of Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald’s edited volume, 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Resource-mobilization and 
political-opportunity theories coalesced, with culture thrown in as well, 
to establish the main outlines of an “emerging synthesis” of how scholars 
would henceforth explain social movements and related phenomena. The 
three basic building blocks were political opportunity structures, which 
summarized what was important about the external political environ-
ment, mobilizing structures, which were the networks and other factors 
that helped people to assemble, and cultural frames to acknowledge some 
subjective element.2
Although this structural framework inspired vast quantities of research 
– continuing today – cracks in the edif ice appeared immediately. In the 
volume itself, David Meyer and William Gamson (1996) wondered if the 
concept of political opportunity structures had not been overextended to 
cover too many diverse phenomena, soaking up all the explanatory power 
in many models. Goodwin and Jasper (1999) soon attacked the entire para-
digm as overly structural, ignoring strategic, emotional, and most cultural 
dimensions of protest. Two years later McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001), 
the leading architects of political process theory, retreated to the concept 
of mechanisms in an effort to breathe more dynamism and culture into 
what they now admitted had been overly structural theories.
Efforts to rethink the idea of political opportunity structures have taken 
three main forms. One was to acknowledge the cultural work that goes into 
opportunities: they are not objective moments when structures open up, 
regardless of people’s ideas about them; instead, protestors can create them 
with the right interpretive work, including emotions. They are subjective 
openings that need to be imagined, and they depend on decisions made by 
all the players in several arenas (Goodwin and Jasper 2012; Kurzman 2004a).
A second frequent response to criticism was to distinguish different 
types of opportunity structures, such as discursive opportunity structures, 
2 In line with true structuralism, political opportunity structures were supposed to be entirely 
objective. McAdam insisted that the “kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are most 
defensibly conceived of as political opportunities should not be confused with the collective 
processes by which these changes are interpreted and framed” (1996, 25-26).
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emotional opportunity structures, legal opportunity structures, or corpo-
rate opportunity structures. This proliferation was a tacit recognition of the 
other players in the environment for protestors: corporate opportunities 
were actually the goals and strategic moves of corporations; legal opportuni-
ties were changes in formal laws or their interpretations; and so on. The 
structural language was kept, limiting the analysis of these other players 
as players. Other players’ decisions and actions were still merely external 
“opportunity structures” for protestors.
A third approach was to specify political structures in more detail. 
Amenta (2006) offered a political mediation model in which strategies 
must be matched to specif ic arenas, replacing the language of political 
opportunity structures with concepts more familiar in political science 
such as electoral laws and the goals of coalitions of legislators (Amenta et 
al. 2002). Bloom (2015) argues that political opportunities favor some tactics 
over others, rather than favoring particular groups, while Boudreau (2004) 
suggests that regimes often choose between repressing certain groups or 
repressing certain tactics (with the aim of “crafting” nonthreatening forms 
of political contention).
McAdam traded in the language of political opportunity structures, 
which he had largely promulgated (McAdam 1982), for that of f ields (Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012). Borrowed from Bourdieu, who used the idea mostly to 
analyze intellectual production rather than directly political interactions 
(Bourdieu 1993), the term “field” focuses on competition among individuals, 
but also recognizes that there can be different kinds of players in the same 
field. This was a useful step beyond the image of a social movement facing its 
structural environment, allowing us to view that environment as populated 
by many different types of players.
Fields are social structure, not political structure, and run some risk of 
circularity: social structure is meant to explain patterns of behavior, yet 
social structure consists of those patterns of behavior. Bourdieu avoided 
circularity through the idea of types of capital, which players can bring with 
them from the outside, and with habitus, the dispositions and skills they 
deploy in their f ields. But often the social skills useful in a f ield are specif ic 
to that f ield, returning to a kind of circular model. Formal rules are mostly 
imposed from the outside in Bourdieu’s f ields, by the state. Fligstein and 
McAdam try to build more rules into their idea of a f ield, but in the end it 
remains social structure: any interaction between two players is its own 
f ield, they say, with the result that there are millions of f ields in a society.
Fields share many of the limitations of the concept of institutions, a 
more traditional attempt to describe at the same time patterns of action 
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and the norms and rules that govern them. In the hands of Talcott Parsons, 
institutions were the embodiment of underlying values through the norms 
and roles that apply them to concrete situations. According to his critics, 
such as Philip Selznick and Alvin Gouldner, there is less consensus over 
those values than Parsons assumed, and in fact institutions are frequently 
riddled with conflict. These scholars shifted from institutions to formal 
organizations to show that not all organizations are well institutionalized 
in the sense of having shared norms.
The next swing of the intellectual pendulum brought neo-institutionalism, 
which restored some of the consensus that Parsons had posited, while replac-
ing its basis; it was no longer grounded on some mysterious moral values, but 
on shared cognitive understandings (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This was 
in line with the cultural turn in the social sciences (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
The terminologies of f ields and institutions were naturally combined 
in “institutional f ields.” As Verta Taylor and Mayer Zald (2010, 307) put it, 
echoing Fligstein and McAdam, “The institutional f ield in which a social 
movement mobilizes includes a large array of actors held together by com-
mon cultural understandings, practices, and rules, but it may also be driven 
by conflicting logics and beliefs about how practices and roles tied to the 
institution ought to be enacted.” The institutional tradition emphasizes 
those common understandings and practices, while the f ield tradition high-
lights conflict (although that conflict is often seen as occurring alongside 
many shared understandings). In our view, we need to distinguish the rules 
and traditions of arenas from the norms and expectations of players, who 
often break the rules or create new arenas. Subalterns, hoping to remake 
arenas to their own liking, may follow different norms than elites, and the 
new arenas may reflect different institutional traditions.
A vocabulary of players and arenas has emerged in recent years as a 
commonsense effort to integrate insights into political structure derived 
from process and f ield theory with cultural insights into the construction 
of players and their goals, while not conflating the two (Duyvendak and 
Jasper 2015; Jasper and Duyvendak 2015). Arenas are designated physical 
places where decisions are made, with a variety of objects ranging from 
quotes chiseled into the walls to doors and seats, but also with formal 
rules, informal expectations, and supportive technologies, as well as with 
something at stake in the decisions made. (Although some authors use 
the term more metaphorically, or as an aggregate, such as public opinion 
or the media as arenas (Duyvendak and Fillieule 2015).) The players need 
not be copresent, as decisions can be made via the internet in a dispersed 
fashion. Arenas contain players with different roles and different strengths: 
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there is no assumption of fairness or equality among them. (There are also 
backstages where important preparation or morale building takes place, 
such as fundraisers or pep talks, but they do not involve interaction with 
other players.)
Players consist of individuals or groups who have some sense of a shared 
identity, some shared goals, and who cooperate in at least one arena (usually 
several arenas at the same time, and sometimes in different roles: as specta-
tors in some arenas, direct players in others, judges and referees, advisors, 
and so on (Amenta, Caren, and Tierney 2015)). Both players and arenas 
reflect the weight of history: of past decisions, accumulations, understand-
ings and expectations, physical stockpiles – an interactive approach does 
not assume that each interaction starts from scratch, ready to be def ined 
and negotiated willy-nilly.
By reflecting history, both arenas and players contain some structural 
influences, but they bring these to bear on concrete interactions. Resources 
such as money are distributed according to laws, coercion, and past interac-
tions (or the vague term “capitalism”), but they only matter when players 
use them to do things, to pay off other players for instance. Players have 
the capacities (including not only their physical capacities but their social 
skills, knowledge, network ties, and so on) that they do because of social and 
political structures. Arenas’ rules also reflect how they were established, 
through strategic interactions which had relative winners and losers. Some 
players were excluded from the founding engagements, while others were 
included but lacked much influence on the arenas created.
This cultural-strategic – and interactive – framework separates the 
moving parts in our theories instead of conflating or combining them. It 
gives equal weight to players and to arenas, and acknowledges a number 
of different kinds of players. Although we may focus on one player, the 
approach discourages us from reducing the other players to the status of 
structures or a static environment. Another advantage is that it reflects the 
everyday language that players themselves often use.
A corresponding drawback is that the term “player” seems to attribute 
too much unity to groups of protestors and to states. Players are constantly 
shifting, dissolving, and recombining. Considerable research has observed 
looser connections, such as networks and communities, that enable mo-
bilization and which tie protestors together. Because players are never in 
full agreement, we need to be able to analyze them also as arenas in which 
decisions are made: to look at their internal operations. The temporary 
unity attributed to players at a given time or place is an analytical device to 
cope with such multiplicity in rapidly evolving political situations. (Arenas 
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also change constantly, and provide considerable flexibility within their 
apparent rules.)
The overall trend in these theoretical shifts has been away from vague 
macro-level structures that are posited by the observer but are otherwise 
invisible, toward concrete micro-level phenomena that are commonsensical 
and visible to anyone (Jasper 2010, 2012). You can see an arena, but not a 
political opportunity structure. You can sit down and read a law, but not a 
value. In many ways this change is in line with what is known as assembly 
theory or actor-network theory (Latour 2005): social action consists in bring-
ing together individuals, objects, places, symbols and ideas, and more, in a 
way that accomplishes something. References to “the social,” whether it is 
Durkheim’s social facts, institutions, values, f ields, or other imagined causal 
influences, are discouraged in this model. Only causes that can be observed 
concretely in a setting are valid ingredients in our descriptions, and once 
we have thick, f ine-grained descriptions, we have already pretty much 
explained the actions. When we concatenate chains of these interactions 
together, we may be able to account for macro-level outcomes (Collins 2004).
Representing Social Movements in the Middle East
This trend toward micro-level details has helped scholars to recognize, 
criticize, and avoid various forms of essentialism, be it Middle Eastern, 
Arab, or Islamic. In the 1990s, regional specialists tackled the issue of the 
so-called “exceptionalism” of the region and of Islamist movements in 
particular. Decisively in the last two decades, scholarship on social move-
ments and mobilization in the region has rejected most of the assumptions 
of exceptionalism about regional players and movements.3 Accepting the 
main tenets of mainstream social movement theory, regional special-
ists deployed conventional approaches to explain social and political 
mobilization in the Middle East, showing that Islamist movements are not 
inherently different from American and Western European movements. 
Structural approaches at the time usefully combated orientalism.
Regarding the most studied movement in the region, the Muslim Brother-
hood (MB), Munson (2001) used traditional notions of political opportunity 
structure to explain its early trajectory. Wickham (2002) emphasized the 
political opportunity lens to explain the resilience of the organization, 
3 An early account “normalizing” the behaviors of Iranians during the Islamic revolution is 
Kurzman’s (1996) article on the 1979 Islamic revolution. 
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and resource mobilization theories to account for the evolving structure 
of the movement. In a more interactionist perspective, Clark (2004) also 
used these frameworks to examine the structural and strategic dynamics 
of the middle-class activists joining MB charities in Jordan, Egypt, and 
Yemen. Clark tested the boundaries of the structural perspectives on social 
mobilization by detailing the strategies of the different players involved, 
but her analysis ultimately remained focused on these models.
Wiktorowicz (2004) helpfully brought together authors using these 
prevailing theoretical perspectives to map the dynamics of Islamist move-
ments across the Middle East. In addition to more conventional forms of 
mobilization, armed Islamist groups were also explained through resource 
mobilization, political opportunity structures, and ideological framing. In 
addition, contributors to the book’s sections on cultural framing and on 
networking provided insights into the mechanisms of strategic (re)formula-
tion of ideological and political orientations among and between Islamist 
movements. They corrected the latent tendency of identity-focused accounts 
of social mobilization, particularly in the case of Islamists, to overstate the 
structuring power of culture and ideology. Yet, in the comparative politics 
and security literature, there remained a pronounced tendency to rely 
on the salient identity traits of the Islamists to account for their strategic 
orientations and behaviors in the face of stable authoritarian regimes.
Beinin and Vairel (2011) complained just before the Arab uprisings that 
regional specialists and studies did not contribute to general theoretical 
debates on contemporary social movements. They noted, on the one hand, 
a “disinterest of the dominant currents in comparative politics or sociology 
in collective action and social movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa” (2011, 22) and, on the other hand, how little empirical research on 
social movements in the region contributed to challenging or revising the 
main approaches in social movement theory. A better dialogue between 
Middle East studies and social movement theory seemed to be needed, and 
the Arab uprisings provided just that opportunity.
The continuing inability of social movements (including violent move-
ments) to change governance in the Middle East remained a puzzle to 
be solved through regional analyses of social mobilization inspired by 
the perspectives on social movements developed in a “Western” context. 
In the 2000s, once the issue of (non)“exceptional” mobilization had been 
resolved, the problem of political stasis became a central challenge. The 
longer the “exceptional” authoritarian resilience of Middle East regimes 
lasted, the more social movements were deemed to be structured by 
authoritarian bargains producing spaces and modes of contestation that 
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could not directly challenge the state.4 At best, the slow transformation 
of Turkey’s social and political scene could be portrayed as a situation 
where traditional social movement activism appeared to have influenced 
governance (Tuğal 2009). Alternatively, normalization could be linked to 
the growing assertiveness of some of the better organized women’s organi-
zations making inroads into policy making (Moghadam 2001; Moghadam 
and Gheytanchi 2010) – even though the interactions between Islamist and 
feminist movements made it diff icult to account for these developments 
in a linear narrative (Salime 2011). More often, before the 2011 uprisings, 
regime resilience allowed so-called Islamic exceptionalism to reappear 
in a new form.
The apparent tension between explaining the “normality” of social 
mobilization in the Middle East and the “abnormality” of its political 
outcomes led Asef Bayat to propose an alternative approach to activism 
in an authoritarian regional context where formal activities are continu-
ously repressed by “hard” states. Throughout the 2000s Bayat progressively 
downplayed the specif ic relevance of Islamist activism, which he labeled 
post-Islamism to stress its ideological and political pragmatism, and increas-
ingly emphasized instead the impact of more informal social networks 
(Bayat 2005, 2007). In Life as Politics, he coined the term “nonmovements” 
to refer to the “collective actions of noncollective actors” (Bayat 2010, 20). 
Because authoritarianism discouraged explicitly political movements in 
the region, Bayat argued, nonmovements “embodied shared practices of 
large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities 
trigger much social change, even though these practices were rarely guided 
by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations” (2010, 15). In 
this perspective, contemporary Middle East politics created an exceptional 
social movement dynamic.
But positing the existence of a nonmovement without explicit structure 
or even collective identity requires considerable interpretative liberty. 
Regional specialists had investigated these grassroots networks before 
without bundling them together as a type of social movement (or nonmove-
ment) (Singerman 1995). In addition, considering the strategic interactions 
between different players from the urban lower classes, Ismail (2006) noted 
that, individually and collectively, they could join forces to oppose state 
policies, but they could also side with the authorities in order to gain some 
4 Scholarship on social movements in the Middle East before the Arab uprisings is similar 
to most comparative politics and sociology on the region at the time, which approached their 
subject matter in a context of political stasis. See, for example, Posusney and Angrist (2005).
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advantage over their neighbors. If we look hard enough we can usually see 
players pursuing advantages in different arenas.
From Environments to Players
The environment for protestors includes not only structured arenas but 
also the other players at work in them. In more structural traditions players 
are less important than the arenas, and are typically seen as derived from 
those arenas: when a new arena arises, players with an interest at stake 
will almost automatically appear in order to take advantage of the arena. 
The basic insight is sound, but the automatic quality of the process cannot 
be taken for granted except perhaps under rational-choice assumptions of 
pure rationality based on objective interests. In the real world, it takes work 
to coordinate, identify, and mobilize a new player, or to redirect existing 
players to new arenas. As we saw, political opportunity structures have 
moved – partly – in the direction of incorporating players.
John Krinsky and Ann Mische (2013) have traced Charles Tilly’s efforts 
to grapple with the question of players, and shown why he mostly avoided 
it. They quote from the manual he wrote in 1966 for coding disturbances 
in France: “Sets of participants belong to distinct formation to the ex-
tent they act collectively, communicate internally, oppose other sets of 
participants and/or are given specif ic identities meaningful outside the 
disturbance itself” (2013, 4). This could be a def inition of players. But in 
his published work he was more deterred by what Krinsky and Mische 
call the paradox of actors, namely that they are constantly changing 
through interaction with others. Tilly followed actions rather than actors, 
def ining the latter through their engagement with other actors, in a view 
heavily inf luenced by Marxism and in reaction against the institutional-
ism of Talcott Parsons. Identities shape action, but action can also shape 
identities.
In one version of the structural paradigm, waves of protest movements 
were seen as forming cycles, in which one phase helps to bring on the 
next phase, driven by shifts in political opportunities (Tarrow 1998). When 
windows of opportunity open, such as a decrease in repression, new move-
ments quickly appear with their own demands. Early riser movements 
are joined by others, which eventually overwhelm the political system 
and close down opportunities. Again, only if interests are assumed to be 
simple, such as inclusion in the polity or material benefits, and these are 
assumed to be universal, can we assume that players are already there, 
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“classes in themselves” that easily turn into “classes for themselves” when 
opportunities appear.
If the political wing of process theory ignored the process of player forma-
tion, the economic (resource mobilization) wing had a place for it in the 
form of moral entrepreneurs who recognize where public opinion would 
favor new issues and might provide suff icient resources to launch social 
movement organizations. Because McCarthy and Zald (1977) saw social 
movement sectors and industries as parallel to markets, they expected 
competition among players. The formal organizations that were the main 
unit of analysis in their theory are relatively persistent and well-def ined 
players. Regional specialists looking at cycles of social unrest in the Muslim 
world easily saw such moral entrepreneurs in Islamist leaders, but also in 
other influential religious, ethnic, or tribal players.
A great deal of the cultural turn in social-movement studies has aimed 
to show how players form. Foremost is the extensive research on collective 
identity, which shows that organizers and ideologists must work hard to 
label and delineate most movements before they can enter any arenas. 
There are different bases of identity. Although the paradigmatic image is 
an identity based on demographic categories of race, class, gender, or sexual 
orientation, identities can also form around favored tactics, organizational 
membership, the goals of a movement – or ideology and religion (Jasper 
1997). Collective identities yield a range of benefits but also risks to groups 
as well as to individuals: any given identity f its some participants more 
comfortably than others (McGarry and Jasper 2015). Melucci (1996) saw 
identity processes and struggles as the core of social movements.
The role of changing identities in the recent wave of social mobilization 
in the Middle East remains understudied.5 Often, the Arab uprisings have 
been viewed primarily as the outcome of a long structural undermining of 
authoritarianism, leading to a situation in 2011 when protestors seized what 
was then an objective opportunity – even if regional experts did not see it 
coming – that corresponded to overdue rearticulations of power (Brownlee, 
Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). Such explanations see the identity of these 
players as predefined in relation to the existing authoritarian order, and 
they sideline the role of the protest events in shaping new political views, 
practices, and identities. Yet detailed analyses, such as Allal and Pierret’s 
(2013) collection, as well as those found in this book, highlight the relevance 
5 More broadly, scholars have increasingly challenged the social and economic categories 
commonly used to box in social players in explanations of a long structural undermining of 
authoritarianism (Tripp 2013; Amar 2013). 
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of the transformations of identities and their attendant practices for the 
emergence of revolutionary players in 2011. For example, in Syria, informal 
social networks were important, but new structures and behaviors emerged 
alongside these preexisting entities, as previously distinct networks merged 
into one another when the unrest and then conflict gained momentum 
(Leenders 2012; Leenders and Heydemann 2012).
Identities can and usually do change through strategic interactions. 
Repeatedly in the region, the common diagnostic and prognostic fram-
ing derived from Islamism required substantial reframing. Motivational 
framing through Islamist lenses lost some of its relevance during the 
uprisings and the early post-uprisings period, when transnational, armed 
Islamist networks were unable to impose themselves as leading politi-
cal players. This observation dovetails with accounts of armed Islamist 
mobilization produced before the uprisings that indicated how theories 
repeatedly prioritized the role of ideological framing at the expense of the 
role played by situational positioning and interactive processes of frame 
articulation (Snow and Byrd 2007). Other forms of Islamist motivational 
framing advocating electoral participation gained prominence, particularly 
in those situations of open multiparty competition, as in Tunisia. While 
cultural and political identities shaped protest in situations of rapid dein-
stitutionalization, these strategic rearticulations were themselves shaped 
by the trajectories of the protests. The 2011 uprisings did not take hold in 
Algeria because a sharp divide persisted between secularist and Islamist 
opponents of the regime, which was not in this case superseded by new 
protest identities (Volpi 2013).
Other cultural work has built on this basic idea of identities, showing how 
individuals are recruited via the right frames, how identities are sustained 
or redirected through new narratives, how friends and foes are built out of 
the raw materials of villains and victims and heroes. Even groups that claim 
to oppose collective identities deploy labels such as the 1% or the 99%. But 
identity work never ends, leaving identities forever open to contention. The 
very category of “Islamist movement” was reshaped after the uprisings as 
individuals and groups redefined what an Islamic identity meant in these 
new circumstances (Lacroix and Shalata 2016). The “Islamic identity” card 
could thus be played as much by pro-regime players as by different types 
of Islamist organizations to entice, frighten, or neutralize the competition.
If we can incorporate multifaceted accounts of players in our theories, 
we can better explain decision-making – and vice versa. Players are never 
entirely unif ied, homogenous actors. Even when they appear that way from 
the outside, when you look inside them they are arenas as well: places 
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with various procedures for disagreeing and for generating decisions. Every 
player can be analyzed into its subplayers – all the way down to individuals. 
An interactionist perspective can help us understand how meetings produce 
decisions, for which we need to know things such as who is at the meeting, 
who speaks, who is listened to, how leaders operate, and what affective 
loyalties are present (Haug 2013).
If the concept of arenas helps pull together some of the best structural 
insights, the concept of players draws on many cultural and interpretive 
insights. Arenas and players are constantly changing, often as the result of 
strategic efforts, but they offer enough stability at any time for us to use them 
in our explanations. (“Structures,” after all, are simply components that we 
choose to accept as f ixed for the purpose of our current explanation.) And 
their very transformations are something to be explained. But in the end, we 
need to put the players in motion, engaged with each other in various arenas.
Strategic Interaction
The shift from stable, inert structures to active players in changing arenas 
reflects a desire to build more dynamic models that reflect agency, choices, 
dilemmas, and contingency. Dozens of scholars have tried to push beyond 
static models, with varying degrees of success.
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) acknowledged the need for more 
dynamics in the political-opportunity approach by calling for “mecha-
nisms”: small causal links that, when triggered, f lip the situation from one 
state to another with predictable regularity. Chains of these mechanisms 
could be put together to explain broader processes or macro-level results 
such as revolutions. Unfortunately their use of mechanisms was widely 
criticized (e.g., Koopmans, 2003; Oliver, 2003; Taylor, 2003). Too many types 
of causes, ranging from the psychological to the macrolevel, were included, 
partly because the authors rejected the standard usage of a mechanism as 
dropping down to the psychological or social psychological level in order 
to explain institutional outcomes (Elster 1999; Hedström 2005, 8-9), prefer-
ring instead Merton’s treatment of mechanisms as middle range theory. In 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001), mechanisms remain mechanistic, lacking 
the contingency or nuance that most analysts seek.
Applying McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly to the Middle East, Beinin and Vairel 
(2011) gave priority to structural dimensions of arenas over players’ perspec-
tives. They conceptualized contexts comparatively as structured political 
cultures that shape interactions among players – be they workers’ unions, bar 
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associations, human rights networks, and so on. Regarding networks, and 
particularly informal networks and processes of micromobilization, they 
deemphasized the role of hierarchical structure and cost-benefit analysis 
for individuals. Contentious practices rested on the logics of action and the 
logics of situation during exchanges between regime and opposition that led 
to the construction and utilization of particular repertoires of contention. 
But despite Beinin and Vairel’s best efforts to deal with the limitations of 
the Dynamics of Contention framework, this theoretical framing imposed 
a structuralist slant on their examinations of regional contexts, networks, 
and practices. Beinin and Vairel embraced Kurzman’s (2004a) suggestion to 
take protesters’ beliefs seriously, but they limited themselves to articulated 
beliefs. Yet, not only voiced beliefs but also emotional states associated for 
example with anger, fear, revenge, or confusion can directly shape action.
The Arab uprisings generated arenas of contention in which, instead 
of prestructured players interacting with state players under a known set 
of rules and expectations, unstable situations encouraged both anti- and 
proregime players to redefine their tactics, strategies, and identities. In this 
light, Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule (2012) suggested a reconsideration of the 
relationship between structural and interactionist factors in explanations of 
social processes in the region. This changing regional context favored those 
perspectives giving a more salient role to framing and prioritizing players’ 
(micro) views over structural (macro) conditions (Kurzman 2008, 2012).
Strategic tradeoffs, dilemmas, and decisions force players into choice 
points in some cases, or encourage them to actively ignore options at other 
points, as game theory observes. But few political engagements can be 
summed up accurately in neat games with clear endpoints, from which 
decision-makers can calculate backwards. Instead, politics is an endless 
series of actions and reactions, so subtle and complex that players only 
anticipate one or two moves ahead. Prediction is almost impossible, unin-
tended outcomes are always present. A number of scholars have called for 
an interactionist and strategic alternative (Oliver 2003; Maney et al. 2012).
Duyvendak and Fillieule (2015) refer to the players and arenas framework 
as the “strategic interaction paradigm,” in order to highlight its moving 
parts: individuals, compound players, rules and expectations, physical 
arenas, other settings, the actions that lead to other actions, and so on 
down long chains. It is a “dispositionist interactionism,” they say, since 
it recognizes the cultural baggage that players carry with them. They do 
not begin each interaction from scratch, subject only to the def inition of 
the situation that emerges or which is imposed by the various players. 
Individuals are key players, partly independent of the organizations to 
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which they belong and capable of long and complex careers outside those 
organizations (Fillieule 2010). This argument dovetails with Dobry’s (2009) 
theory of f luid conjunctures, which examines the repositioning of actors 
and practices within preexisting structures during crises. Personal and 
institutional histories do matter, but crisis situations are precisely moments 
when such baggage can be reoriented toward different objectives – past 
experiences and practices are not so much negated or forgotten, as they 
are put to new uses.
The interactionist perspective answers what we might call the “Kurzman 
challenge.” In a book on Iran, Kurzman (2004b) assessed the dominant 
theories of revolution – political, organizational, cultural, economic, and 
military – and found them all wanting, even in combination. They all posited 
initial conditions from which analysts – retrospectively – believed that the 
1979 revolution followed. Instead, the revolutionary movement created its 
own conditions for success out of a mass of confusion, in particular building a 
sense of itself as a viable political player that could and would win. By digging 
into participants’ own points of view, Kurzman could see how this viability 
was created, and how the movement created the organizational, political, and 
other factors that it needed for success. He even mentions that emotions and 
strategic choices were part of this story (Kurzman 2004b, 169). Revolutions 
and other political outcomes must be traced through micro-level, cultural, 
and strategic interactions, because initial conditions are never enough.6
Culture and Emotions
We have suggested several ways that the new interactive approach must 
take seriously the points of view of players, reinforcing the role of culture 
and psychology. Players act through their cultural lenses and expectations 
and a variety of emotions. We saw the crucial role of collective identities in 
forming players and guiding their actions. Innumerable social-movement 
scholars have also examined frames and framing processes, stories and 
narratives, and a wealth of other carriers of meaning (for a summary see 
Jasper 2007). Social psychologists have reasserted the importance of motiva-
tional processes, long banished by the structural school (Klandermans 1997; 
Pinard 2011; Jasper 2017). Culture has been rethought as knowledge and tools 
6 For a similar anti-structural argument see Jasper (1990), who argues that nuclear agencies 
and industries in France managed to create the very conditions that were then used to justify 
the country’s nuclear commitment.
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that change in response to circumstances (and help players react), rather 
than a f ixed set of traditions – as a much-criticized orientalist tradition once 
viewed culture in the Middle East (Lockman 2004; Volpi 2010). Decisions 
are very much part of culture, as are emotions.
An older view of emotions dismissed them as irrational upwellings from 
deep inside individuals that tend to derail coordinated or sustained actions. 
Recent research demonstrates that most of the time, instead, emotions 
help us continue paths of action and cherished projects. They shape our 
goals as well as the actions taken to obtain them. They attach us to allies 
and tie us into social networks (although those networks may discourage 
political activity as well as enable it). In the form of moods they give us the 
energy to participate (or take that energy away). Emotions connect us to our 
physical and social worlds as well as to our own bodies. Our emotions send 
signals to ourselves and to others about how well we are doing in relation 
to our projects and values. Emotions are a good example of open-ended, 
micro-level mechanisms (Elster 1999; Jasper 2018).
As traditional repertoires of contention break down in arenas charac-
terized by unusual interactions between players, emotions can become 
in specif ic locations and at specif ic times an important element in the 
reconstruction of new repertoires of action. This does not mean that protes-
tors in those arenas are abnormal players, rather that emotionally grounded 
action corresponds to a possible logic of action (Pearlman 2013). During the 
Arab uprisings, interactions between regimes and demonstrators repeatedly 
facilitated the emergence of arenas of contestation in which these responses 
seemed appropriate. From the riots that followed Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
in Tunisia to the armed clashes in Libya’s Benghazi, ad hoc violence by 
pro- and anti-regime players surprised by the turn of events escalated the 
confrontation and created new repertoires of contention (Volpi 2017).
Jon Elster (1999) uses emotions as mechanisms to get at choices and 
uncertainty. Emotional pathways may have several possible directions: a 
small number, but not an inf inite number. Traced carefully, we can under-
stand the emotional steps taken to action, to interaction, and eventually to 
broader outcomes. By watching individuals interact with each other, and 
by understanding the psychological makeup they carry with them to those 
encounters, we can understand the interactions better without lapsing into 
overly determinate models.
The study of gender has been closely tied to that of culture, in that 
masculinities and femininities are deeply cultural and emotional, as well 
as obviously embodied. Extensive work on the gender dynamics of Western 
movements has been adapted to the Arab awakening. Women activists often 
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play different roles in movements than men, for instance keeping social 
networks and communities intact or bridging between networks (Al-Ali 
2012; Salime 2011). Women’s bodies often become a target for repression and 
violence (Johansson-Nogués 2013; Hafez 2014). The status of women can also 
be taken as an indicator of Westernization and liberalization – whether 
that is framed as a good or a bad thing (Sjoberg and Whooley 2015). Glib 
theories of frustrated masculinity, according to Paul Amar (2011), have been 
used to simplify and dismiss much of the protest, in an orientalist echo of 
crowd theories that leapt too easily from deep psychological motivations to 
collective action. In practice, women’s networks, as complex players, have 
developed complex interactions over time with pro- and anti-regime actors; 
and the Arab uprisings provided new opportunities and constraints for 
these players to strategically engage with new social and political processes 
in order to achieved multilayered objectives (Khalil 2015).
Players and arenas, identities and tactics, decisions and emotions, all 
set in a cultural perspective that acknowledges how we attribute meaning 
to the world around us and act by means of those meanings: this is a new 
explanatory sensibility that has emerged in Europe and the United States 
in the last decade or two (Jasper 2010, 2012). It thrives on micro-level details, 
but it can also deal with macro-level players, arenas, and outcomes. Like any 
new perspective, it allows us to rethink the concepts of the older structural 
paradigm without losing its insights.
The Cultural-Strategic Rethinking of Structure
The cultural-strategic vision does not reject the insights of older theories, 
but incorporates them by reimagining the entities and processes about 
which they taught us so much (Jasper 2007, 89-95). We can begin with 
crowds, which were once dismissed as automatic mechanisms for dema-
gogues to impose their will on participants, but which we can now see as 
extended interactions that express cultural understandings but also allow 
the creation or reinforcement of emotions such as indignation. Gatherings 
and other events such as protests have their own open-ended, interactive 
logics that represent an alternative to the overly organizational models of 
the structural paradigm (Oliver 1989; Collins 2004).
Networks once seemed the paradigm of the “mobilizing structures” that 
allow movements to form (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). But networks 
include emotions and cultural meanings, which they help to transmit; in 
many cases these are more important than a movement’s ideology in drawing 
28 JAMes M. JAsper And Frédéric Volpi 
recruits (Munson 2009). Plus a new appreciation of agency suggests that new 
networks can be created when necessary. Bloc recruitment and biographical 
availability, other factors that were given a structural interpretation, also 
depend on considerable cultural work: having young children is a constraint 
on some potential recruits, but others bring their kids as part of their perfor-
mance. Bloc recruitment depends on persuading the leaders of those blocs, 
such as religious leaders with loyal congregations (which represent almost 
the only examples of bloc recruitment). Even those Islamist networks that 
had previously been seen as the main orchestrators of contentious politics 
in the Arab world showed their limitations during the Arab uprisings, as 
anti-regime mobilization repeatedly bypassed them (Clarke 2014).
In the structural vision, resources were taken as hard and fast; even 
their distribution was largely assumed to be given. But of course a large 
part of strategy is to mobilize resources, especially to grab resources from 
the other side whenever possible. Although describing soccer hooligans 
f ighting the police, Buford (1991, 291) shows how easily many resources can 
be rethought and repurposed.
One inspired little scientist discovered that, with such a strong Mediter-
ranean breeze coming off the port, he had only to step to one side of the 
brown cloud issuing from the canister on the pavement, grab it from 
behind – as if picking up a lobster – and throw it back at the very people 
who had f ired it at him. It was like a revelation inverted: in an instant, 
the canister lost its mystery and power. It also lost all signif icance, except 
one: it became a new thing to throw at the police.
During the 2011 Libyan uprisings most dramatically, as crowds overwhelmed 
local security forces in many locations in the east of the country, protestors 
found themselves in possession of the military arsenals left behind. The 
weapons that the Kaddafi regime had stockpiled throughout the country 
became an important resource for the protestors as unrest turned into more 
systematic armed confrontation between the regime and its opponents.
Repression often seems like a structural factor, based on available re-
sources. In the case of Egypt, how could billions of dollars in US military aid 
not constrain the protestors of 2011? This seems like an obvious background 
condition, continued for decades both before the Arab uprisings and after 
el-Sisi’s coup. Yet there are several problems with this apparently structural 
constraint. First, any army’s possession of extensive weaponry still requires 
a decision to put it to use before there is direct coercion (although there may 
be some threat of coercion, but even in that case the army must decide to 
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parade its tanks and troops through the streets). Decisions to use or not to 
use resources are strategic, not structural.
Repressive actions by state security forces are also, like protest actions, 
susceptible to the situational logic of particular episodes of contention 
(with all their emotional responses and contingencies within the chain 
of command). It may well be that some security apparatuses are generally 
more structured and functional than others, but that does not guarantee 
that they will effectively repress an uprising of a kind they have never faced 
before (Goodwin 2011). Most retrospective explanations of why the Tunisian 
and Egyptian military behaved as they did involve rationalization of the 
behavior of the different players in order to make the outcome appear the 
most rational course of action for all those involved.
In addition, sophisticated military hardware is not especially relevant 
to the repression of protest. Egypt may have the largest, best equipped 
military in the Arab world, but it does not need all that equipment to put 
down protestors. An air force of F-16 f ighter jets is unlikely to be used 
against Egyptian civilians. Out of desperation both Kaddaf i and Assad 
indeed used f ighter jets against their own populations, but these – at least 
at f irst – proved blunt instruments that discredited the regime as much 
as they cowed protestors. Almost all states are capable of killing peaceful 
protestors if they wish; they do not need advanced weapons from the US, 
Russia, or other international munitions producers. Only when those protes-
tors develop into armed insurgents and protest events into a civil conflict, 
processes that take time, does the balance of arms begin to matter.
Structures don’t do much by themselves; they always depend on cultural 
understandings and strategic decisions. These understandings and strate-
gies can be emotionally induced and coincidental, especially in situations of 
severe deinstitutionalization, when a lack of reflexivity does not make them 
any less consequential. Even the most structured arenas can be changed 
and interpreted. Resources can be captured or repurposed. Only through 
dynamic, interactive, and micro-level models can we fully grasp how this 
happens.
Back to the Macro Level
The challenge for a cultural-strategic approach, or any approach grounded 
in micro-level interactions, is how to “scale up” to broad outcomes such 
as national movements, regime changes, and policy impacts. Ideally we 
would trace long chains of interactions. For protestors, these might begin 
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with conversations around kitchen tables, move to exchanges between 
neighbors, proceed out into the streets, and then on to central sites like 
Tahrir Square. We would love to trace similar sequences for the police 
and militaries: from a private conversation among commanders to their 
instructions to the troops, and on out to the engagements on the streets. And 
with politicians: from private interactions to public debates, and f inally to 
parliamentary or executive decisions. We would follow compound players 
back and forth as they turn into arenas making choices, then as they try to 
implement those choices in their engagements with other players.
So much for the ideal. Methodologically, there are a lot of interactions to 
which we will never have access; all strategic players have some moments 
they wish to keep secret. State players have great advantages in doing so. 
This is why it is so easy to reduce them to black-box structures, a bit mysteri-
ous from the outside. But we should not make a methodological limitation 
into a theoretical assumption.
Social science offers two shortcut methods for linking the micro to the 
macro. The more common is to aggregate the microactions. Market prices 
result from many, many individual transactions, providing a model for 
economists to understand all sorts of social outcomes and to describe 
paradoxes in which those outcomes are not the intent of any of the players. 
Voting is also a form of aggregation, although in this case with rules and 
resources that generate a macro-level outcome. Most often, social scientists 
must sample some population to get the raw materials they need to ag-
gregate; this is the point of surveys for instance. Such techniques usually 
assume that the individuals are interchangeable, or that their idiosyncrasies 
average out in the aggregate. They are not so good at grasping the influence 
of salient symbolic and decisive individuals or events.
The second solution is to insert microdynamics into structural models 
through scope. When George W. Bush decided to go to war against Saddam 
Hussein, a great deal then happened in both their countries (and others) 
due to their organizational positions, which allowed both men to direct 
resources and personnel to pursue their projects. Although there needs 
to be a structural component in our strategic story, the story begins with 
a tiny group of individuals talking with one another in a small number 
of meetings: Bush, Cheney, and a handful of advisors (a shockingly small 
number, for such a momentous decision).7
7 An astute reviewer for the press pointed out the long history of US involvement in the region 
as a key structural factor. But Bush had to decide how (and perhaps whether) to continue that 
tradition. Another president – Clinton or Obama – might have made a very different decision.
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The implementation of their decisions also occurred through a chain 
of personal interactions in several government agencies, in several armed 
forces, and within those forces, at the level of each corps, division, brigade, 
company, and platoon. Sometimes it is useful for an analyst to assume that 
organizational structures will respond the way they are supposed to, but in 
some cases it is not. Regime change during the Arab uprisings was precisely 
the result of these “dysfunctions” within various chains of command (mili-
tary, political, and so on). A full explanation would cover how compliance 
is achieved or not achieved, by following the chains of microinteractions 
(which for methodological reasons we may need to sample selectively).
The Chapters to Follow
In the f irst chapter, John Chalcraft addresses the question the volume 
poses about the configuration of new, “revolutionary” actors: their origins, 
emergence, identities, goals, practices, interactions, relative stability, and 
structure. The chapter makes a pitch for the relevance of a form of appropria-
tion called “piracy”: the unruly, translocal, and often cross-border appropria-
tion of “unpatented” contentious ideas in triggering, shaping, and fortifying 
the mobilizing projects of early riser activists. The chapter considers some 
central forms of appropriation across borders in the Arab uprisings of 2011, 
including frames, such as bread, dignity, and freedom; identities, such as 
that of the rights-bearing people; goals, such as overthrowing the regime; 
networked styles of organizing; and strategies and tactics, such as continuous 
occupations and pitched battles with police. It argues that piracy offers new 
lines of collective action for those undergoing hegemonic disincorporation, 
bringing – amid uncertainty and risk – a guide to mobilization, a basis of 
cohesion amid new connections, and an asymmetric strategy for new and 
previously fragmented and weak collective actors. Piracy of this kind has a 
long history in the Middle East and North Africa. Chalcraft challenges more 
structural studies of diffusion, faulting them for their overly mechanistic fo-
cus on media of transmission, and their use of metaphors rooted in economic 
forms of causation. The piracy metaphor draws attention to political explana-
tory logics and mechanisms, and brings into clearer view the importance 
of unruly appropriation (including search, seizure, and translation), and 
the role played by the situated political struggles of adopters. In so doing, 
it can help explain the velocity, selectivity, many-headed-ness, and utility 
of the translocal life of contentious ideas, and shed new light on the rapid 
constitution of new and transgressive collective actors.
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In Chapter 2, Jillian Schwedler examines the anti-Israeli protests at the 
Kaluti mosque before and after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, in order 
to bring to light dimensions of the protests that are often overlooked in 
situations of regime stability. In one reading, the low turnout for the Million 
Man March might be read as evidence for the failure of a mass uprising to 
emerge in Jordan. But in another reading, that event was part of a set of 
protests that, although small, did considerable political work other than 
to just pressure the regime to change a policy. This chapter examines the 
latter reading. In the first section, the chapter briefly examines how scholars 
study protests in general and the Arab uprisings in particular. It illustrates 
how attention to micropractices can reveal political work done through 
protests that is often overlooked by analytic frameworks that prioritize 
generic questions pertaining to social movements or uprisings. The chapter 
then turns to the specif ic dynamics of the Kaluti protests that took place 
prior to the 2011 uprising, paying close attention to the interactions between 
various participants and security agencies over the course of the protests. 
Having attended 21 such protests, Schwedler is able to identify routines as 
well as innovations, and to share insights from participants about what 
they understand to be happening. Finally, the chapter examines the post-
uprising Kaluti protests, noting few innovations or deviations from the 
familiar script until July 2014, more than three years after the uprisings 
began. By focusing on the microdynamics of a limited set of protests, the 
chapter reveals the ways in which protests can do a wide range of political 
work, beyond that of building a movement, making a claim against a regime 
(or some other power), or, on the part of the state, displaying a willingness 
to either permit or repress dissent.
In Chapter 3, Frédéric Volpi shows how political revolutions can generate 
revolutionary actors. In Tunisia, a highly visible aspect of grassroots activ-
ism after the 2011 Arab uprising was Salaf i religious, social, and political 
mobilization. Ansar al-Sharia (AST), a movement with no previous history 
as a mass-based organization, became a serious challenger for both state 
institutions and established social movements. The chapter traces how 
new individual and collective identities crystallized into a religious and 
political activism, which broke down after a couple of years when the 
new Tunisian regime declared AST a terrorist organization. It investigates 
Ansar al-Sharia f irst as a player competing against other social and political 
players to shape arenas of contention and governance in post-uprising 
Tunisia, and second as an arena of contention over the meaning and practice 
of Tunisian Salaf ism. Between 2011 and 2013, AST embodied a tentative 
consolidation of new identities and contentious practices during an episode 
introdUc tion 33
of deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization of the Tunisian state. 
This process and its outcomes were not “predefined” by already existing 
Salafi discourses and practices, and their (in)compatibility with democratic 
institutions. Instead, the interactions between the grassroots sympathizers 
inspired by a “revolutionary” praxis and more established Salaf i leaders 
made it diff icult for the cadres of the movement to impose a political 
discipline. In turn, this set of interactions increased over time the level of 
the strategic confrontations between AST and other players of the Tunisian 
democratic transition. Finally, the strategic confrontation between pro-
state players seeking to entrench the formal arena of a liberal-democratic 
political order and AST players challenging these state-imposed boundaries 
eventually led to the collapse of AST as a unitary player.
In Chapter 4, Wendy Pearlman illustrates that while structural factors 
were critical in shaping the motivations and opportunities that drove Syr-
ians to revolt, we must also examine localized decisions and actions to 
understand when, where, and how the uprising began. Original interviews 
with participants in the f irst mass street demonstration in Daraa, Syria 
offers a complement to structural models, making three contributions 
to understanding revolts. First, scrutiny of decisions in context reveals 
how easily they can be derailed, calling attention to the consequential 
contingency infusing events. Second, scrutiny of sequences of actions 
reveals both premeditation and spontaneity, the relative roles of which 
are puzzling under repressive regimes that make prior planning for protest 
both more diff icult and more necessary. Third, examination of participants’ 
understandings of their own choices uncovers the microfoundations of 
macropolitical phenomena, illustrating the varied ways that instrumental 
rationality, values, and emotions guide behavior.
In Chapter 5, Youssef El Chazli shows that, while revolutions might well 
be national events, they still emerge from locally constructed conf igura-
tions. Understanding what happened in Egypt in early 2011 requires us 
to look at local strategic interactions between different actors (protes-
tors, political parties, security apparatuses, and “ordinary people”), and 
not only in the capital city Cairo. The case of Egypt’s “second capital,” 
Alexandria, is of great interest in this respect. During the year 2010, it 
witnessed a protest dynamic that was quite different from Cairo’s, and 
was recognized afterwards as one of the main “revolutionary cities.” By 
delving into the bundles of interactions between the different actors 
in the lead up to January 2011, we can see how a decentered approach 
focusing on local interactions in the “periphery” provides an alternative 
story about political crises and revolutions; about their contingency and 
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indeterminacy; and how tactics, strategies, and actions result from these 
various interactions.
In the f inal chapter, Farhad Khosrokhavar investigates how Arab revo-
lutions promoted nonviolence (selmiyah) and the dignity of the citizen 
(karama) at their outset. These mottoes were formulated in gestures that 
involved body language, slogans, collective “emotionalism,” and attempts 
at building new concrete communities, especially at Tahrir Square. These 
mottoes could not resist the violence of the Deep State, the intolerance 
of the revolutionary actors, and geopolitics (with the exception of Tuni-
sia). The chapter analyzes violence during the transitional period, from 
the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011 to the el-Sisi takeover in 2013, 
stressing the signif icance of affects, in situ actions and reactions, and 
the effervescent atmosphere of the demonstrations and sit ins. During 
this period, violence resulted as much from the moods from below as 
the widening gap between the larger society and the newly empowered 
Muslim Brotherhood.
Charles Kurzman concludes the book by contrasting the cold, simplif ied 
explanations that social science offers for shocking moments like the Arab 
uprisings with the lived experience of those making them. We do not always 
know how to put all the small pieces together, but we cannot ignore them. 
People have emotions, make decisions, and try to make sense of the world 
around them. In the process, they create that world.
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Abstract
This chapter argues for the relevance of piracy – the unruly, translocal 
and cross-border appropriation of “unpatented” models for contentious 
mobilization – in triggering, shaping and fortifying the mobilizing pro-
jects of early-riser activists. The chapter considers some central forms of 
piracy, undertaken by dissenting constituencies undergoing hegemonic 
disincorporation, in the Arab uprisings of 2011. Piracy brings amid un-
certainty and risk a guide to mobilization, a basis of cohesion amid new 
connections, and an asymmetric strategy for previously fragmented and/
or weak actors. The chapter challenges standard studies of diffusion, 
faulting them for hydraulic and/or economistic approaches. Piracy can 
help explain the velocity, selectivity, many-headed-ness, and force of the 
translocal life of contentious ideas, shedding light on the rapid constitu-
tion of transgressive collective actors.
Keywords: piracy, appropriation, transgressive mobilization, Arab upris-
ings, diffusion
“What are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but Loose-Fish?”
– Herman Melville, Moby-Dick
The Egyptian economist and public intellectual Galal Amin came unusually 
close to predicting the Arab uprisings of 2011. Nonetheless, in his first substan-
tial publication after Mubarak’s fall, even he placed considerable emphasis 
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on the fact that Egypt had “surprised itself” in the upsurge (Amin 2011). What 
was at stake in 2011 was not the incremental development of a tried and tested 
protest repertoire, but a more radical discontinuity. How can we explain and 
understand the rapid and relatively sudden appearance of new collective 
actions by subordinated groups? In the case of the Arab uprisings of 2011, how 
can we account for the temporary coming together of a forceful collective 
agent identifiable as a rights-bearing sovereign people seeking to bring down 
the regime, an agent-in-becoming that was associated and partially defined 
by various ideas, goals, and practices that were in some significant degree 
innovative: the secular slogans of bread, dignity and freedom, the goal of 
regime overthrow, decentralized modes of organizing, unarmed but forceful, 
institutionally disruptive action, swarming tactics to generate crowds, pitched 
battles against police, and the continuous occupations of vital public space 
(Chalcraft 2012; Gunning and Zvi Baron 2013; Ismail 2012; Tripp 2015).
The social constructionist turn in social movement theory has increas-
ingly taken up questions of agency and innovation (Jasper 2007; Jasper 
and Duyvendak 2015; Klandermans 1997; Kurzman 2004, 2012; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). One promising line of enquiry looks for answers 
in the study of “diffusion”: the origination, circulation, and appropriation, 
especially cross-nationally, of ideas, models and practices relevant to col-
lective action (Beissinger 2007; Chabot 2000; Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; 
McAdam and Rucht 1993; Snow and Benford 1999; Strang and Soule 1998). 
Paying particular attention to the case of Egypt, this chapter pursues this 
line of investigation, building on these studies while challenging some of 
their basic modes of description and explanation.
While the diffusion model has already been criticized for its linearity 
and Eurocentrism (Chabot 2000), this chapter suggests that the diffusion 
model in regards to the study of transgressive mobilization is neither ap-
propriate nor unitary, and argues that we can usefully move beyond it 
altogether, referring to the social life rather than the diffusion of contentious 
ideas. This usage draws our attention to how social subjects in particular 
settings come to give value to, and actively appropriate, ideas. The chapter 
argues, further, that we can better understand this social life by thinking 
less in terms of media infrastructure, similarity attribution, and broker-
age, metaphors and concepts which suffer from economism, sociological 
determinism, and descriptiveness, and more in terms of piracy. A focus 
on piracy, understood as involving unruly forms of ideational translocal 
appropriation, can enrich our understanding of how models for collective 
action cross national borders, and thus of how new collective actors are 
assembled in relatively rapid, powerful and partially spontaneous ways.
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Piracy
“Piracy” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the action of com-
mitting robbery, kidnap, or violence at sea or from the sea without lawful 
authority”; it is also defined as “the unauthorized reproduction or use of an 
invention or work of another.” Benedict Anderson (2006) famously argues that 
nationalism after the late eighteenth century became modular, abstracted as 
a guide for action, and available for appropriation on the global stage in widely 
differing political, social and economic contexts. In much of Anderson’s work, 
print capitalism and the colonial state act as sociological “surrogate parents” 
for the appropriation of ideas and deep horizontal ties involved in nation-ness. 
Anderson was eventually to suggest that such forms of prior sociological 
determination were not always necessary. In the afterword to the third edi-
tion of his book, Anderson considered the pattern of transnational diffusion 
and translation of the book itself. He conceived this pattern metaphorically 
as piracy, in the second sense noted above. There was, he conceded, no patent 
on his book, and “local initiative, rather than external coercion or slavish 
imitation” governed the process of translation, initiatives that were taken 
amid situated and diverse political struggles. One of his examples of such 
appropriation touched on Middle East studies, as it involved the prominent 
Palestinian-Israeli politician and commentator, Azmi Bishara, who wrote the 
introduction to an edition of the book, a publication motivated by opposi-
tion to the “slide toward apartheid” in a “Likud-ruled” state (Anderson 2006, 
228-229). Anderson was to conclude that amid these unruly appropriations, 
Imagined Communities was “not my book any more” (p. 235). In some sense, 
the book’s own intellectual model had taken on a life of its own.
The term “piracy” implies that the connections involved in the social life 
of models for collective action, especially those of intense interest and those 
forged at moments of high risk and deinstitutionalization, are made by pro-
tagonists, they are not just found in transmission infrastructures, or caused 
by market logics or prior sociological determinations. The first sense of piracy 
as defined above is also suggested, at least metaphorically. Just as pirates 
acquire their booty by heading toward established shipping routes, and insist 
in an unscheduled, risky, and unauthorized way on forging a connection 
with existing and routinized forms of circulation, and go on to ransack 
items under circulation for their own purposes, so too are connections made 
between challengers and existing networks of communications and the ideas 
circulating therein in unauthorized, variable and discontinuous ways. Ap-
propriators, like pirates, use existing networks of communication, but their 
actions and purposes are not dictated by them. Their logic is unauthorized 
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and unruly. Their actions run according to logics not determined by off icial 
rules, communication and transport infrastructures, or institutions.
The relevant mechanisms are the inverse of those at work in the “micro-
mobilization tasks and processes” delineated by Snow and his coauthors 
for preestablished social movement organizations in the latter’s strategic 
attempts to align their frames, interests, and goals with previously unmo-
bilized constituencies and thus win adherence and participation (Snow et 
al. 1986, 464). The logics relevant to piracy and unruly translocal appropria-
tion are not those stemming from the interests and tasks of preestablished 
collective actors, but those involved in the making of collective actors that 
do not previously exist or are only latent in the cracks and tensions of 
existing forms of structure. The idea of piracy can help to capture some 
aspect of this “creative ontology.”1
When activists seized the initiative in the Arab uprisings, and when 
ordinary people came onto the streets, driven by a wide variety of material 
and ideal interests, people were put into new relationships with one another, 
for which there were no routines and rules. In a sense, they were suddenly 
living like pirates. Ordinary hierarchies and social conventions were put to 
one side, and commonsense notions of space and place were shocked and 
even broken. The hybrid and motley social associations and recombinations 
that were now enacted, where Copts and Muslims, for example, demon-
strated side by side, are redolent in some respects of the “multinational, 
multicultural, and multiracial” formations familiar to historians of pirate 
ships (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000, 164). The search for new forms of au-
tonomy, “dignity” and “freedom,” familiar also in pirate forms of shipboard 
egalitarianism, established against the hierarchies of navy and commerce, 
was now on (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000, 162-173; Rediker 2004, 60-82). 
Under these conditions, where social action lost its customary guides, new 
appropriations and guides for action were sought out as routes from injustice, 
and voraciously appropriated. These models helped now to inspire and guide 
the action, altering like railway switchmen, in the Weberian analogy, the 
tracks on which action was pushed by the dynamic of interest.
A Very Active Search
Actors engaged in piracy are understood here as having latent, enduring, 
socially established reasons to act. They are understood to be possessed 
1 I credit this phrase to my PhD student, Jann Lohmann.
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of a strong sense of injustice and to be experiencing powerful, shared 
feelings of dissent. For a variety of reasons, their relationships to existing 
structures of power and authority are full of tension. They are not “like 
rich men dwelling at peace within their habitations” (Churchill, cited in 
Chomsky 1997, 5). They are expected to feel that transacted politics and 
established authorities are corrupted and incapable of tackling the injus-
tices they feel. It is likely that they also experience established forms of 
contained contention as inadequate. As some Bahrainis declared on the 
eve of 2011, “anger and frustration is [sic] boiling among us all” (Bahrain 
Online, February 2011, cited in Shehabi and Jones 2015, 3). In Egypt, diverse 
constituencies held strong grievances in the late 2000s: industrial workers 
opposed deteriorating wages and the attrition of the corporatist bargain, 
women faced discrimination and harassment, civil servants organized 
against public sector cuts, the urban survivalist poor faced rising prices, 
corruption and official indifference and violence, pan-Arab, pro-Palestinian 
or local nationalists were disappointed with Mubarak’s craven stance on 
the regional stage, educated youth chafed against political exclusion and 
human rights abuses, while repressed Islamists fought rigged elections, and 
football fans wrestled with police (Chalcraft 2014; Al-Aswany 2010). This 
chapter views the relevant feelings of injustice, even though they may be 
passionate and even angry, not in terms of male frustration-aggression (Gurr 
1968), but in terms of a socially established tension between is and ought 
that distances subjects from existing structures of power and engages the 
normative and political imagination, propelling a search for alternatives. 
Like pirates, scattered and dissenting constituencies are disincorporated 
from existing hegemonic structures and alienated from existing forms of 
contained contention. The tension in view is an unruly latency that acts 
as an enabling condition for new forms of collective action: a “situational 
causal mechanism” (Hedström and Swedberg 1998) with an indeterminate 
outcome (Elster 1998). “Something must be done” is one common sentiment, 
but what can possibly be done, especially in the face of a lack of adequate 
mobilizing structures, inspirational frames, plausible opportunities, and 
existing repertoires.
Paying attention to the motivations engendered in situations of hegem-
onic disincorporation provides an explanation for why actors engage in a 
search to make a wide variety of “attributions of similarity,” attributions 
which may be highly contested in a given situation. Diffusion models have 
studied how model transmission requires as a condition some kind of at-
tribution of similarity between receiver and transmitter. The explanation 
suggests, with some plausibility, that movement actors imagine that “we 
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are like them and therefore let us do as they do.” Such commonalities might 
be actual or perceived. They may be rooted in identity, “we are women,” 
“Arabs,” “Muslims,” and so on, or in occupational and professional posi-
tions, or a location in some kind of relatively formalized state-based or 
institutional hierarchy. This approach, however, can become tautological, 
insofar as connections require similar conditions or attributions by defini-
tion, and therefore such attributions or conditions are not separable from 
the phenomenon they are supposed to explain. Beyond this, the approach 
can be worrisomely arbitrary in terms of the preexisting commonalities it 
posits as explanatory, and remains indeterminate as a causal mechanism, 
especially in revolutionary or potentially revolutionary situations, as such 
similarities may or may not come into being, or they may change over 
time in form or content. We are still permitted to ask what drives and 
motivates attributions of similarity, especially insofar as certain actors 
are motivated to do it, and others are not. We note that during the Arab 
uprisings of 2011, guardians of the status quo insisted that every country was 
different, that there was no reason to think that Egypt was like Tunisia, or 
that Syria was like Bahrain, while those determined to seize the moment 
asserted exactly the contrary. These different parties had different reasons 
to insist on similarity and dissimilarity. In short, processes of hegemonic 
disincorporation, engendering an active search for new forms of collective 
action, rather than either preexisting, static conditions of similarity, or self-
propelled or purely agentic attributions of similarity, are an important part 
of the explanation, focusing attention on basic motivations for translocal 
ideational appropriation.
Seizure and Appropriation
On January 14, 2011, when Tunisia’s long-standing strongman president, Zin 
Al-Din Ben Ali, fell from power, a new model of collective action became 
available for pirating. Mass protest by ordinary people had brought down 
a president-for-life (Owen 2012). This was a model that was not owned or 
controlled by its own inventors. It was now a “loose,” not a “fast-f ish” in the 
striking language of Herman Melville’s classic novel, Moby-Dick. A fast-f ish 
referred to a whale connected by a harpoon-line to a ship that by sea-faring 
custom now had ownership rights over the whale. A loose-fish was a fugitive 
whale that had been pursued but was not attached by a line to any given 
ship, and thus was no one’s property by right. Across the region, sectors 
undergoing disincorporation were suddenly offered dramatic inspiration 
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in regards to a possible escape route. They set out in hot pursuit of this 
loose-f ish. The model was seized on and appropriated by dissenters to serve 
in their own local and situated political struggles. Other sectors, invested 
in the status quo, particular regimes, or prof it streams, took completely 
different views of this loose-fish: for Saudi Arabia, it was a form of subversion 
carried on by malcontents that threatened its monopoly on correct Islamic 
polity; for Iran, a new assertion of Islam; for Israel, a potential threat to its 
security and its ideological claim to be the only democracy in the region; 
for some in the United States, an attractive movement that was nonethe-
less a contagion that could upset markets and cut against US strategic 
alliances (Al-Rasheed 2014; Ayoob 2014; Shlaim 2014; Quandt 2014). This 
section argues that diffusion is too passive, slow-moving, technocratic, and 
infrastructural a metaphor for the active and unruly processes of seizure 
and appropriation at work in translocal appropriation.
Diffusion referred to a specif ic phenomenon in natural sciences long 
before sociology took it on:
The Latin word “diffundere” means “to spread out.” Depositing a droplet 
of ink in a basin of water without stirring gives a simple demonstration of 
diffusion. After a few hours the colour will have spread a few millimetres 
and after several days the solution will be uniformly coloured. Diffusion 
is caused by the Brownian motion of atoms or molecules that leads to 
complete mixing. (Mehrer and Stolwijk 2009, 2)
The basic idea is that a particular group of particles, whether of a liquid, 
a gas, or even a solid, undergo diffusion insofar as although initially of a 
high concentration, they increasingly become less concentrated in their 
surrounding environment, until they are completely mixed with it, as a 
result of Brownian motion operating to overcome over time a differential 
concentration gradient.
The notion of diffusion was taken up in sociology to explain policy in-
novation. In this version, diffusion proceeds from stage to stage among 
decision-makers until an innovation is either implemented or rejected. 
The f irst stage involves actors becoming aware of the existence of an in-
novation, and seeking knowledge about it. The second involves persuasion, 
whereby receivers interact with interpersonal networks and trustworthy 
opinion leaders, learning more about positive and negative attributes of the 
innovation. The third is the decision stage, involving adoption or rejection. 
The fourth is implementation, where innovations are translated into actual 
practice, and may be adapted and reinvented in the process. The f inal stage 
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involves conf irmation, where actors reevaluate whether the innovation 
meets expectations and decide to prolong or discontinue it (Rogers 1995). 
The relationship of this model to the natural science model of diffusion as 
Brownian motion and molecular gradient, we note, is fairly remote. The 
policy model posits instead stages of purposive adoption and decision-
making in regards to innovation, with an eye on procedure and eff iciency. 
In general this refers to a methodical, highly rational, policy-relevant, 
monitorialist, and technocratic kind of behavior, where the time, resources, 
and information available to adopters are abundant. In some variants of the 
model, unsurprisingly, the institutional positions and structural similarities 
of receivers and transmitters play an important role. Adopters during the 
Arab uprisings were not established actors in structured institutional posi-
tions formulating policy, or testing new drugs, however. Their activities were 
high risk. Time, capital and technological resources, along with detailed, 
expert, statistical and technical information, of the kind envisaged in the 
policy model, were not available. Moreover, adopters moved in a far speedier 
fashion, to “concertina” the stages in order to seize the moment. They did 
not advance through steps in a slow and methodical fashion, but acted more 
suddenly and decisively, to take the “tide in the affairs of men” at full f lood. 
In other words, technocratic, policy-making diffusion models, while giving 
a clear description of decision-making stages by established actors, are not 
so self-evidently appropriate or explanatory in regard to the high velocity 
of the appropriation by high-risk actors-in-formation in the Arab uprisings.
Just as the policy-related diffusion model is quite different from the 
natural science model, the use of “diffusion” in social movement theory is 
different from the policy model. The focus in social movement theory in 
regard to diffusion has been far less on the lengthy, methodical, adoption, 
decision-process, and, overwhelmingly and repetitively, on the means, 
media and infrastructure of diffusion. Many social movement theorists, 
in keeping with their eschewal of the study of basic motivations, not to 
mention strategic and material interests, and their interest in how rather 
than why questions, have considered the issue of the means by which 
information is transmitted above all, means which are often conceived 
of as being out there, almost as forces of nature. The question of whether 
the study of the means of transmission of radical ideas and practices is 
usefully identif ied by the term “diffusion” was not thoroughly addressed 
when the latter term was introduced into the social movement literature 
(McAdam and Rucht 1993). The term “diffusion” seems to have been granted 
a kind of self-evident validity as a basic metaphor for understanding the 
translocal social life of contentious ideas. Perhaps this was because of its 
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aura of scientif ic precision, or the way it used a neutral- or off icial-sounding 
term to domesticate and render legitimate potentially highly contentious 
and disruptive forms of action. Or it was simply seen as a catchall, general, 
and abstracted term “embracing contagion, mimicry, social learning, [and] 
organized dissemination,” among other things (Strang and Soule 1998, 266). 
The problem, of course, with general abstracted terms, is that they can 
nonetheless carry baggage, in this case naturalistic and hydraulic baggage, 
and when they do not carry any baggage they may simply end up as “empty 
signif iers,” allowing no more analytic purchase than the specif ic concepts 
written into them by particular authors in sometimes ad hoc ways. The 
naturalistic baggage, in this case, may be a major confusion, given the sharp 
and “primary” frame distinction, in how we “locate, perceive and label” 
experience, between natural and “unguided” events (like Brownian motion) 
on the one hand, and “guided doings” involving “will, aim and controlling 
effort” on the other (Goffman 1974, 21-22). Diffusion appears impossibly 
to straddle both primary frameworks – a blunt, confused metaphor with 
misleading and ambiguous consequences.
Existing infrastructures of communication, especially social media and 
satellite television, but also new, private, daily and weekly print press, all 
of which forms of media had developed in leaps and bounds in the Middle 
East and North Africa region since the late 1990s (Lynch 2007), ensured 
a rich, speedy, and extensive flow of information outwards from Tunisia 
in 2011, such that any interested party was able to undertake a more or 
less “informed” reading of events. Communication infrastructure, what 
social movement theorists have called “nonrelational diffusion,” involving 
transmission in mass and impersonal media, was a necessary condition, as 
it happened, for the social life of these ideas. Infrastructures of communica-
tion have long acted in this way, whether by television, radio, telegraph, or 
print. If there were no communications infrastructure, then there could 
be no mass communication. A necessary condition, however, especially 
one this self-evident, does not get us as far in causal terms as some seem to 
suppose, for whom it is enough to invoke “print capitalism” or the internet to 
explain the spread of particular ideas that were only expressed, transmitted 
and received by highly selective and particular groups or individuals. We 
note, indeed, that equally necessary for the existence of communication is 
the presence of several interested parties, motivated to give out, transmit 
and receive information. Without such actors, there could be no connection 
between points, and thus no communication.
By and large, however, during the Arab uprisings, the emission, selec-
tion, interpretation, and packaging of information, and how these moves 
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related to the model for collective action in question, were far from being 
a kind of mass, undifferentiated, Brownian motion type of diffusion. The 
relevant media systems did not simply channel information passively, but 
actively shaped the news agenda according to their ideal, material and 
strategic interests. As “players” engaged in strategic action (Jasper and 
Duyvendak 2015, 10) they cannot be analyzed as if they are natural and inert, 
like water and ink molecules offering a density gradient that could act as 
a passive medium for diffusion, especially in regard to the revolutionary 
ideas unleashed, which were highly problematic to many of engaged in 
the control and transmission of information on a mass scale. Ideational 
transmission in the media was heavily impacted by interests and agenda: Al 
Jazeera spoke in inspiring terms of “revolution,” while the BBC spoke aridly 
of “unrest” and “clashes,” often relating its coverage to diplomatic agenda. Al 
Jazeera played a key role as cheerleader in testimony after testimony. It was 
no surprise to anyone at all, on the other hand, that the Bahraini regime in 
2011 immediately “used the media […] to discredit protest leaders and their 
lack of ‘patriotism’” (Shehabi and Jones 2015, xv).
That powerful media work in this way should be no surprise. Jackson et 
al. (1960) is cited (in Della Porta and Tarrow 2005, for example), as an early 
or even classical study of diffusion, and the role of communication networks 
therein. In fact, the research of Jackson and his collaborators does not men-
tion the word diffusion, let alone study it as a concept. Only one factor in 
their multicausal explanation as to why a social movement failed to gather 
momentum bears on communication networks. The other factors include 
failings in leadership, ideology, and in staging events. On closer inspection, 
it turns out that even the factor “communication networks” in this study is 
very much a shallow, intervening variable, and that its functioning hinges on 
the material interests that governed the actions of the Los Angeles taxpay-
ers’ organizations. In this case, the fact that the tax interests of downtown 
industrial and commercial property owners were at odds with the tax 
interests of suburban residential property owners meant that the former did 
not lend their organizational and communicative weight to the tax protests 
of the latter (Jackson et al. 1960, 37). It was material interests, then, not 
the structure and nature of the communication system that governed the 
action. Powerful communication systems, and the ideas that they circulate, 
are constructed and freighted with interests and strategies. They cannot be 
treated as inert, innocent, connecting infrastructures, a danger in social 
movement studies of nonrelational diffusion, that take the naturalistic and 
impersonal f lavor of the metaphor of diffusion, as if the hydraulic f lows of 
gases and liquids were at stake, too seriously.
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Social movement theorists have also considered relational modes of 
diffusion, which refer to diffusion by face-to-face ties, word of mouth, and 
informal networks of various kinds. The importance of rumor networks 
for the transmission of meaningful information about French colonial-
ism, negotiation by religious notables, and commoner resistance has been 
effectively excavated, for example, in regard to anticolonial protest in 
nineteenth-century Algeria (Clancy-Smith 1994). For some, it is a consensual 
f inding that face-to-face ties are the “most effective” transmitters. There 
are reasons to doubt this general assertion, at least in its strong version 
where it is elevated almost to the status of a covering law. Louër’s subtle 
study of transnational connections showed that transnational Shi’ism 
became indigenized in the Persian Gulf not because of any diminution of 
face-to-face ties, but because over time local political struggles in Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, became more important than debates and 
struggles centered on Qom, Najaf, and Karbala (Louër 2008). Face-to-face 
ties in Egypt were often used to caution against action, Tunisia-style. In 
some cases, protestors had to extract themselves from cautious family and 
neighborhood environments: one form of this applied to women, who were 
told they could not protest as it would be shaming to appear in public: here 
(civil) freedom was directly counterposed to (sexual) purity. Face-to-face 
ties were highly segmented: some contacts were trusted on economics but 
not politics, in matters pragmatic, but not in matters normative. Other ties 
were intensive at one moment, and severed in the next.
At other points, the personal and the impersonal were deeply intertwined, 
partly as friendships mediated mass transmission in social media, and 
in constructed niche-cyber-worlds likewise, in ways that disrupted the 
personal/impersonal binary. Disentangling transmission by face-to-face 
and transmission by mass media is a fraught and problematic task, when 
each kind of communication created in some cases the conditions through 
which the other worked. It was easier to persuade neighbors of, and frame 
information about, the violence and corruption of the regime when images 
and information underlining and characterizes these things were broadcast 
extensively on Al Jazeera. Some viewers and listeners believed that they had 
a more or less personal relationship to media broadcasters, and responded to 
the latter’s emotions and reactions accordingly. In other words, we should not, 
wary of social movement theory’s veritable cottage industry in descriptive 
classification, overstate the distinction between relational and nonrelational 
diffusion, especially when it comes to causation. This point is particularly 
important in an “information age,” when a primary task, especially where 
motivations for new and risky action are involved, is selection, not simply 
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a passive consumption by disinterested observers (or, alternatively, con-
sumers) of the great flood of information “out there.” The sheer quantity of 
information available about Tunisia, once satellite and social media got fully 
involved, actually intensif ied the need for selective, rather than wholesale 
forms of appropriation. The deluge of reportage implied that those who did 
not know what they were looking for were lost. Selective readings, moreover, 
were highly influenced by ideal and material interests of various parties to 
the communication, and the actual content of what it was that was com-
municated. Neither interests nor content are given suff icient attention in 
readings stressing the infrastructural means of diffusion.
Attentive to such problems, some have considered the more active and 
interested elements – such as brokers, certif iers, and movement entre-
preneurs – who are involved in transmission (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001; Tarrow 2011). The means and media of communication were certainly 
developed by those who validated and transmitted the model. The concepts 
of brokerage and entrepreneurship, however, are sharply limited by the 
fact that they refer to leaderships, established organizations and the logics 
of market and profit. The distinctive feature of the Arab uprisings, on the 
other hand, was that they involved the activation of initially unorganized, 
f irst-time protestors in their hundreds of thousands and even millions, in 
a context where credible leaderships were often lacking as a result of state 
repression. The unruly entrance into the political f ield by a diverse array of 
social groups, including the rural and urban poor, gave the uprisings a good 
deal of their force (Chalcraft 2014). Certif ication by powerful f igures turned 
off some f irst-time movers and activists who believed that such certif ica-
tion diminished, rather than enhanced, the radical appeal of their claims. 
Activists, like pirates, are not always impressed by authority f igures, and do 
not always grovel for the approval of those enjoying high status and cultural 
capital. Protestors new and established should not be seen as engaged in 
continuous enterprise, obeying market rules or seeking to maximize profit: 
they were rapidly making active connections, sometimes on a value-rational 
basis, under high-risk conditions, and for political purposes.
A more unruly entry point into seizure and appropriation, interests and 
content, can begin with the generous definition of brokerage as the “forma-
tion of new links among transmitters and receivers” (Chabot and Duyvendak 
2002, 706-708). Such a definition can point us away from markets and toward 
creativity. The forging of new links is precisely what was at stake when it came 
to the seizure and appropriation of new models for collective action during 
the Arab uprisings. This forging involved selection among the deluge of 
information that was available about Tunisia and what Tunisia meant. Those 
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searching for routes out of violence found something that in some latent way 
they were already looking for: an apparently viable model for tackling deeply 
felt injustices. This explains why they did not respond with indifference or 
rejection. For such actors, what mattered was the content: Tunisia suddenly 
brought into focus, and crystallized a fundamental contradiction between an 
active, rights-bearing, sovereign people on the one hand, and the corrupted, 
predatory, and kleptocratic regime on the other. The people demanded and 
succeeded to bring down the regime. Here in vivid form was the “‘people’/
power bloc contradiction” that Laclau once saw, more than the class struggle, 
as “the dominant contradiction at the level of a concrete social formation” 
which in turn constituted the “specif ic domain of the popular-democratic 
struggle” (Laclau 1979, 166). What mattered in regard to the Tunisian model, 
more than the media of transmission, was whether or not it provided, and was 
seen to provide, a new picture of the world, a new diagnosis of the situation 
and its dominant contradictions, and a new image of a viable path out of 
a situation of domination now defined with a new clarity and vividness, a 
track which could be taken by those getting on board the “locomotive” of 
new forms of collective action. A focus on means and media sidesteps these 
questions, avoiding issues of motivation, content, and causation, and focusing 
on abstract descriptions, categories and distinctions too often denuded of 
dynamism, stakes and significance. What was taken on, and who took it on, 
were arguably more important and relevant questions, in comparison to the 
means and media by which information was shifted, as if it were so many 
bales of cotton available to this or that consumer or entrepreneur or certify-
ing authority, ready with a stamp of approval or maximizing strategy. The 
model for collective action was actively seized not because it resonated with 
some preexisting code or culture, but because it was able to give substance 
to an active, unincorporated normative and political imagination.
Appropriation, therefore, was fundamental: connections were made, 
not found. These appropriations varied greatly temporally and by relative 
intensity. Diffusion and transmission were just as much an effect of the 
multiplication of sites of appropriation as they were causes in their own 
right. Just as an animated flipbook presents a series of pictures in rapid 
succession so that an observer perceives, say, a stick-man moving from one 
end of the page to the other, the movement of the model across borders is 
an optical and cartographic effect of the fact that a number of sites seize 
on the idea at some geographic distance from the point of origin. What 
matters is neither the observer, nor the illusion of travel through space, 
but the seizure and appropriation of the model in various sites. Associated 
forms of space compression are as much effects, as they are causes, of these 
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appropriations, and the active search that underpins them. In fact, there are 
ways to grasp and specify why the Tunisian model was taken up in many, 
but by no means all, constituencies in the Arab world in 2011.
It is vitally important to think about “what spreads, replacing a theory 
of connections with a theory of connecting” (Strang and Soule 1998, 276). 
It seems, however, that in doing so we should avoid tautological banalities 
such as “practices that accord with cultural understandings of appropri-
ate and effective action tend to diffuse more quickly than those that do 
not” (Strang and Soule 1998, 278). The inverse might just as well be true, 
especially in regard to transgressive mobilization. For example, when 
“cultural understandings of appropriate action” have been shattered and 
turned upside down by protest failure over a decade, on the one hand, 
and a rapidly changing horizon of possibility, on the other, as was the case 
for many during 2011, then a new model, such as the idea of taking on, for 
example, Egypt’s paramilitary security forces in pitched battles, suddenly 
gained immense purchase. In this case, it was precisely practices that no 
one had previously believed to be appropriate or effective that were taken 
on with great rapidity. Such mechanisms were much more saliently at work 
in regards to explaining the immediate take-off phase of the Arab uprisings.
In their forms of seizure and appropriation, receivers were as much like 
pirates as they were like brokers or entrepreneurs. The Tunisian model 
was not transmitted because of the routine functioning of standard com-
munications infrastructure, but because adopters emerged suddenly, like 
pirates, from their hideaways, or anonymous social media locations, where 
their actions and motivations were not widely publicized, and seized hold 
of circulating information, like those who would hijack ships running 
to schedules and timetables, creating connections that were not already 
there. The mode of emergence here was more like an ambush rather than 
a scheduled act. We see here the voracity, suddenness, surprise, and energy 
of the appropriators searching for a guide to novel action, where adopters 
cast aside the normal rules and social conventions of social interaction and 
pragmatism. Search and seizure, much more than circulation, was the cause 
of movement across borders.
This accounted for a high-velocity modular spread, which vastly outran the 
actions and relatively limited constituencies of “brokers” and existing leader-
ships. During the Arab uprisings, appropriators were not established or highly 
institutionalized brokers, in any case, but emergent actors engaged in highly 
unofficial, unauthorized, risky and uncertif ied action, which disrupted and 
altered sites and trajectories of circulation. The pattern of dissemination, 
rather like the movements described in Linebaugh and Rediker’s (2000) 
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“hidden history” of the revolutionary Atlantic, was unruly and many-headed. 
No surprise then, that those who did take up the model were depicted by 
regimes, like pirates, as “villains of all nations” (Rediker 2004). Unlike a 
diffusion pattern, in which there is a clear center (the ink drop) and a steady 
and even transmission outwards to a periphery (the increasingly ink-colored 
water), the cartography of ideational social life was more jumbled. Geographic 
proximity, or the extent of established media saturation, or personal links to 
Tunisia, was no guide to where or among whom the model would be seized. 
In proximate Algeria, for example, in spite of the fact that socioeconomic 
protests there continued for much of the period, and followed a rising trajec-
tory during early 2011, the model of regime overthrow was not appropriated. 
In relatively far away Syria, on the other hand, or in Bahrain, where media 
infrastructures were no more developed, this model was appropriated. In 
Syrian cities, where media saturation was higher, the model spread far slower 
than in the provincial towns and villages. While in the UAE, where there was 
both media coverage and extensive social media penetration, nationals and 
noncitizen migrants alike remained largely quiescent.
Transformation and Its Limits
The model provided a guide to action and a basis for cohesion for a new, 
fragile and previously fragmented collective actor – “the people,” as a rights-
bearing, sovereign multitude. It assisted in constituting and articulating the 
new, fragile, bonds of solidarity and associative links that appeared amid the 
radically diverse constituencies appearing in the streets. In this it implied 
new ways of constructing what was held in common. It gave new practices a 
certain meaning, given that no one otherwise would have known in advance 
what such new transgressions meant, especially because normal rules and 
beliefs were thrown into disarray. Ben Ali’s departure at the hands of popular 
protest could not be explained by ordinary ways of seeing because it was 
so unprecedented. With crowds pouring into the streets in Egypt, Libya, 
Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, looking to Tunisia made sense in order to make 
sense of “what is going on here.” It allowed protestors to say, “This is what we 
are doing.” It provided a certain, tentative, untried map of what to do: head 
to the square, stay there, don’t be afraid, and take on the riot police. This 
guide to action was a blinding flash of inspiration for many: while in Egypt, 
for example, there had been forceful and contentious interactions with the 
police and security forces, especially over the previous decade (Ismail 2006, 
2012), no one had seriously considered taking on in pitched street battles the 
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paramilitary riot police in Egypt, the approximately 350,000 strong ranks 
of the Central Security Forces, before January 14, 2011. The whole proposi-
tion was foreign to the climate of nonviolent protest during the 2000s, and 
seemed ludicrously nonviable in terms of the apparent balance of forces on 
the ground. In Bahrain there was a similar disjuncture:
Most observers […] reckoned that the call [for a Day of Rage on February 
14, 2011] would attract the customary small number of protesters. The re-
gime and mainstream opposition did not seem particularly worried. Both 
sides expected the planned action to follow the same pattern established 
by Bahrain protests over the past decades. A small number of protesters 
would converge from different towns and villages to listen to speeches 
and/or march through the streets. They would quickly be dispersed by 
security forces and be pushed back to their neighborhoods and villages. 
At worst, the clashes would result in injuring a few protesters, some 
fatally, and the arrest of more than a hundred persons. (Khalaf 2016, 1)
What transpired was something different. Bahrain’s ruling family decided 
that the domestic security forces were insuff icient, and sought and ob-
tained a military intervention from Saudi Arabia. The Tunisian (and now 
Egyptian) model enabled new expectations to be formed, and provided a 
basis for new forms of coordination between activists and protestors, in 
that it suggested a common end, and gave a rudimentary set of banners 
and principles under which action could be joined: bread, dignity and 
freedom. What was at stake, to use Snow’s terminology, was more than the 
alignment, extension or amplif ication of an existing way of framing the 
situation, that is, of saying “What is it that is going on here?” It was more 
a radical transformation, a “switch” in the Weberian analogy. Here was a 
new “keying,” in the sense meant by Goffman, which redefined activities, 
events, and biographies that were already meaningful from the standpoint 
of some key framework, in terms of another framework, such that they 
are now “seen by the participants to be something quite else.” What is 
involved is “a systematic alteration” that radically reconstitutes what it is 
for participants that is going on (Goffman cited in Snow et al. 1986, 474). 
Although the details, organization, and ideology of this rekeying were 
hardly substantive or worked out, and strategic capacities and outcomes 
were highly uncertain, a new way of seeing, a new horizon of expectation, 
was adventurously in play.
Older agencies and methods for achieving change, such as those espoused 
by Al-Wefaq, the “off icial opposition” in Bahrain, were devalued (Khalaf 
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2016). Existing stakes held in older patterns of subordination (crumbs on the 
tables of the poor, limited civil liberties, pockets of autonomy, and patron-
age) were devalued by the hoped-for alternatives in regard to prosperity 
and democracy that hove into view on all sides. Older sources of “mere” 
grievance, such as the succession (tawrith) in Egypt, whereby the son Gamal 
Mubarak was supposed to accede to the presidency of the father, were now 
def ined as intolerable and beyond the pale of political normalcy going 
forward. Such ideas of the politically normal were in fact brand new.
In unruly, translocal appropriation we can construe a causal mechanism 
relevant to the charismatic moment of early rising radical action. For protes-
tors, the power of the Tunisian model enabled them to declare, implicitly 
or explicitly, in prophetic mode: “It is written, but I say unto you.” In other 
words, the “holy scriptures” governing the rules of power, politics, and 
protest could be thought against, profaned, and considered inapplicable. In 
this case, it was not religious blessing or charismatic leadership, but unruly 
translocal appropriation that was at work.
Once the model was appropriated, like pirate booty, it was taken over, 
transformed and translated, applied to all sorts of purposes, potentially 
far from its meaning, form and practical application and results in Tunisia. 
Among US-based Leftists in the 1960s, forms and ideas drawn from the Third 
World national liberation struggles were adapted in “hybrid, provisional 
and partial manner” (Young 2006, 15). The same could be said of the Arab 
uprisings. What mattered now were the new contexts in which the model 
was applied, movement dynamics, and the ongoing course of the political 
struggle. There are sharp limits to reading this process in terms of mimesis. 
In some respects, every local context was different, although not neces-
sarily in the ways power holders had said. The unruly appropriation of a 
new model for collective action by no means implied its success. Instead 
it meant its attempted application in a new political, economic, social and 
cultural context. This raised formidable new problems for activists of overall 
cohesion, organization, and strategy, especially in the face of activists’ 
shallow organizational and ideological depth, their lack of a real mass base, 
the opportunities opened up for those, particularly but not only among 
Islamists, who worked to segment “the people,” the repression wielded 
by regimes, the repressive or ineffective stances taken by regional and 
international powers, and the failure of any state to champion or export the 
new politics. Indeed, the very suddenness of the piratical mechanism virtu-
ally ensured that the new mass actor “the people” be highly decentralized, 
highly uncoordinated, and to some extent dispersible. Its hopefulness may 
have been quite inappropriate to the harsh realities of state repression: in 
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Syria for example, the regime reacted to signif icant challenge as it always 
had – with extensive and intensive repression and violence.
The forms of coeval appropriation considered here are not confined to 
the 2011 uprisings. It has been very important, for example, for the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement for Palestinian rights, since its 
inception in early 2000s, to assert a similarity with the translocal BDS cam-
paign that helped to bring down Apartheid in South Africa (Barghouti 2013). 
Opponents of BDS contest the analogy as best they can. Moreover, piracy 
should not be understood to stem above all, or in any automatic way, from 
recent developments in the new media, the internet, or globalization. The 
piracy metaphor is intended to challenge such linear, faceless, apolitical, and 
West-centric views. The model of the Islamic revolution in Iran of 1978-1979 
was an inspiration to Islamists old and newly mined, Sunni and Shia, from 
Morocco to the Philippines. It was nowhere fully replicated. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the Maoist and Guevarist model of the people’s guerrilla war had a 
signif icant social life of its own, notably in Algeria (1954-1962), South Yemen 
(1963-1967), Palestine (1964-1982) and Dhofar (1965-1975) (Chamberlin 2012; 
Khalili 2007; Takriti 2013). Dispossessed Palestinians scattered in refugee 
camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and Egypt after 1948 were engaged 
in an active search for models of collective action. It was this as much as 
sociological commonality that saw them looking with intense interest at 
Cubans, Algerians, and Vietnamese, and their anticolonial models of the 
people’s guerrilla war, after the Cuban revolution of 1959 (Khalili 2007). The 
Nasserist model, involving a revolutionary coup without an organized mass 
base, carried out by patriotic Free Off icers against their commanders, and 
in the name of national independence and socioeconomic progress, was 
attempted (after the success of July 23, 1952, in Egypt) in Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan in the 1950s, and succeeded in Iraq (1958), North Yemen (1962), and 
Libya (1969), changing the face of the region (Chalcraft 2016).
In the colonial period, Fawzi Al-Qawuqji, the Ottoman-trained military 
off icer and peripatetic proponent of Arab nationalist armed struggle from 
the 1920s to 1948, wrote in his memoirs that “[t]he doings of the hero Abd 
Al-Karim [in Morocco] – truly these were the inspiration to us in our 
revolution [in Syria]” (Qawuqji 1995, 104). Abd el-Krim himself, who led 
the armed struggle against Spanish and then French colonialism in Mo-
rocco in the 1920s, was impressed by the Young Turks and the republican 
armed struggle of Atatürk (Pennell 1986, 258). The general strike that 
inaugurated the Great Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) was modeled on 
the Syrian example of a few months earlier. Palestinians hoped to repeat 
the electrifying success of the 50-day general strike in Syria, which had 
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just led to the French announcement in March 1936 that they would seek 
a treaty of independence with Syria (Nimr 1990, 87-88). Ahmad Sharif 
Al-Sanusi, the exiled head of the Suf i Sanusiyya of Cyrenaica, who had 
been conducting an armed struggle since 1911 against Italian conquest in 
Libya, was to be found in 1921 in northern Iraq, exhorting in Islamic terms 
tribesmen there to pick up arms against the British (Wahab 1967, 105). Here 
were indications that the rugged, patriotic armed struggles of the interwar 
period in Iraq 1920, Turkey 1920-1922, Morocco 1921-1926, Libya 1921-1929, 
Syria 1925-1927, and Palestine 1936-1939, were linked by more than just 
local and endogenous circumstances or nonideational translocal forms. 
These examples suggest that coeval ideational appropriation has a long 
history in the region.
In the wider world, similar forms of piracy have been at work. For exam-
ple, in the case of the search for liberty among the slaves of San Domingo in 
the 1790s, few would have pointed to sociological, positional, occupational, 
or identitarian similarities between Afro-Caribbean slaves in the Caribbean 
and Parisian Jacobin lawyers or the sans-culottes of the Faubourg Saint 
Antoine, prior to the assertion by slaves that they were indeed similar to 
these revolutionaries, in that they were all men and thus should enjoy the 
Rights of Man declared in 1792 in the French National Convention (James 
1963). Similarly, Cynthia Young’s study shows how the US Third World Left, 
in the 1950s and 1960s, “turned to Third World anticolonial struggles for 
ideas and strategies that might aid their own struggles against the poverty, 
discrimination, and brutality facing peoples of color” (Young 2006, 2). This 
time around the model was not the First but the Third World. Young’s study 
captures the point about the importance of an oddly underappreciated 
motive for looking abroad and beyond: to acquire leverage amid a locally 
situated political struggle. Young suggests that through acts of appropria-
tion, local struggles could be depicted in more compelling terms. This does 
not go very far in conceptualizing what this “more compelling” aspect 
involves, but it certainly offers a fundamental rationale for the active search 
for spatially removed models of collective action.
These examples suggest a number of observations in regard to translocal 
appropriation. First, that it is not a creature of the new media or post-1990 
globalization. Second that it is not a prisoner of infrastructures of con-
nection: even where such infrastructures were highly underdeveloped 
by twenty-f irst-century standards, challengers found ways to seize on 
contentious ideas. As in the old Arabic proverb: al-labib takfihi al-ishara 
(For the wise man, a hint is suff icient): the idea being that in so far as merely 
a glimpse of an alternative can resonate with existing exigencies, it might 
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be suff icient to stimulate action. Third, that it is an unruly phenomenon, 
which does not depend on preexisting forms of similarity. Attributions of 
similarity may be made between widely differing constituencies for political 
reasons. Appropriations may not be done in propitious contexts, and are no 
guarantee of success. Fourth, that it is a many-headed phenomenon, capable 
of inspiring ordinary people (i.e., those not normally engaged in activism), to 
make a f irst-time, transgressive move into the political f ield, accounting for 
the force and capacity of the upsurge, which changes the existing balance 
of forces in ways that does not just rely on “brokers” or “entrepreneurs” 
(i.e., existing leaderships). Finally, to invoke historical examples where 
markets or at least capitalism were either hardly existent, or instantiated 
in fundamentally different and uneven ways, it helps to underline the 
inadequacy of market metaphors (such as brokerage) in coming to terms 
with the reasons why actors act to appropriate. The argument here situates 
such actions instead in contexts of hegemonic disincorporation. In all the 
examples above, subjects and citizens searching for routes out of specif ic 
forms of violence and alienation appropriated, sometimes at great speed, 
models for collective action pioneered by others in order to deliver trans-
formation, in ways that were constitutive for subsequent collective action.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to contribute to explanations of the sudden 
emergence of revolutionary actors in various parts of the Arab world in 2011 
by looking at the unruly, translocal appropriation of a model of collective 
action pioneered in Tunisia. Like the literature on ideational diffusion, it 
accepts that ideas play a role in coordinating the action of new movements, 
and can help explain their incidence, forms of cohesion, content, goals 
and practice. It nonetheless has suggested a number of important limits 
on the utility and capacity of conventional characterizations, involving 
metaphors of diffusion, relational and nonrelational mediation, attribution 
of similarity, brokerage, and movement entrepreneurship to characterize 
and explain why ideas cross borders. These concepts struggle to explain 
the motivation for the adoption of a new model. They pay little attention to 
power-laden forms of structure and destructure, consent, and alienation. 
They do not go very far in grasping and explaining how identif ications of 
commonality across borders can suddenly come into being, or get perceived 
and constructed on new bases. They struggle to account for the crucial 
selectivity of appropriation. They do not identify the functions and purposes 
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of appropriated models for movements. And they struggle to account for 
the f irst-time protestors of vast masses of ordinary or nonactivist sectors. 
They rely too much on deterministic, natural science and market metaphors, 
at the expense of metaphors more adequate to unruly political dynamics.
I have suggested, therefore, that rather than thinking in terms of the 
outworn metaphor of the diffusion of models for collective action, we 
might be better served by thinking in terms of their social life. Instead of 
a hydraulic pattern of linear diffusion, what was at stake in Egypt, Libya, 
Bahrain, Syria and Yemen was the social life of a contentious idea, a social 
life involving many-headed, sudden, high-velocity, and unruly translocal 
appropriation, and one not always destined for either continuous and 
entrenched organizational embodiment or for success. This unruly, translo-
cal appropriation can be likened to piracy, involving search, seizure, and 
translation of transgressive models for collective action, which now served as 
the basis for new forms of solidarity among previously heterogeneous actors.
This chapter f inds enabling conditions for piracy, in prior, inherited, and 
directly encountered patterns of hegemonic disincorporation. Feelings 
of injustice based on a social tension between is and ought engage the 
normative and political imagination in a latent and potentially unruly 
search for new means of collective action to address injustice. This chapter 
sees this search as fundamental to the motivations of those who were hugely 
inspired by the model for collective action unleashed by the fall of Ben Ali 
at the hands of the people. Attributions of similarity were rooted in these 
contexts, rather than in preexisting similarities of sociology, occupation, 
ethnicity or position. Those sectors who maintained key stakes in existing 
forms of hegemony tended to reject the Tunisian model as inapplicable to 
their situations and societies, while those experiencing a latent search for 
new forms of the common seized on the similarities between their interests 
and actions and those of the Tunisians.
What mattered were not infrastructures of communication, whether 
relational or nonrelational, but how such infrastructures and the informa-
tion they contained were ransacked and made appropriate in a wide variety 
of local contexts. What was at stake was neither expert, stage-by-stage, 
policy adoption, nor Brownian diffusion, but the seizure of a model capable 
of rekeying a worldview. Exhilaration coursed through the crowd because 
the model was felt to be eliminating the tension between is and ought. 
The protagonists came from all walks of life: they were neither necessarily 
preexisting activists, nor were they institutionalized, nor acting according 
to market logics, as metaphors of brokerage, entrepreneurship, and certifica-
tion tend to imply. Protagonists acted more like pirates: they rewrote the 
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rules of contentious interaction, or acted as if older rules were no longer 
applicable. Thinking in terms of piracy can assist in making sense of the 
forms of creative ontology and revolutionary becoming that are sometimes 
at work in transgressive mobilization, without explaining these forms away 
via structural determinism on the one hand, and without seeing them as 
entirely unfathomable, arbitrary, and unpredictable on the other.
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Abstract
This chapter examines the anti-Israeli protests in Jordan before and after 
the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. The protests seldom attract more 
than several dozen protesters and are heavily policed; yet feel routine 
and uncontentious. Through careful ethnographic attention to the mi-
cropractices of this series of protests, it becomes evident that the protests 
do political work for both state and nonstate actors. I look beyond the 
self-evident claims making against centers of power and examine what 
various actors understand the micropractices of the protests to mean. In 
particular, these routine protests both maintain space for the expression 
of political dissent toward the regime’s peaceful relations with Israel while 
also shoring up the regime’s power.
Keywords: Jordan, protests, micropractices, script, routine, uprising
In early September 2011, protesters in Cairo breached the Israeli embassy 
by breaking apart a security barricade with sledgehammers and climbing 
through a window. They accessed what an Israeli off icial described as a 
“waiting room,” where they tossed stacks of Hebrew-language documents 
out of the windows (Sherwood 2011). Protesters tore down the Israeli f lag 
hanging outside, and Egyptian security forces reportedly watched without 
intervening for several hours. In Jordan, weekly protests since the outbreak 
of the uprisings across the region had been strong, but they had not reached 
a size or intensity that seriously threatened the regime. Still, King Abdullah 
II was nervous. He had already sacked a prime minister and lifted restric-
tions on public gatherings, reforms introduced to assuage anti-regime 
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sentiment. The breach of the Israeli embassy in Cairo, however, made 
the king particularly uneasy: Jordan and Egypt were the only Arab states 
that had signed peace treaties with Israel. As the regime feared, Jordanian 
activists took the events in Cairo as inspiration to escalate activism around 
their consistent condemnation of Jordanian-Israeli relations. A Facebook 
page announced the organization of a Million Man March1 on the Israeli 
embassy in Amman, to be held a few days later, on Friday, September 16. It 
focused on three demands: annulling the 1994 peace treaty, expelling the 
Israeli ambassador to Jordan, and permanently closing the Israeli embassy 
in Amman. Coming just one week after the break-in of the embassy in 
Cairo, Israeli off icials were concerned enough to evacuate all but a skeletal 
staff the day before the event (Greenberg 2011). Unlike in Cairo, Jordan’s 
security forces had no intentions of watching idly. In the end, however, the 
protesters were far too few to push back the 1,500 security forces, let alone 
even come close to the Israel embassy (Agence France Press 2011): Only a 
few hundred protesters turned out. Instead of a march, the group held a 
demonstration adjacent to the Kaluti mosque in the upscale neighborhood 
of Rabia, more than half a mile from the embassy. The organizers expressed 
extreme disappointment at the turnout (Kershner 2011), although they 
declared the preemptory evacuation of the Israeli ambassador and staff 
to have been a major success (Agence France Press 2011).
The New York Times suggested that the Arab uprisings had created a 
rupture that unleashed long-simmering anti-Israeli sentiment in the two 
countries that had signed peace treaties with Israel (Kershner 2011). But 
for observers of protests in Jordan, the demonstration was very familiar. 
Jordanians have been protesting against the peace treaty with Israel 
since before the document was signed, and hardly a month has passed 
without a demonstration, march, or boycott raising the issue. Even more, 
anti-Israeli protests near the Kaluti mosque in Amman were not only 
frequent, they had become almost routine (Schwedler 2017). The most 
visible difference between the Million Man March and the other Kaluti 
protests was the dramatically increased security presence. The timing of 
the event – coming not only during the period of the Arab uprisings but 
also within a week of the Israeli embassy breach in Cairo – invoked the 
increased regime response, but the organizers had hoped for a far greater 
turnout as well.
1 The organizers adopted the name symbolically and never even hoped that the crowds would 
reach that size; Jordan’s population is approximately seven million. They had hoped, however, 
that the crowds would reach into the thousands. Interview with author, March 17, 2016.
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This chapter examines the anti-Israeli protests at the Kaluti mosque 
before and after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in order to bring to light 
dimensions of the protests that are often overlooked. In one reading, the 
low turnout for the Million Man March might be read as evidence for the 
failure of a mass uprising to emerge in Jordan. But in another reading, that 
event was part of a set of protests that, although small and often overlooked, 
did considerable political work other than to just pressure the regime to 
change a policy. This chapter will examine the latter reading.
In the following section, I f irst brief ly examine how scholars study 
protests and general and the Arab uprisings in particular. I illustrate 
how attention to micropractices can reveal political work done through 
protests that is often overlooked by analytic frameworks that prioritize 
questions pertaining to social movements or uprisings. I look beyond 
the self-evident claims making against centers of power and examine 
what various actors understand the micropractices of the protests to 
mean. I argue that the Kaluti protests prior to the uprising worked both to 
maintain space for the expression of political dissent toward the regime’s 
peaceful relations with Israel while also shoring up the regime’s power. I 
then turn to the specif ic dynamics of the Kaluti protests that took place 
prior to the uprising, paying close attention to the interactions between 
various participants and security agencies over the course of the protests. 
Having attended 21 similar protests, I identify routines as well as innova-
tions, and I share insights from participants about what they understand 
to be happening. Finally, I examine the post-uprising Kaluti protests, 
noting innovations and deviations from the familiar script until July 
2014, more than three years after the uprisings began. By focusing on 
the microdynamics of a limited set of protests, I hope to reveal the ways 
in which protests can do a wide range of political work, beyond that of 
building a movement, making a claim against a regime (or some other 
power), or, on the part of the state, displaying a willingness to either 
permit or repress dissent. The Kaluti protests maintained a space for 
open criticism of one of the regime’s core commitments – peace with 
Israel – while protesters refrained from crossing a line that would invite 
repression. In July 2014, however, a rupture in that established script 
resulted in a harsher repression of some protesters and, subsequently, a 
loss of the regime’s toleration for the events. These events together provide 
a richer understanding of Jordan’s modest Arab uprising by bringing into 
focus continuities and ruptures in the practice of protests and policing 
around the Kaluti mosque.
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Approaching the Study of Protests
In most scholarly studies, the concept of “protest” is left undefined. Protests 
can take a variety of forms but they always entail the possibility that humans, 
even those furthest from power, have the capacity for expressing dissent – an 
act of protest – as well as potentially realizing change as a result. Protest can 
be done quietly, individually, and even secretly, but not unintentionally, and 
not only in one’s own mind. Protest is dissent translated into action, however 
minor, even if done without the hope of realizing change. It is “explicit 
[expression of] criticism of other people, organizations, and the things they 
believe or do” (Jasper 1997, 5). Protest can be “hidden”2 or can range in visible 
actions such as whistleblowing, speaking out, demonstrating, and more; it 
need not be part of an organized movement.
Most studies of protest, however, focus on social movements, political 
parties, unions, clubs, spontaneous groups of people, and so on.3 The unit of 
analysis is not the protest event, but either the organizing group or a larger 
“cycle” or “wave” of protests, such as a revolution or uprising. The protest 
event is of interest primarily because it helps to piece together a larger 
story. This analytic focus on the metaphorical life or cycle of a movement or 
uprising directs attention toward questions about the origin, development, 
and trajectory of the social movement or uprising. How does a movement 
or uprising begin, gain followers, and evolve? What tactics and strategies 
does it adopt or adapt? How does it utilize mobilizing resources (e.g., social 
media, cell phones, networks, and so on)? What are the internal dynamics 
of the movement or uprising? And, of course, how do various powers or 
state agencies respond to and interact with the movement?
Many scholars examining the Arab uprisings have adopted just such 
a focus, concentrating on the trajectories of the uprisings, rather than 
the dynamics of specif ic protest events. Of those, many studies employ a 
methodologically nationalist approach, meaning that the nation, state, or 
country is treated as the basic and natural political unit of the modern world 
(Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Scholars thus focus on the uprising in a single 
case, or else draw comparisons between states in an effort to understand 
the variations in the trajectories of individual cases (Brynen et al. 2012; 
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). Many analyses of the uprisings begin 
2 James C. Scott (1985, 1990) is credited with developing the notion of “hidden transcripts” or 
everyday forms of resistance.
3 Exceptions are exemplif ied by the work of James C. Scott’s everyday forms of resistance 
(1985) and Lisa Wedeen’s politics of acting as if (1999).
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with the seemingly self-evident statement that the uprisings began with 
the self-immolation of Tunisian street-cart vender Mohammed Bouazizi 
and then diffused across the Arab world. It is told as the story of a rupture 
and a diffusion, of citizens “breaking through the wall of fear” to demand 
the downfall of long-despised regimes (Patel, Bunce, and Wolchik 2014). 
While the uprisings began in Tunisia, each state touched by the diffusion 
has its own beginning, the moment when protests erupt in a new state. I 
have elsewhere developed a critique of the limitations of comparing the 
uprisings to each other as discrete objects and attempting to identify the 
causal variables that explain differences between them (Schwedler 2015); 
here I wish merely to draw attention to this pattern of analysis in which 
protests are but events or units in some larger whole that itself is the object 
of analysis.
Methodological nationalism also tends to aggregate protests at a state 
level, obscuring the particularities of protest activities in different locales. 
The events in Tahrir Square, for example, have come (in the scholarship as 
well as in popular imagination) to represent – and are treated as representa-
tive of – the entire Egyptian uprising against the regime of President Husni 
Mubarak. If the central analytic question is why some mobilization suc-
ceeded in overthrowing the regime, local and regional variations melt away 
as nation-level stories come into view. Of course, scholars of Egypt certainly 
would acknowledge that Tahrir Square did not mirror the dynamics and 
mobilization of protests elsewhere in Cairo, let alone the rest of Egypt). As 
Youssef El Chazli demonstrates, the spatial dynamics of Alexandria meant 
that protesters on January 25, 2011, wove their way back and forth across 
the city, rather than seeking to congregate in a central square, as was the 
case in Cairo (2016, and this volume). But these variations across space are 
of little interest to studies that seek to explain the trajectory of the uprising 
as a whole. Even many scholars who have examined protests prior to the 
uprisings – such as the Kifaya movement in Egypt or the labor movements 
in Tunisia and Egypt (Beinin 2012, 2016) – retain an analytic focus that 
probes when and why the protests escalate to a level that challenges the 
regime or draws a regime response.
My concern with the dominant scholarly approaches to the study of 
protests (and thus the uprisings) is that these framing questions overlook 
other issues such as what different actors understand themselves and others 
to be doing, or the meaning-making that happens over the course of even a 
single event. Instead of seeking to explain origin and trajectory (of a move-
ment or uprising), in this chapter I ask instead: What political work is done 
in the course of a protest or set of protests, and for and by whom? I explore 
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those questions through a close examination of the micropractices of the 
Kaluti protests before and after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011.
Protests can do a broad range of political work in part because they 
have multiple audiences: participants in the protests, a wider constituency 
or group, a general public, a specif ic government agency or personnel, a 
regime, a foreign government, international organizations, corporations 
considering investment opportunities, or a global public, to give just a few 
examples. Asking what a protest accomplishes, therefore, requires a second 
question, for whom?
From 2006-2010, I attended 21 protests at the Kaluti mosque, each of which 
was attended by members and leaders of Islamist groups, leftist political 
parties, and professional associations. Each protest expressed the same three 
demands: expelling the Israeli ambassador to Jordan, permanently closing 
the Israeli embassy in Amman, and annulling the 1994 peace treaty. Some 
protests were held as Israel invaded Palestinian-controlled territories, others 
were linked to no specif ic event. After my third or fourth protest, I began 
to recognize patterns in the actions of the security services, the protesters, 
and by passers-by. My observations cannot be generalized to all anti-Israeli 
protests in Amman, or even to all of those held at the Kaluti mosque. But, 
they help uncover meanings and practices that are often recognized by 
participants but invisible or irrelevant to most life-cycle analyses. In addition 
to observing the protests, I conducted more than a hundred interviews with 
protesters and two with Public Security Directorate (PSD, or Amn al-‘Amm) 
officers, many during protest but some before, after, or between protests. My 
open-ended guiding questions – What is happening? Why are you doing this 
(and not something else)? Why are the (security services) doing this (and not 
something else)? – aimed not to reveal a single narrative of a protest or set of 
protests, but to reveal multiple perspectives of what participants understood 
themselves and others to be doing and what they hoped to achieve.
Many of the insights I gained are insightful for analyses that focus on 
the lives of social movements or cycles of protests. Notably, recognizing 
routines in protests and policing enables one to better identify a rupture 
in those practices. From a distance, large ruptures are highly visible, such 
as the mobilization in Tunisia following Mohamed Bouazizi’s death, or the 
January 25 mobilization in Egypt. But seemingly small innovations and their 
signif icance only become recognizable when routine practices come into 
sharp relief. Even small ruptures can be meaningful, indicating a pushing 
of boundaries or defiance of a previously honored red line, whether done by 
the security services or by protesters. Such insights can call into question 
commonsense understandings of when a protest cycle or an uprising began.
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Anti-Israel Protests in Amman
Protests against the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty began before the treaty 
was signed in October 1994 at Wadi Araba, the southernmost crossing be-
tween Jordan and Israel. Early protests took place outside of the parliament 
(where the treaty was to be ratif ied), in the main downtown area, and at the 
Professional Associations Complex located in the western Amman neighbor-
hood of Shmeisani, where the professional unions (niqabat) have off ices. 
Criticism of the treaty was a main topic in the lead-up to the November 1997 
parliamentary elections, which every opposition political party boycotted 
in protest of government reforms restricting press freedoms and altering the 
elections law in ways that gave disproportionate representation to loyalist 
regions (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002, 358; Schwedler 2006, 55-56). In the redis-
tricting, Palestinians in particular found themselves in some regions with as 
little as one-tenth the representation of non-Palestinians (Schwedler 2010).
Most anti-Israeli protests are relatively small (a few hundred protesters), 
but some do escalate. On such occasions, tens of thousands of Jordanians 
f illed the streets of many parts of the country, but most notably in the capi-
tal Amman, Irbid (a city north of the capital), and Ma’an (a small trucking 
town in the south). The dynamics of many large-scale protests in Jordan are 
exceptional from many other parts of the Middle East for several reasons. 
Most notably, state security forces are a powerful presence but seldom turn 
on protesters, and thus serious injuries and deaths are rare. Arrests are not 
infrequent, but detained protesters are released without being charged, 
usually after intimidating questioning at a distant police station.
The f irst large-scale and disruptive anti-Israeli protest was held in Janu-
ary 1997, on the occasion of the opening of the f irst Jordanian-Israeli trade 
fair. Thousands of protesters, organized by former government off icials, 
the professional associations, labor unions, opposition political parties, 
and independent activists, convened in various locations around the trade 
fair complex in southwest Amman, effectively clogging the streets so ef-
f iciently that the fair itself – while off icially inaugurated a day later than 
planned – saw the convention hall nearly empty (Schwedler 2005). The 
ecstatic protesters had utilized the then new SMS (short message service) 
of the expanding mobile phone industry to inform each other about such 
pragmatic issues as the whereabouts of security forces, which intersections 
had been blocked, and where the protesters were advancing unimpeded. 
While the regime did try to stop protesters from reaching the site by block-
ading nearby intersections, one minister at the time told me that they did 
not try very hard: The government had been experiencing particularly 
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tense relations with Benjamin Netanyahu and was not motivated to stop 
the protests entirely, which had outraged the Israeli prime minister.4
Over the next few years, anti-Israeli protests were held increasingly at 
the Kaluti mosque, symbolically important for its relative proximity to the 
Israel embassy but also useful because it is situated next to a large empty lot 
ideal for assembling protesters. Anti-Israeli protests also took place in other 
locations, notably at the Professional Association Complex in Shmeisani. 
During major Israeli aggressions against Palestinian-controlled territories, 
crowds in Jordan occupied many major intersections across Amman and 
nationwide. Large-scale protests broke out across Jordan, for example, fol-
lowing the outbreak for the Second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000. 
Later that fall, the regime became concerned over a ten-day sit-in in the 
southern city of Ma’an. Several human rights advocates and activists from 
Amman attempted to join the protest but were turned back by army and 
PSD forces, leaving them unable to reach the sit-in. Located along Jordan’s 
main north-south trucking route to the port of Aqaba, Ma’an has been the 
site of many large protests in opposition to government politics. The 1989 
protests against the regime’s lifting of bread and oil subsidies, which led 
King Hussein to introduce political liberalization and democratic elections 
later that year, began in Ma’an before spreading across the country.
Jordanians took to the streets in large number again eighteen months 
later as Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, which lasted from 
March 29 to May 3, 2002. During that period, the Israeli Defense Forces 
swept through numerous Palestinian cities, destroying hundreds of build-
ings in Jenin, Nablus, and elsewhere. The largest protests were in Amman, 
where the majority of Palestinians in the kingdom reside. They were held on 
seven consecutive Friday afternoons and were highly disruptive of traff ic 
but generally peaceful. The army moved armored vehicles to many major 
intersections, but did not intervene to control the crowds or push them back.
For the regime, large protests are never welcome because they can be 
unpredictable and diff icult to contain. King Abdullah openly and strongly 
condemned the Israeli aggression, but he was eager to contain the protests 
at home without being seen to oppose the strong anti-Israeli sentiment in 
the kingdom. The regime sought to manage the large crowds of protesters 
rather than to repress them, while simultaneously advancing two projects 
intended to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to the Palestinian cause. 
First, the government launched a telethon to raise money for humanitarian 
4 Interview with Minister of Information Marwan Muasher, May 7, 1997, Amman. Muasher 
also served as Jordan’s f irst ambassador to Israel following the signing of the peace treaty.
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relief for Palestinians, encouraging Jordanians to donate 10 Jordanian dinars 
($14) by texting a given phone number. Second, it organized its own march 
through the Jordan River Foundation, a royally endorsed nongovernmental 
organization, or RONGO. Led by Queen Rania, the march included parlia-
mentarians, cabinet members, and other prominent Jordanians, aiming to 
demonstrate government and regime sympathy for the Palestinians without 
yielding to the widespread demands to close the Israeli embassy in Amman 
and cancel the peace treaty (Schwedler and Fayyaz 2010). When the Israeli 
operations subsided in early May, so did the large protests across Jordan.
Many other anti-Israeli protests have taken place since the 1989 political 
opening, including during the siege of Gaza in 2009, when Israel’s Operation 
Cast Lead killed 1,400 Palestinians in three weeks. Less reported in the local 
Arabic media (and nearly absent in the English-language press) are the many 
boycott events in which organizers issue lists of products to boycott and often 
burn them (along with Israeli and US flags) in bonfires, post blacklists of Jor-
danians doing business with Israeli counterparts, and organize art and music 
performances that clearly convey critiques of Israel, support for Palestinians, 
and opposition to the regime’s peace treaty with Israel (Schwedler 2003).
The Kaluti Protests
The Kaluti mosque is located in the affluent neighborhood of Rabia in west 
Amman, on Omar bin Abd al-Aziz Street, known locally as “the street that 
leads up to the Israeli embassy.” Situated near the bottom of a gentle hill, 
it is adjacent to a vacant lot to the north. Its location more than a half mile 
from the embassy provides both proximity as well as distance: to reach 
the embassy, the crowds would have to march up the road, which narrows 
past the f ield where protesters assembly. The spot is a chokehold that the 
regime might easily secure, but Kaluti is close enough to the embassy for 
protests to make a symbolic statement.
Most of the Kaluti protests are coorganized by a number of political 
and professional groups, but not in a consistent or coordinated manner. 
One or another of the groups might announce a protest, and then others 
will call on their numbers to turn out. The cast of participants varies, but 
they usually include members of the leftist Wahdah5 party, the Jordanian 
5 Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party (Hizb al-Wahdah al-Sha’abiyah al-Dimuqratiyyah 
al-Urduny), formed in 1990 as the Jordanian branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine.
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Communist Party,6 and the Muslim Brotherhood Society and its political 
party, the Islamic Action Front.7 Leaders and members of the professional 
associations – doctors, lawyers, engineers, agricultural engineers, and den-
tists – also participate frequently. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the elected 
leaders of the professional associations often came from Islamist ranks, so 
the coordination between the professional associations and the mainstream 
Islamists was easy and routine, even as animosities between the groups 
sometimes emerged.8
The diversity of regular participants underlines the extent to which 
the role of the Kaluti mosque in the organization of the protests cannot 
be reduced to its symbolism as a religious space. More than a site of pious 
gathering following the major communal prayer of the week, the Kaluti 
mosque provided an adequate physical space for assembly in the same 
neighborhood as the Israeli embassy. Even with Islamist leaders recite 
Quranic passages or lead prayers at the protests themselves, the character 
of the events is seldom exclusively or even primarily religious.
Most protests at the mosque begin on Friday afternoon. Contrary to 
some perceptions, crowds do not assemble following the Friday prayer, 
the congregators riled up by a f iery sermon. Rather, people trickle out and 
gather next to the mosque and in front of it, some leaving and returning, 
others milling around and chatting as others arrive. Leftist protesters 
gather apart from the Islamists, often distinguishable by their sartorial 
choices as well as by their greater gender diversity. Women donning head-
scarves are present in the leftist as well as Islamist contingents, but they 
are most vocal in the former. The sizes of protests can vary substantially, 
but leftists typically number from 20 to 40, and Islamists from 50 to 100 
or more.
Also present are various branches of the security services, occasionally 
in numbers that exceed those of the protesters. They arrive before protest-
ers begin to assemble, and they include two visibly distinct contingents, 
6 Founded in 1948 (Hizb al-Shuyu’iyah al-Urduny).
7 While the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama’a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimuun) and the Islamic Action 
Front party (al-Jabhat al-‘Aml al-Islamiyyah) were institutionally separate in 1992 when the 
latter was formed, by the late 1990s the two had become essentially one and the same.
8 Over the past decade, the regime has worked to weaken the influence of both Islamists 
and leftists in numerous arenas, including the professional associations and university student 
councils. Given that membership in one’s professional association is mandatory to practice 
professionally, most members pay their dues but little more. By encouraging (and likely pay-
ing) more nationalist and conservative members to participate, vote, and run for association 
leadership positions, the regime has steadily weakened “opposition” voices in those bodies.
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and sometimes two less visible ones. First are members of the PSD. They 
handle most of the routine policing but are present at protests. They often 
cluster in groups of two to four and stand off to the side or across the 
street. They move casually around and through the assembly, on some 
occasions also chatting with protesters and handing out bottles of water. 
Their interactions with protesters and particularly with the leaders of the 
Islamist group suggest familiarity. Both leftists and Islamists conf irmed 
to me that they knew and were friendly with some PSD off icers. During 
one protest, on June 12, 2009, I spoke with a PSD off icer who told me that 
the PSD routinely observed known leaders of the group during protests 
– leftists as well as Islamists – in order to gain information about how 
everyone understood the event to be going. At times, they chatted with 
protesters directly.
Indeed, the regime is always concerned with the possibility that the 
protests could escalate. Its second contingent is the Darak forces, Jordan’s 
gendarmerie or militarized police force, which is more popularly under-
stood to f ill the role of the riot police. These forces congregate in two spots: 
approximately 50 meters up the road, where the protest will eventually 
head, and off to the far right (east) side of the empty lot. The Darak in the 
street are clad in riot gear but are directed by an off icer without a helmet. 
Before the protest begins, they stand off to the left (west) side of the road, 
their masks raised and shields held casually, waiting for instructions. The 
second contingent of Darak forces, across the f ield, stand around eight to 
ten armored vehicles readily visible to the protesters.
The two remaining state forces are members of the General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID, known as the mukhabarat or secret police) and plain-
clothed baltajiya (individuals loyal to the regime but not necessarily on 
permanent payroll). The GID is the security force most responsible for harass-
ing and intimidating citizens, threatening them with physical, f inancial, 
or professional retaliation if they fail to abide by the regime’s “requests.” In 
protests, they largely play a more passive roll, monitoring and recording who 
is present but seldom intervening directly. The latter are the “muscle” or thugs 
brought in beginning in 2009 to aggressively engage protesters so that the 
uniformed forces do not have to. The increased presence of the baltajiya at 
protests beginning in 2010 (and through the uprisings) underlines a desire 
to more aggressively constrain protests without uniformed forces having to 
engage them physically. This move is likely due in no small part to widespread 
recording of protest events by protesters, bystanders, and journalists.
The protests themselves begin gradually, with people assembling next 
to the mosque and milling about, chatting with each other. A small truck 
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arrives and Islamist leaders pass out the green flags of the Muslim Brother-
hood, while leftists congregate with flags representing their parties, most 
frequently the red flags of the Wahdah and the Jordanian Communist par-
ties. Other protesters carry Palestinian or Jordanian flags, as well as placards 
that may be hand drawn or more professionally produced. Some protesters 
don the black-and-white kufiyyah (headscarf) that in Jordan symbolizes 
Palestinian nationalism and resistance; some cover the face “Hamas-style” 
(as one Jordanian described it), while others draped the scarves around the 
neck.
The events will often “begin” with Islamist leaders reciting passages from 
the Quran and leading a prayer. Often, leftists will chant or begin a call 
and response, sometimes seemingly in an attempt to drown out the prayer. 
Most commonly, chants include “No to the Zionist entity, no to the peace 
treaty!,” “Zionist entity out of Jordan!,” and “The Jordanian people stand with 
the Palestinian people!” The protesters usually come together into a single 
crowd for a short period, visible by the mingling of red and green flags in the 
assembly; at other times the two camps remain distinct, even if adjacent to 
each other.
Jordan’s leftist parties and Islamist groups have a long history of engag-
ing with each other, particularly in opposition to specif ic government 
policies (Schwedler 2006, 2011; Clark 2006). They began holding joint press 
conferences as early as 1992, expressing shared concerns over changes in 
the electoral law, restrictions on press freedoms, and the overall reversal 
of democratic openings that took places over the course of the 1990s. 
Islamists and leftist were also well represented in the professional as-
sociations, which became a kind of proxy democratic public space as the 
opportunities to express dissent in the parliament steadily decreased. 
But the groups were not without tensions. Leftists in particular disliked 
the Quranic readings and prayers at protest events and rallies, and often 
sought to chant over the religious rhetoric. Younger Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters took particular affront to leftists during such moments, 
although Islamists leaders generally tried to keep the calm and ignore 
the leftists. On some occasions, younger Brothers even get into f ights 
that begin with shouting and sometimes escalate into shoving and even 
punching, until Islamist leaders or the PSD break it up. I attended a rally9 
at the Professional Association Complex in June 2010 but after four hours 
needed to leave for an interview. One activist told me, “Don’t leave before 
9 The rally was held to honor the Jordanians who were aboard the f lotilla that departed 
Istanbul on May 31, 2010, aiming to bring aid to Gaza, which Israel had blockaded. 
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the Brothers and leftists get into a f ight!” Curious, I remained and within 
the hour, shouting turned into shoving until PSD off icers and one Islamist 
elder broke up the small melee. While I witnessed such incidents on only 
a few occasions, the antagonism between the sides and the possibility 
of a f ight is not unusual, even at events supported by groups across the 
political spectrum.
At the Kaluti protests, the assemblage will gradually move off the curb 
and into the street after an hour or so of gradual congregation and chanting 
on the sidewalk or f ield adjacent to the mosque, attempting to shut down 
traff ic. The drivers of cars and trucks seem more annoyed than concerned, 
and they creep forward to make their way through the crowd as long as 
possible.10 The PSD and Darak forces continue to stand off to the side and 
make minimal effort to stop the protesters or keep traff ic flowing. Once 
the road is clogged, an off icer will direct traff ic away from the street and 
sometimes assist trapped drivers in backing out of the crowd blocking the 
street.
This period, with the mass of people in the street and the PSD the 
nearest of the security agencies, can last as little as f ifteen minutes or more 
than hour. Eventually, the leftist contingent will begin to move north up 
the road a few steps at a time, broadly in the direction of the Israel embassy. 
As this period approaches, the Darak assemble in a line well up the street 
but blocking the possibility of the protesters’ advance up the road. At 
that time, the forces don their helmets and line up shoulder-to-shoulder, 
while two or three more senior Darak off icers move around giving orders 
and organizing the line. The forces line up at the same location, directly 
opposite of the doorway for building number 114. Until the protesters ap-
proach that location, the security forces do not interfere in the protesters’ 
activities.
Before any possible tension increases in anticipation of a confronta-
tion between protesters and the Darak forces, the Islamist contingent 
departs. This dynamic was pointed out to me in 2008 by leftist protesters. 
“Watch the green [Muslim Brotherhood] f lags disappear; the Islamists 
are afraid of actually confronting the police,” said one. They mocked the 
timidity of the Islamists – a perspective that I had heard on previous 
10 Indeed, on more than on occasion, I have encountered a protest while in a taxi, and the 
driver has expressed aggravation or frustration at the protesters. Their comments remind me 
of living in Washington, DC, where traff ic disruptions from protests are routine. But as Jordan 
is not a democratic country, it is interesting to note the extent to which protests are a routine 
part of life in the capital, so much so that citizens are more annoyed than concerned.
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occasions – suggesting that the Brothers’ avoidance of any real confronta-
tion with the regime proved that they had been co-opted. One activist 
argued that Islamists wanted to be photographed at protests so that they 
could display to their supporters their opposition to the regime, while “in 
reality they try really hard to avoid any real confrontation” (interview 
with Hisham Bustani, January 13, 2007, Amman). Such a view of Islamists 
as avoiding real contention with the regime is echoed among many leftist 
and independent activists.
Hamzeh Mansour, a prominent leader of the Islamist movement who has 
served as secretary-general of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), pushed back 
against this characterization during an interview in 2003. He said that they 
(the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF) viewed the Palestinian cause as among 
their core missions. To that end, they regularly worked with other political 
parties as well as the professional associations to coorganize protests and 
support each other’s events. But they tried to avoid confrontation with the 
security forces because they feared the presence of instigators who aimed to 
make trouble or cause property damage in order to give the security forces a 
reason to respond harshly or shut down the event, or to portray the Islamists 
in a poor light. “When we see people we do not recognize, we are concerned 
that they will disrupt the peaceful nature of the event by throwing stones 
or breaking windows or lights.”11 The Kaluti protests of the mid-to-late 2000s 
were not disrupted by such instigators, however; the Islamists simply departed 
as the protesters advanced slowly toward the Darak line blocking the road.
At the Kaluti protests, the now predominantly leftist protesters gradually 
move closer to the Darak line, but there is little sense that the impending 
confrontation will turn violent. In fact, the street itself is never entirely 
blocked, and people – passers-by, journalists, and even members of the 
assemblage – can easily walk freely around the back and sides of the police 
line. The appearance is one of the protesters performing an effort to march 
on the Israeli embassy more than actually trying to do so. For their part, the 
Darak forces play their own role of “stopping” the protest’s advance – stand-
ing in a line with shields raised that signif ies “You shall not pass!” without 
actually blocking off the entire road. Armored Darak vehicles across the 
f ield to the east do always signal a willingness and capacity for repression, 
however, should it be necessary.
11 Interview at IAF off ices, Amman, December 10, 2003. This interview concerned the Islamists’ 
experiences with protests in general, and did not discuss the more routine Kaluti protests discussed 
here. He did speak of an earlier effort to hold a major protest at the site in 2002, but on that occasion 
the security forces blocked access to the site and the event was consequently canceled.
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As the distance between the protest and the police vanishes, women 
often take the lead in the chants. One female activist told me that they did 
so in order to dare the police to violently repress women who are peacefully 
protesting, particularly with photographers heavily present. The protesters 
do not attempt to break through the police line, but some limited pushing is 
not uncommon as the protesters and police f inally meet. This f inal period 
of confrontation can last as little as ten minutes or more than an hour, 
depending on the energy of the crowd.
In June 2010, a new actor appeared at the Kaluti protests: the baltajiya, 
plain-clothed supporters of the regime brought in to serve as “muscle” to 
create a buffer between protesters and the uniformed security forces. These 
men hold hands and form a line facing the protesters, their backs to the 
uniformed police. One Wahdah protester told me, “I think they12 are doing 
this so that they have an excuse to get physical but [the government] can 
deny responsibility; even if it is caught on camera, they’ll say it wasn’t them” 
(interview during a protest, June 2, 2010). The faces of these plain-clothed 
men express hostility as they glare at the protesters and journalists alike. 
They glare menacingly not only at protesters but also at reporters and others 
observing the protesters, as if threatening them to stay back. The police, 
however, focus their attention on the protesters themselves, largely ignoring 
journalists and other observers as they move in and out of the crowd, even 
around the back of the police line itself.
Jordanians have been protesting actively in Jordan since the political 
liberalization of 1989, and even with the reversal of many of those reforms 
they have never stopped. In November 2010, the IAF and Wahdah parties 
both boycotted the parliamentary elections and called for the king to 
withdraw from governance and allow a real constitutional democracy to 
emerge. Protests escalated in size and frequency, but most did not represent 
a signif icant rupture from existing protest routines.13
By September 2011, protesters gathered at Kaluti almost weekly since the 
uprising began, and some of the activists began to refer to themselves as the 
Kaluti Group, as did the media. Their Million Man March failed to attract 
the numbers they had hoped, but the protests at the site continued. In July 
2014, large protests across Amman erupted in response to the launch of 
12 I understood “they” to refer to the regime, but I did not have the opportunity to follow up 
for a more specif ic answer about who she thought had given the order to bring in these men.
13 A full review of the ruptures that did emerge is outside of the scope of this chapter, but will 
appear in my forthcoming book, Protesting Jordan. Also see Tobin (2012); Ryan (2014); and Yom 
(2014).
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Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in which more than 2,300 Palestinians 
were killed and 10,000 injured, including 3,000 children, over a seven-week 
period (Maan News Agency 2015).
During that period, some dozen Kaluti Group protesters broke routine: 
despite the heavy police presence, they pushed passed the Darak line in an 
effort to make their way up the street in the direction of the Israeli embassy. 
They were stopped well short of their goal, but their willingness to violate 
the understood script led to their arrest. Their arrest was announced via 
loudspeaker to those remaining with the main protest near the mosque. 
All were released later without being charged.
The Work of Protests
If the Kaluti protesters were not trying to actually reach the Israeli embassy 
all those years, what were they doing? In 2010 I asked one independent 
activist, What would happen if you just decided to start the protest farther 
up the street, closer to the Israeli embassy? Without hesitation he said, 
“They would arrest us and beat the shit out of us” (interview with Hisham 
Bustani, June 14, 2010, Amman). The protests would be shut down, he said, 
and they would not be able to protest at all. But reaching the embassy was 
not the objective as much as protesting against it.
The question of whether to seek political change by working “within” 
the system or outside of it is a perennial one for activists. Adhering to state-
imposed boundaries limits possibilities for change but affords greater room 
to operate; crossing known red lines invites swift repression. The actors in the 
Kaluti group protests may have brought different agendas to the events, but 
they largely adhered to the script that enabled them to carry out the protests 
with regularity over the years. The protests were contentious to the extent that 
they consistently called for the end of a treaty that the regime was committed 
to maintaining; however, the protesters’ adherence to a script that had been 
learned and adopted over time had a practical effect of deflating the protests 
of more contentious dynamics: they had become routine, mundane, almost 
ritualistic. The blasé attitudes of many bystanders, onlookers, and drivers 
caught in traffic further suggest that the protests did not even register as even 
potentially politically contentious. In that sense, their adherence to behavior 
acceptable to the regime also worked to shore up the regime’s own authority.
What, then, were the protesters getting from the protests? What kinds 
of political work were they doing, and for whom? And what did each un-
derstand themselves and others to be doing? In talking to protesters, it is 
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clear that a primary reason for holding protests, even constrained ones, 
is to keep open the crack that allows for the open expression of political 
dissent, particularly around Jordan’s relations with Israel and the rights 
of Palestinians everywhere (but particularly in Jordan). The work of the 
protests was not only to express specif ic claims against the regime (abroga-
tion of the peace treaty, etc.), but also to affect public discourse. In this 
case, the protests keep the widespread disapproval of the treaty present 
in the public spaces.
All protests, and thus all actors in protests, have numerous audiences. For 
the protesters, these include: passers-by, some curious and others shouting 
words of encouragement or of condemnation at the protesters; the Jordanian 
body public; journalists and others recording or photographing the event; 
and the regime. Protesters also participate for themselves, and for their 
followers, to show their own continued relevance as well as for affective 
reasons and building solidarity.
For all the protesters, the Darak forces serve for as a proxy for the regime, 
in that confronting security forces symbolizes confronting the regime and 
its policies as well much as it entails a real physical confrontation. But 
protesters direct their chants at the Darak off icers themselves, calling them 
out for their service to a regime that has betrayed the Palestinian struggle 
by making peace with the enemy. Here the presence of the leftists at the 
last stage of the protest is as meaningful as the Islamists absence: only the 
leftists are immediately shouting at the Darak, confronting them face-to-
face. Thus the Islamists, in their absence by that stage, are not participating 
in the critique directed at the individual Darak off icers.
Leftists also have Islamists as an audience, daring them to be more 
contentious than they are willing to be, and exposing their unwillingness 
to directly confront the regime. Islamists appear little concerned with 
leftists or leftist critiques of Islamists, but as a movement and party they 
are plenty concerned with their own constituency. Journalists from the 
Islamist weekly Al-Sabeel photograph the Islamists and their f lags and 
report on their presence at protests, expanding the Islamist audience from 
those who came out to the protest at the leaders’ requests, to include those 
who follow Islamist media but are not present at the events.
The Islamist leaders are clearly concerned with the regime, more so in 
the late 2000s than in earlier periods. In the 1990s and early 2000s, they 
were visible participants in many contentious protests, including several 
at which Islamist leaders were injured. At the Kaluti protests, however, the 
leaders and their ranks routinely exited well before the other protesters 
moved into closer confrontation with the Darak.
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For the regime, allowing the protests supports its declared commitment to 
freedom of expression. King Abdullah has boasted to his allies that Jordan is a 
“moderate” regime working to implement democratic reforms, but real politi-
cal freedoms have steadily declined. Protests that are widely photographed 
provide tangible evidence that the regime tolerates political dissent. Indeed, 
several protesters told me that the ability to protest on highly political issues 
was by the late 2000s the only remaining political freedom in Jordan. With the 
parliament, the professional associations, and media all tightly constrained 
and conveying overwhelmingly proregime perspectives, protests are one 
of the few remaining arenas for expressing political dissent. The regime 
tolerates rather than encourages protests, and always seeks to keep them 
contained.14 And as long as the protesters adhere to the established script, 
routine protests also work to produce and reproduce the regime’s power.
Protests can do other work for the regime, as in 1997 when the f irst 
Jordanian-Israeli trade fair was effectively shut down by hundreds of 
protesters choking access to the exhibition hall. The regime might have 
more aggressively pushed back the protesters, but instead let the protests 
do the work of interfering in normalization at a time when government 
off icials and King Hussein were frustrated with the actions of the Israeli 
prime minister. The protests proved a useful interruption, and one that 
the regime could also portray as illustrative of emerging democratic life 
in Jordan. At the same time, the regime sought to monitor and manage 
protests, lest the crowds become too large or diff icult to easily contain. 
The heavy Darak presence, the armored vehicles, and the appearance of 
the baltajiya betray regime concern that protests might escalate. Protests 
keep alive the possibility of serious challenge to the regime, which remains 
vigilant in preparing for (and seeking to prevent) that moment.
As scholars of protest have recognized, regimes also can gauge public sen-
timent by watching protest activity closely for changes. The Kaluti protests 
played this role for the regime. With the protesters seldom numbering over 
200, a sharp escalation would provide the regime with valuable information. 
Similarly, the failure of the Million Man March in September 2011 to bring 
out a significantly larger-than-usual crowd conveyed its own message, to the 
regime as well as the organizers. But even at their most routine, the Kaluti 
protests kept present the possibility of a larger mobilization, signaling to 
the regime that they would not go away.
14 My current book manuscript, Protesting Jordan, explores the regime’s preference for small, 
stationary protest events, rather than larger events or marches. What the regime permits or 
forbids also varies by neighborhood.
roUtines And rUptUres in Anti- isrAeli protests in JordAn 85
Finally, not immediately present but still members of the audience for the 
Kaluti protests are Israel and the Israeli embassy off icials up the road; the 
regime, which maintains the peace treaty; the parliament, which ratif ied 
the peace treaty; the United States, which considers Jordan a key ally and 
watches the kingdom closely; and other foreign nations.
Many Amman residents encounter the Kaluti protests but do not exhibit a 
sense of concern or danger about them. Passers-by sometimes stop to watch 
but, just as often, they continue walking up or down the street without 
so much as a turned head. The heavy presence of the Darak – with their 
armored vehicles and a line of off icers in riot gear blocking much of a street 
– simply does not elicit concern, even though Jordan is not a democracy. 
I have often hired a taxi to drop me near to a Kaluti protest and have on 
several occasions witnessed the driver register exasperation at the ways in 
which protests disrupt traff ic. Photographs of protesters confronting riot 
police suggest danger and potential violence. But that possibility – while 
always present – is often understood to be so remote that it does not register 
with bystanders and passers-by.
Protests may be a central form of contentious politics, but they do other 
kinds of political work as well. In particular, what the protests mean, and 
to whom, extends well beyond the straightforward narrative suggested by a 
regime-opposition confrontation. Protests that might seem to be failing – in 
their diminishing numbers and failure to produce real policy changes – may 
be quite productive in other ways.
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Abstract
The rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) in the aftermath of the 
2011 Tunisian uprising is indicative of the opportunities and pitfall of in-
stitutionalization of revolutionary movements in situations of democratic 
transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. AST’s failure to become a 
leading player of the Tunisian political transition is a direct consequence 
of its strategic confrontation with other Islamist and secularized players 
seeking to impose a new identity on the Tunisian state and society. On 
closer inspection, the origins of this confrontation can be traced to the 
intestine struggles within AST, between different ideological trends, and 
between the leadership and the base to def ine the identity and practices 
of the movement.
Keywords: Tunisia, mobilization, democratic transition, Salaf ism, rep-
ertoire, contention, identity
The Tunisian revolution started the 2011 Arab uprisings and brought 
to light key aspects of regime change in the region. Regime change in 
Tunisia also revealed the complexities of social activism in the country 
that were previously quashed by a police state. In particular, a highly 
visible aspect of grassroots activism after 2011 was Salaf i religious, social 
and political mobilization. This raised the question of how a movement 
with no previous history as a mass-based organization could became a 
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serious challenger for both state institutions and established social move-
ments – how new individual and collective identities could crystallize 
into a powerful religious activism, that would then break down after a 
couple of years.
During the Tunisian democratic transition, the activism of previously 
co-opted and repressed social and political players, such as the Tunisian 
General Labor Union (UGTT) and the Islamists of the Ennahda movement, 
molded the reinstitutionalization process (Beinin 2016; Filiu 2015). Yet the 
uprisings and transition episodes also enabled many new players to enter 
the arena of contentious politics and make their mark. For “old” players, 
the fall of the regime provided an opportunity to reengage with the state 
and to redraw the formal boundaries of the arena of political contention. 
The wider arena of social contention opened up by the contingent process 
of a leaderless uprising was itself also crucial in reforming “old” players’ 
identities and practices, as well as in shaping those of “new” players who did 
not have much of a voice before. The rise and fall of the Salaf i movement 
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) between 2011 and 2013 illustrates well some 
of the complex interactions between arenas and players, as well as between 
players themselves in a context of rapid institutional changes.
What we can view as a unitary player from one perspective, we can al-
ternatively portray as an arena of contestation where constituent members 
f ight for the direction and identity of their movement. In the following, 
Ansar al-Sharia is analyzed f irst as a player competing against other social 
and political players to shape arenas of contention and of governance 
in post-uprising Tunisia, and second as an arena of contention over the 
meaning and practice of Tunisian Salaf ism. I challenge the assumption 
that there is a predef ined (Islamist) constituency in the polity simply 
waiting to be mobilized by specif ic (Islamist) players. Different social and 
political players became AST through diverse and contingent processes 
of mobilization. In its turn, the formulation of the AST political project 
itself was shaped by the (diff icult) integration of diverse constituencies 
of activists.
AST’s formative period was marked by “transformative events” (Sewell 
1996), which reshape the form and content of arenas of contention, from 
the local to the national. Nationally, they enabled the activities of previ-
ously excluded Salaf i players. These institutional changes – particularly 
breakdowns – facilitated new logics of situation and action (Dobry 2009) 
over established behavioral routines. The coming together of AST and its 
eventual downfall were in large part attributable to the strategic interactions 
between Salaf i political entrepreneurs and Salaf i grassroots sympathizers, 
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and between these Salaf i players and other Tunisian social and political 
players. Yet the identity of the movement and of its members, as well as its 
ideological and political orientation, remained contentious throughout the 
transitional period.
The recognizable Salaf i ideological repertoire put forward by AST’s 
emerging national leaders coevolved with the more idiosyncratic, emo-
tional, and immanent appropriations and interpretations of Islamist 
themes and practices by self-made grassroots Salaf i players who con-
structed their religious orientations mainly during the transition. The 
activism of AST players combined practices derived from preexisting Salafi 
and/or national repertoires of contention with newer practices derived 
more directly from the arenas of contention produced by the uprisings 
and state deinstitutionalization. In their turn, the interactions between 
new and old players and the new democratizing Tunisian state, as well 
as the interactions between the players themselves, slowly reshaped a 
new, post-revolutionary arena of contention structured by democratic 
institutions.
Arenas of contention are the physical and material sites where players 
can shape and consolidate their identity and practices via the strategic 
interactions that link them to their arena and to other players (Jasper 2011). 
Ansar al-Sharia represented such a tentative consolidation of new identities 
and contentious practices during an episode of deinstitutionalization and 
reinstitutionalization of the Tunisian state. This process and its outcomes 
were not “predefined” by Salafi discourses and practices, and their (in)com-
patibility with democratic institutions. Instead, the interactions between 
the grassroots sympathizers inspired by a “revolutionary” praxis and the 
Salaf i elites make it diff icult for the cadres of the movement to impose a 
political discipline. In its turn, this set of interactions increased over time 
the level of the strategic confrontations between AST and other players of 
the Tunisian democratic transition.
The strategic confrontation between pro-state players seeking to entrench 
the formal arena of contention of a liberal democratic political order and 
AST players challenging these state-imposed boundaries eventually led to 
the collapse of AST as a unitary player. The consolidation of the institutions 
of the state enabled state players to exclude AST from the formal arena of 
political contention by declaring it an illegitimate and illegal player (i.e., a 
terrorist organization in this case). Unable to sustain a high enough level 
of popular mobilization in the face of an increasing level of state repressive 
practices, AST dissolved back into a multiplicity of Salaf i identities and 
players.
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Islamist Players and Contention in Tunisia before 
the Arab Uprisings
The def ining features of social and political (de)mobilization in Tunisia 
under authoritarian rule were the limited arenas of contention that were 
left open to Islamist and non-Islamist opposition players, who in turn 
developed specif ic repertoires of contention in response to repression. 
The anticolonial movement that had become the leading political force in 
Tunisia at the time of independence, the Neo-Destour Party of Habib Bour-
guiba, advocated a secularized nationalist discourse as the foundation of 
the postcolonial state. While Islamic-minded players had contributed to 
the construction of a Tunisian national identity shaped by Islamic culture, 
they had not coalesced into a structured political force at the time. For 
most of the 1960s and 1970s the main political debates and tensions in the 
country revolved around the opposition between leftist and liberal politi-
cal players. The repeated changes of political orientation of the Bourguiba 
regime (toward the left in the early 1960s and then back toward the right 
in the early 1970s) were accompanied by a steady increase in authoritarian 
political practices. The violent confrontation between the UGTT and the 
regime in late 1978-early 1979 resulted in nationwide riots which required 
the intervention of the army (Beinin 2016). Although ultimately unsuc-
cessful, this protest event would induce the regime to initiate a (short) 
period of political liberalization in the early 1980s that widened the scope 
for contentious politics. During this period of authoritarian relaxation 
Islamists emerged as recognizable political players.
The Movement of Islamic Tendency (MIT), which would later become 
Ennahda, was formally launched in 1981 with the objective of obtaining 
legal recognition as a political party. Islamist mobilization inspired by the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been growing in the country in the 1970s, 
mainly via dawa (proselytizing) networks advocating a cultural revival of 
Islamic teaching and practices (Burgat 1993). Increasingly popular among 
both a conservative public and religiously minded youth, the movement 
cofounded by Rashid Ghannushi sought to use the new liberalizing rhetoric 
of the regime to gain public recognition and avoid open repression. Unset-
tled by the emergence of a new opposition player whose religious identity 
ran counter to the secularizing identity of the state, the Bourguiba regime 
refused to legalize the MIT and jailed its principal leaders. They would 
remain in jail until the nationwide “food riots” of 1984, which forced the 
regime into another short period of political liberalization that included 
an amnesty for all political prisoners.
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In the mid-80s, increasingly repressive practices by the state expanded 
the strategic confrontations between Islamist players and the regime (Allani 
2009). As interactions became more violent, the identities and preferences 
of both sets of players began to change. In 1987, the Tunisian authorities 
charged that some members of the MIT had been planning an armed insur-
rection against the regime, and the death penalty was pronounced against 
Islamist players. The ruling elites’ strategic use of violence against the Islam-
ists not only reshaped the interaction between Islamist and state players 
and threatened the internal cohesion of the MIT, but it also weakened the 
grip of an ageing president Bourguiba over the regime. At the end of 1987 
Bourguiba’s new prime minister (and former interior minister), Ben Ali, 
deposed the president in a palace coup. As Ben Ali sought to consolidate 
his authority within state institutions, he endeavored to contain external 
challenges to his legitimacy as president by proposing a new period of 
political liberalization.
The leadership of the MIT, now renamed Ennahda, reaff irmed its re-
formist, nonviolent political identity in the early days of the Ben Ali regime 
as leniency from the ruling institutions facilitated a modest redrawing of 
the formal arenas of political contestation (Tamimi 2001). Although the 
movement was not at the time a legally recognized political organization, 
it was able to present its members as independents candidates to the 1989 
parliamentary elections. Ennahda-aff iliated candidates obtained abound 
15 percent of the vote according to the off icial results and about 30 percent, 
according to independent observers (Dunn 1996; Daoud 1991). These relative 
gains made by Tunisian Islamist players, and the dominance of Islamist 
players in the democratic transition taking place at that time in neighboring 
Algeria, encouraged the Ben Ali regime to roll back its democratic reforms 
in order to retain political control. In the months and years that followed 
the elections, state repression targeting Ennahda increased and most of 
its leaders once again were either jailed by the regime or, like Ghannushi, 
forced into exile. Signif icantly, this transformation of the domestic arenas 
of contention did not break down the reformist identity and electoralist 
strategy that the leadership of the party had articulated during the political 
opening.
In response to Algeria’s civil conflict, which from 1992 onward pitted a 
military-backed regime against armed Islamist guerrilla groups, the Tuni-
sian regime increased its repression of all Islamist players. The hardening 
of the Ben Ali regime shrank the political arenas for all social and political 
players, regardless of their ideological orientation (Camau and Geisser 2003). 
At the turn of the century, the identity of the Tunisian regime turned on its 
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repression of and ideological opposition to Islamist players, as reaff irmed 
through the new security discourse and policies of the “War on Terror” that 
permeated the international arena after the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks in the 
United States. With social and political contestation severely limited by the 
security policies of the state in the 2000s, Islamic-minded players explored 
two main strategies of activism.
First, there was growing interest in Salaf i-jihadism, even though for 
the most part the players attracted to this identity did not translate this 
ideational involvement into concrete actions. Salaf i-jihadi players with 
links to transnational networks such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) occasionally mounted operations in Tunisia, 
such as the 2002 bombing of the Djerba Synagogue. Nonetheless, they 
were unable to signif icantly modify the repertoire of contention of Islam-
ism in Tunisia which, by choice or by default, remained predominantly 
nonviolent. The 2007 dismantling by Tunisian security forces of the “group 
of Soliman” – named for the location of their only and f inal showdown 
with the police – showed the limited outreach of Salaf i-jihadi discourse 
and networks in the country at the time (Wolf 2013). Second, as an alterna-
tive to violent contention, the main form of activism during the 2000s 
was a “scientif ic” type of Salaf ism that concentrates on the Islamization 
of the individual and articulates itself on friends and family networks. 
While this ultra-conservative Islamic identity influenced by Wahhabism 
had been present in the country since the 1970s, it made ground in the 
2000s due to the weakness of other Islamist players (such as Ennahda) 
and a particularly constrained arena of contention which only left room 
for microsocial activism (International Crisis Group 2013b; Merone and 
Cavatorta 2012).
Prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings, Islamist networks of all orientations 
were not organized at the national level due to intense police surveillance. 
With no political activities tolerated, and the mosques under tight police 
control, activists could only articulate dissenting cultural and religious 
views within small local circles, which were also mostly disconnected 
from the global Islamist discourse due to heavy state control over the 
media and internet. Hence, Islamists were not able to evaluate the influ-
ence and appeal of their views in Tunisian society shaped by secularized 
state policies, nor were they able to fully appreciate the specif icities and 
strength of the different approaches to Islamization in the larger Islamic 
public sphere.
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Social Mobilization and Islamization in the Wake of the 
Tunisian Uprising
In the immediate aftermath of the Tunisian uprising (2011-2012), the syner-
gies and tensions between Salaf i political entrepreneurs and rank-and-f ile 
Salaf i sympathizers shaped the identity of Ansar al-Sharia in a context 
characterized by fluid boundaries between arenas of contestation and weak 
state institutional order. Islamist and Salaf i players were not spearheading 
the street protests that slowly gained momentum in December 2010 after 
the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in the provincial town of Sidi 
Bouzid. Groups and individuals participated in an ad hoc fashion in protest 
events for a multiplicity of reasons, usually at f irst in relation to specif ic 
local dilemmas and dynamics (Allal 2011). Even as these protests snowballed 
into a nationwide uprising by the turn of the year, this “leaderless/leaderfull” 
movement was not at the time orchestrated by one or a few structured 
national social and political players. The leaderless character of the protests 
at the time is probably best described as a case of a multiplicity of local lead-
ers (hence leader-full) who were not part of an overarching organization. 
Localized protest dynamics reflected the mobilization of multiple players 
trying to obtain different concessions from local and national authorities, 
as well as acts of revenge, self-promotion, economic opportunism, and so 
on (Volpi 2017). Across the board, the anti-regime rhetoric and practices 
were not particularly colored by Islamic identity markers.
As the uprisings gained further momentum in the f irst half of January 
2011, some of the better-structured (and previously co-opted) opposition 
forces in the country, such as the UGTT, began articulating more program-
matically and strategically the demands of the protestors (Beinin 2016). The 
UGTT’s call for a national strike initially launched in Sfax on January 12 
provided a useful framework for the anti-regime protests. Ben Ali’s depar-
ture on January 14, 2011 deepened the process of deinstitutionalization of 
the state and reconfigured the national arena of contention. Pressure from 
the street and from opposition players led the transitional government 
to implement swiftly a general amnesty of political prisoners and to set 
up simple administrative processes to legalize political organizations. At 
this juncture, Islamists players made a noticeable return to the arenas of 
contentious politics. They not only reentered national politics, but also 
competed locally against other social movements to gain influence in the 
local councils, as well as sought to gain control of the religious institutions 
previously controlled by the state (Volpi, Merone, and Loschi 2016).
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In the spring of 2011 Islamist networks of all orientations scrambled to 
organize themselves and to obtain legal recognition in Tunisia. The Ennahda 
party was legalized on March 1, 2011. The Hizb ut-Tahir movement also 
attempted to become a political party, but was turned down the f irst time 
around – it would become off icially recognized the following year. The 
Ansar al-Sharia movement was formally launched in late April 2011, but 
it did not seek legal recognition as a political party. New Tunisian Salaf i 
associations and parties also emerged progressively over the months, includ-
ing Jabhat al Islah, which became a political party in 2012, Hizb al-Asala, and 
Hizb Arrahma. The formal establishment of parties and associations was a 
direct consequence of the changing institutional order in the Tunisian polity 
and the redrawing of the boundaries of the arenas of formal political conten-
tion. Beyond formal institutional changes, however, complex mobilization 
processes empowered these organizations in different ways as a result of 
new strategic interactions between new and old players (Donker 2013).
The AST organization launched by Abou Ayadh was in April 2011 mainly 
an empty shell structured around a small network of older Salaf is who had 
participated in international armed jihadism and spent time in Tunisian 
jails. Its main public presence was online, in the social media, notably 
through the al-Qairawan Media Foundation, with postings on blogs, a 
Facebook pages, etc. (Branson 2014). Through these outlets, the leaders 
and cadres of the new organization advocated a mixture of common Salaf i 
themes and Tunisian-framed interpretations (notably the views of Al-Idrissi, 
even though he never joined AST). These Salaf i players sought a national 
audience and local supporters in order to compete with other Islamist and 
other non-Islamist players in a liberalized public sphere.
Grassroots support for Ansar al-Sharia grew throughout 2011 and 2012 
in the context of a reconfiguration of the local arenas of contention within 
the formal and informal religious space. Until the uprising, the regime 
had tightly controlled the mosques, and imams had to deliver sermons 
preapproved and in some case provided by the Interior ministry. As the 
repressive apparatus of the regime fell apart at the beginning of 2011, groups 
of mosque-goers took it upon themselves to evict the off icial imams from 
their local mosques and to replace them by local religious players. While 
some of the new imams were old Islamist opponents of the regime previously 
associated with Ennahda or Islamic scholars not involved in social activism, 
in many poor urban neighborhoods these new religious “authorities” were 
young activists who gained recognition in the weeks that followed the 
uprising (Merone 2016). These self-made Imams and their associates were 
able to establish themselves because they were commonly the f irst ones to 
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take action against state-appointed religious personnel in their neighbor-
hood. Once in place, they sought to legitimize their presence by linking 
up with more structured and higher prof ile Islamist players (interview, 
Bizerte, November 2015). AST was a main product of this encounter between 
established Salaf i players in search of an audience and local activists in 
search of guidance and recognition.
For new grassroots Salafi players, the flexibility of the AST discourse and 
the autonomy given to local activists gave AST a competitive advantage 
over stricter Islamist organizations like Hizb ut-Tahir (interview with a 
former AST sympathizer, Medenine, October 2014). In the early days of the 
transition, the AST brand grew by spontaneous aff iliation of local Islamist 
youth who found in this organization an umbrella structure providing 
user-friendly ideological resources and theological expertise. At that time, 
three sets of interactions were particularly important for the success of the 
movement. First, AST leaders debated among themselves the issue of the 
primary orientation and identity of AST as a mass-based movement. Second, 
the interactions between the base and the top of the movement kept reshap-
ing the internal rules and chain of command of the organization. Third 
and last, the relations between AST groups and other local Salaf i groups 
inspired by AST but not formally part of the movement kept fluctuating as 
a function of changing political circumstances.
Permanent Revolution versus Institutionalizing 
Political Salafism?
The definition of a distinct Salaf i arena of contention as a result of strategic 
competition between Salafi, Islamist and secularized players characterizes 
the beginning of the new democratic Tunisian model (2012-2013). Grassroots 
mobilization turned into a more structured model of militancy that en-
trenched AST as a recognized, unitary social and political player contesting 
the dominant narrative of state reinstitutionalization. The efforts made to 
structure the rapidly expanding movement were visible at AST’s second 
national congress in Kairouan in May 2012. Over 5,000 local representa-
tives from all over the country met to discuss the general orientations of 
the movement (Merone and Cavatorta 2012). National leaders sought to 
formalize the role of the grassroots Salaf i players who had joined the 
movement by including them in centralized national organization. The 
AST leadership also sought to maintain open channels of communication 
with the then ruling party, Ennahda, by having some of their cadres of the 
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Islamist movement at the conference. This drive to make AST a recognized 
unitary player on the national scene was nonetheless counterbalanced by 
the centripetal tendencies of Salaf i activism (Cavatorta 2015).
One noticeable area of friction within AST as much as between AST 
and other social and political players concerned the protean repertoire of 
contentious politics used by grassroots activists, and particularly the use of 
violence. The Salafis’ emphasis on the Quranic notion of “commanding good 
and forbidding wrong” (amr bil maruf wa nahi anil munkir) was interpreted 
and implemented in many different ways by groups in their local context. 
Retrospectively, Salaf i sympathizers often blamed the overzealous and 
misguided Salaf i youths who were too quick to use violence to back up 
their religious message and gave a poor image of AST and of Salaf i players 
generally (interview with former AST sympathizers, Douar Isher, October 
2015). For AST, guilt by association became a growing nuisance in 2012 as 
other social and political players increasingly identif ied the movement as 
a serious competitor (Merone and Cavatorta 2013). The revolutionary mood 
that until then had supported the idea that everything could be changed 
in the country became negatively associated with AST; an organization 
that seemingly challenged all the things that most social and political 
players then wanted to remain stable. In this context, the negative “radical 
f lank effect” which hindered the movement’s acceptance by the wider 
public was not compensated by a positive radical f lank effect in favor of 
the institutionalized Islamists of Ennahda.1
The violent demonstration that took place at the US embassy in Tunis in 
September 2012 gave another twist to these dynamics of grassroots violence 
poorly controlled by AST. Although AST and other Islamist organizations 
had called for a demonstration, its members constituted only a part of 
the crowd that participated, and the ransacking of the nearby American 
school was a coincidental event. Alongside AST members and sympathiz-
ers in recognizable Salaf i attire, came youths sporting shorts and T-shirts 
from neighboring poor suburbs who engaged in looting once the protest 
became more violent (Mosaique FM 2012). As the protest went out of control, 
Tunisian security forces began using live ammunition against protesters in 
an ad hoc response to the turn of events. Secularized political players used 
this episode to ask the Ennahda-led government to ban AST and to step 
up its security response against Salaf i activism. In the aftermath of this 
event, secular opposition actors publicly denounced AST as the main culprit 
1 For typical strategic dilemmas in situations of nonviolent resistance, see Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011.
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behind the violence, and singled out Abou Ayadh as the man responsible 
(Mandraud 2012). Chased by the police, the AST founder went underground 
in Tunisia before crossing over to Libya and associating himself with Ansar 
al-Sharia in Libya.
At about the same time, the negotiations between Ennahda and the 
secularized opposition over the role of Sharia in the new Tunisian consti-
tution had marginalized the views proposed by the conservative faction 
of Ennahda, which were closest to the Salaf i viewpoint, and which had 
lobbied to make Sharia central to the new Tunisian constitution. Despite 
recognizing the popular appeal of AST at a grassroots level, the Ennahda 
leadership had decided that reaching a compromise with pro-secular forces 
was a priority to stabilize the political system. Salafi criticism mounted over 
the months, as grassroots Salafi players increasingly opposed pro-Ennahda 
and pro-government players (Marks 2013). AST and other Salaf i activists 
strategically targeted controversial cultural events and initiatives as well as 
contentious economic activities such the sale of alcohol in order to position 
themselves as the defenders of true Islamic identity. These confrontations 
were underpinned by a growing disappointment with the policies of En-
nhada among grassroots Salaf is, as well as by a desire to reshape their own 
social world in a context where the earlier consensus about the identity 
of the state and of Tunisian society had weakened (interview with former 
Salaf i activists, Douar Hisher, November 2015).
Social and political empowerment was a mobilizing factor particularly 
for the “revolutionary youth” who were seeking to improve their condition 
and society through direct action as they did in the heyday of the uprising. 
Many grassroots activists of all ideological orientations who had become 
empowered at the beginning of the transitional period through “neighbor-
hood committees,” “revolutionary leagues,” and so on, sought to entrench 
their position (Allal 2011). As institutionalized politics and governance 
slowly came back to play a main role in their everyday life, the ad hoc, 
extra-institutional power of these activists began to decrease signif icantly. 
Once in government the Ennahda party in particular was quite effective 
at co-opting many of these local players into its network of governance 
(Volpi, Merone, and Loschi 2016). Islamic-minded players unsatisf ied with 
the terms of the new deal proposed by the Ennahda-led government found 
in the AST an outlet for contesting the new forms of administrative control 
of society.
A second set of strategic interactions were more directly shaped by the 
religious identity of AST and its Salaf i discourse. The grassroots activists’ 
newly aff irmed views about the position of women in society, the scope of 
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Sharia in regulating social interactions, etc., clashed with those of other 
social actors in everyday practices (Cavatorta 2015; Donker 2013). In this 
context, dissatisf ied by the liberal discourse of Ennahda, Salaf i players 
questioned the ability of the party to position Islam centrally in the new 
state system and to help re-Islamicize society. They used those social 
spaces that they had continued to build in the aftermath of the uprisings 
(mosques, poorer neighborhoods) as a springboard to challenge locally 
the authority of the new democratic government and the legitimacy of 
the state. Salaf i sympathizers, particularly among the unemployed youth, 
repeatedly underpinned this identity-based discourse with an account of 
the socioeconomic hardship faced by the population linking socioeconomic 
failure to a lack of proper Islamic governance (interview with former Salaf i 
activists, Douar Hisher, October 2015).
AST as an Arena of Contention and Post-AST Salafi Trajectories
AST failed to entrench a collective identity derived from revolutionary 
practices and to turn itself into an institutionalized movement in the face 
of a reemerging state during the period of democratic normalization of the 
Tunisian model (2013-2014). Strategic competition among AST players and 
between them and pro-state players became at this juncture the principal 
causal factor behind the implosion of the movement. The September 2012 
attack against the US embassy had illustrated the diff iculties of AST to 
speak with a single voice. Subsequently, the flight of one of its main leaders 
accentuated the tendency of AST to function as a multicephalous organiza-
tion. In addition, frictions among different AST currents increased sharply, 
alongside the frictions between them and state and secular players, after 
another act of political violence at the start of the year. On February 6, 2013, 
Salafi-jihadi players loosely connected to AST assassinated leftist opposition 
parliamentarian Chokri Belaid. By openly using political assassinations to 
support their views, these players redrew the boundaries of the arena of 
contestation between AST and other political players, as well as undermined 
the fragile consensus inside AST. Inside the movement, this assassination 
exacerbated the ideological and tactical differences between different cur-
rents within AST ahead of the third annual conference of the movement. 
Those Salaf i-jihadis advocating armed jihad saw Belaid as an apostate 
due to his secularist positions, and thus as someone whom it could be 
legitimate to kill in the circumstances. The (larger) Salafi current following 
the initial model proposed by Abou Ayadh saw the country as a Muslim 
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land in which they could wage the jihad by the tongue (proselytism) and 
so there was no case for waging jihad by the sword (Merone and Cavatorta 
2013; International Crisis Group 2013b).
Domestically, the political violence of the armed jihadi players un-
dermined the strategies of the more pragmatic AST players who did not 
want to engage in a frontal confrontation with the state and secularized 
social movements. In the aftermath of the assassination, the secularized 
opposition parties and civil society organizations such as the UGTT which 
had been criticizing the leniency of the Ennahda-led government toward 
Salaf i players, stepped up their criticism of the lax security policies of the 
government to woo public opinion. To reaff irm the authority of the state 
and its own national legitimacy, Ennahda progressively changed its strategic 
positioning toward AST from a policy of informal accommodation to one 
of formal confrontation. This change, tentatively enacted through the ar-
rest warrant for Abou Ayadh, took a new dimension in May 2013 when the 
interior minister banned the third national conference of AST about to take 
place in Kairouan (Blaise 2013).
As soon as the AST conference was banned, grassroots AST activists and 
sympathizers battled the police in several suburbs of Tunis and several other 
towns. At the same time, senior f igures of the movement discursively hyped 
their opposition to the government and the state institutions (Weslaty 
2013). The decision of the Tunisian government to be less lenient toward the 
transgressions of AST pushed further away the possibility of legalization 
and institutionalization of the movement, as illustrated by the behavior 
and discourse of the Salaf i players at the time. Even retrospectively in the 
light of the failure of AST, grassroots Salaf i sympathizers did not usually 
estimate that the organization had missed an opportunity by failing to 
turn itself into a formal political organization. They would argue that it was 
precisely because it was not a mere political party that AST was attractive to 
people dissatisf ied with the post-authoritarian political system (interview 
with former AST sympathizers, Douar Hisher, October 2015). At the elite 
level, the lack of clear consensus regarding the direction of the organization 
became particularly damaging in July 2013 when armed jihadis assassinated 
a second leftist parliamentarian, Mohamed Brahmi, and rekindled the 
political debates about national security and the need for a complete ban 
on AST activities.
Ultimately, the relationship between AST and the Ennahda-led govern-
ment fundamentally changed in August 2013. In an effort to reassert the 
control of the government over security affairs in the face of increased op-
position from secularized political players, the interior minister announced 
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that AST would be classif ied a terrorist organization. This institutional shift 
from toleration to repression of AST had several important consequences 
not only for AST itself but also for Salaf i mobilization in the country (Ca-
vatorta 2015). As AST was declared a terrorist entity by the state, its appeal 
and usefulness as an umbrella organization for Salaf i players across the 
country fell sharply. Until then AST had benefited from the mimetic quality 
of grassroots Salaf i mobilization to position itself as the leading voice of 
Salaf ism in Tunisia. Grassroots Salaf i players, be they AST members or not, 
had benefited in their turn from the national and international exposure of 
AST in their endeavors to “re-Islamicize” their neighborhood. After the ban 
on AST, as the police increasingly arrested AST leaders and members, many 
Salaf i sympathizers began to take their distance from the organization. 
Their mimetic relation with AST turned from being a strategic advantage 
to being a practical liability. As the security policies of the state became 
more effective over the months, Salaf i activism began to decrease tangibly, 
particularly in those public arenas of contestation where they used to be 
highly visible (mosques, poorer suburbs, etc.).
Increasingly, state authorities regained control of public spaces that had 
been shaped by Salafi activists since the uprisings. The police cleared up the 
public squares where Salaf is organized their activities, clamped down on 
street patrolling by activists, and evicted groups from the mosques which 
they had appropriated for themselves. In this context, purported association 
with AST became a ready-made justif ication for arresting and imprisoning 
Salaf i players. Anwar Aouled, the lawyer heading the families of prisoners’ 
association Marsad, indicated that the reported increase in police practices 
inherited from the old regime, such as torturing suspects, was particularly 
noticeable against alleged Salaf is. He noted that particularly after the 2015 
terrorist attacks in Tunis (March) and Sousse (June), the justice system 
was reluctant to oppose the police on issues presented as cases of “terror-
ism” (interview with Anwar Aouled, Tunis, October 2015). Since 2014, the 
increased state repression against Salaf i players had induced a process of 
demobilization particularly in the poorer suburbs among the youth. In this 
more repressive context, grassroots Salaf i sympathizers not only took their 
distance from AST, but also adopted more low-profile activities to avoid 
attracting the attention of the police. In particular, local players reverted 
to low-key practices through family and friends’ networks with limited 
national or transnational connections (interview with Salaf i activists, 
Douar Hisher, November 2015).
State security policies targeting the “terrorist” activities of AST paved the 
way in 2014 and 2015 for the shrinkage of the arenas of religious contestation 
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through a stricter state control of the mosque networks. The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs appointed new state-vetted imams to the mosques that had 
been controlled by Salaf i players after the uprisings as the police progres-
sively evicted Salaf i imams. This process began under the technocratic 
government of Jomaa in 2014 and accelerated under the government of 
Essebsi in 2015 when former cadres of the old regime reintegrated the ruling 
circles. The appointment of Othman Battikh, Grand Mufti under Ben Ali, 
as minister for religious affairs in February 2015 illustrated well this shift 
in state personnel and practices. In this new and more repressive arena of 
contestation, Salaf i players not directly associated with AST repositioned 
themselves as legal civil society associations, including workers’ unions as in 
Sfax, in order to be able to continue some of their activities (interview with 
Salaf i activists, Tunis, October 2015). In this way, they were able to reshape 
to some extent the arenas of religious contestation and partially to counter 
the strategic expansion of state players in the religious domain. These new 
and more legalistic practices of contestation, especially when backed by 
substantial grassroots support, have proved to be quite effective, as with the 
pressure of the Sfax mosque network (and union) which contributed to the 
removal of the minister for religious affairs at the start of 2016 (Larbi 2015).
This new style of activism was evident in Tunis in October 2015 during the 
well-organized demonstration in front of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
by associations from Sfax contesting the replacement of imams in their 
town. Well-behaved protestors, mostly wearing Western-style clothing, 
adopted a “sit-in” strategy to block the entrance to the ministry, while the 
organizers broadcasted their demands and critiques of the minister. After 
a few hours, the protest ended peacefully, with demonstrators singing the 
national anthem before disbanding. As participants and organizers were 
keen to stress during this protest event in Tunis, they were contesting the 
policies of the government mainly through court actions. Protest events like 
this sit-in in front of the ministry were designed to attract public attention 
to those cases where off icial policies appeared not to be in full compliance 
of the law – such as the administrative eviction of imams before a judicial 
ruling is obtained (interview with activists from Sfax, Tunis, October 2015). 
These more legalistic strategies deployed in the face of the “anti-terrorist” 
discourses and tactics of the police and the government constituted a no-
ticeable shift from the strategies of ad hoc mobilization and street violence 
once used by AST and other Salaf i groups from 2011 to 2013.2 Salaf i-leaning 
2 There were nonetheless more confrontational episodes of street mobilization in the Sfax 
area in the second half of 2015 pitting the police against and Salaf i-leaning players.
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organizations have become more formal civil society associations and have 
engaged more directly with the legal framework devised by the state to 
structure contestation. These were not strategies that AST was commonly 
and explicitly endorsing when it was allowed to operate in the country, as 
its use of “revolutionary” discourse and practice kept putting in question 
the very legitimacy of the state system.
At the same time as these legalistic approaches developed, an older 
repertoire of contention also became more central in the aftermath of AST 
demise. Salaf i-jihadi players advocating armed resistance against the state 
began to be more active in the country, while transnational jihadi networks 
directed prospective f ighters toward external military theaters (Libya, 
Syria). Okba Ibn Nafaa, the Tunisian subsidiary of the Algerian-led AQIM 
began to conduct regular guerilla operations against the Tunisian security 
forces in the Chambi Mountains, near the Algerian border, from the summer 
of 2013 onwards (International Crisis Group 2013a). Salaf i activists located 
near the Libyan border have also crossed over to join Ansar al-Sharia Libya 
as the prospects for AST became bleaker in Tunisia (interview with former 
AST sympathizer, Tataouine, October 2014). Further afield, the jihadi groups 
operating in the Syrian theater have also witnessed an influx of f ighters of 
Tunisian origin. By turning to these very specif ic repertoires of contention, 
many Salaf i players strategically dropped the Tunisian-centric approach 
of AST and reframed their activism within the wider regional arena of 
contention structured by transnational jihadi networks. The breakdown 
of a domestic arena of Salaf i contention shaped by AST and its advocacy 
of nonviolent jihad in Tunisia de facto reinforced a Salaf i identity little 
concerned with national boundaries. In this perspective, the strategic 
deadly violence of (Islamic State-linked) armed jihadis, such as the killings 
of foreign tourists in Tunis and in Sousse in March and June 2015 became 
another main alternative to the societal project of AST.
The mobilization of the revolutionary youth that underpinned the growth 
of AST from 2011 to 2013 did not produce the kind of structured organization 
that the established Salaf i players who had launched the movement had 
hoped for. The leadership of AST failed to secure the place of the movement 
after the revolution via more symbolic and politically ritualistic forms of 
contention expressed through political party activism and voting, as some 
in the Ennahda movement had hoped for. The electoral scores of Ennahda 
in the October 2014 parliamentary elections indicated that, among other 
things, the Salaf i youth who had previously mobilized behind AST did not 
turn to supporting Ennahda once AST was banned. The strategic choice of 
Ennahda to ban AST in August 2013 so damaged the relationship between 
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these two Islamic-minded publics that Salaf i sympathizers would be loath 
to consider supporting Ennahda subsequently – even though some admitted 
that they voted for them in the f irst parliamentary elections of 2011 (inter-
view with Salaf i sympathizers, Douar Hisher, October 2015). In practice, 
the breakup of AST redirected mobilization in two main directions, as well 
as generating a demobilization of Salaf i players across the board. On the 
one hand determined activists turned to those older repertoires of violent 
political contestation advocated by transnational Salaf i-jihadi networks, 
which are designed to cope with authoritarian arenas of contestation. On 
the other hand, mobilization became less politicized and more legalistic 
as Salaf i-leaning players sought to reframe their goals and identity in order 
to operate within a public arena of contestation whose rules are def ined 
primarily by state players.
Conclusion
The rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia in the aftermath of the 2011 
Tunisian uprising is tightly linked to the quasi-dual nature of this Salaf i 
movement. AST’s eventual failure as a unitary player of the democratizing 
Tunisian social and political scene is a direct consequence of its strategic 
confrontation with other Islamist and secularized players seeking to impose 
a new identity on the Tunisian state and society. The roots of this fateful 
confrontation however can be traced back to AST itself but this time as 
an arena of contestation in which Islamist, Salaf i, and grassroots players 
competed between themselves to shape the identity and practices of the 
movement.
Institutionalist accounts of regime change in Tunisia commonly frame 
the rise and fall of AST and of Salafi players more generally in a fairly stand-
ard explanation of the political opportunity structure. From that angle, it is 
mainly a case of previously repressed Salafi activists seizing the opportunity 
created by the collapse of the existing authoritarian system to impose their 
views and practices in society, until such time as the post-revolutionary 
state was able to reimpose its own normative and material order. However, 
while the opening and closing institutional framework was important to 
explain the rise and decline of the AST, it did not explain its specif ic forms 
and dynamics of mobilization.
Post festum it is easy to overlook the grassroots dynamics of mobilization/
demobilization and thus to exaggerate the unitary nature of AST. Although 
the Islamist arena was already complex under authoritarianism, when 
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the opening came, the ways in which the mobilization happened are not 
directly explained by the opportunity structures. The structural opening 
and closing are the context, but they do not explain anything beyond that. 
In particular they do not directly help us understand what that mobilization 
and later repression actually means for the Salafi trend. In effect throughout 
the period of formal existence of AST, grassroots mobilization as Salaf i 
mobilization was contingent, and the relation between Salaf i and other 
players at the national level was always evolving.
The failure of AST to create a critical juncture for the implementation of 
a Salafi project in Tunisia is a principal outcome of these dynamics of grass-
roots mobilization, identity construction, and state reinstitutionalization. 
The forms of mobilization of grassroots players behind AST, be it explicit 
or via mimetic association, at different junctures of the Tunisian transition 
illustrated the aspirational nature of the movement and the autonomy of 
the base. The AST logo often masked microstrategies of social mobility, ad 
hoc responses to local dynamics, personal rediscoveries of the religious, 
etc. that curtailed the ability of the leadership to forge a stable identity for 
the movement and to direct the behaviors of players who have associated 
themselves (or have been associated) to AST. These dynamics of grassroots 
mobilization generated self-limiting strategic options for AST as a national 
player that could institutionalize Salafi practices, ideas and leadership, in the 
face of the competition generated by state, Islamist and secularized players.
It may well be that today, with the benefit of insight, scholars of the region 
may voice long-held doubts such as: “Did the Salafists really have a chance in 
a country like Tunisia?” They may also point to the continuing importance 
of institutionalized players like the UGTT in social and political life as 
evidence of longer-term structural trends in the evolution of the Tunisian 
polity. Once again, the benefit of insight may be deceptive. “Old” players 
too were challenged by regime change. The continuing political relevance 
of the UGTT is not a given but the result of internal policy and personnel 
changes and external repositioning at the time of the revolution to present 
itself convincingly to the population as a much-needed organization of 
the post-Ben Ali period. Despite its initial organizational advantage, it too 
could have become redundant had it not reinvented itself successfully. 
AST too, despite its initial organizational disadvantage, was able to present 
itself as a much-needed player of the post-Ben Ali era to a growing number 
of dissatisf ied Tunisians in the early transitional period. It is its internal 
policing and its external relations failures that thwarted the movement’s 
effort to remain a relevant organization and that made “Salaf ism” a failing 
identity marker of the new Tunisian political system. In both cases, initial 
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conditions only provided a set of identities and resources with which to 
work, they did not predetermine the outcome – if they did, Ben Ali would 
still be sitting in his Carthage palace.
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Abstract
Based on open-ended interviews with Syrian refugees in Jordan and 
Turkey, this analysis of Syria’s f irst mass street demonstration, occurring 
on March 18, 2011, in the city of Daraa, seeks to make three contributions 
to understanding revolts. First, in illustrating how decisions or their 
intended outcomes might have been disrupted, it calls attention to the 
contingency shaping when, where, and how uprisings begin. Second, 
it shows how detailed study of actions and interactions at a specif ic 
juncture in time and place allows us to examine the relative weight of 
both premeditation and spontaneity in the development of protest. Third, 
scrutiny of participants’ understandings of their concrete choices can 
help reveal the microfoundations of macropolitical phenomena, shedding 
the light on the roles of instrumental rationality, values, and emotions 
in guiding behavior.
Keywords: Syria, contingency, agency protest, revolution, critical events
“In a revolution, as in a novel,” Alexis de Tocqueville famously wrote, “the 
most diff icult part to invent is the end.” This quip f inds vindication in the 
Arab world today, where changes put in motion by the 2011 uprisings con-
tinue to surprise and confound observers. Nowhere is this more dramatic 
than in the civil war raging in Syria. Given the astonishing devastation in 
the country, it can be easy to forget that the initiation of peaceful protest 
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also astonished observers at the time. We still have much to learn about 
how demonstrations began and launched a revolt.
Many approaches in social movement theory elucidate the structural 
sources of grievance that motivate people to challenge authority, as well 
as the role of networks and framing in facilitating mobilization. However, 
they leave us to wonder how these factors come together with particular 
decisions, in time and place, in order to produce the f irst acts of protest and 
sustain them long enough to get an uprising off the ground. Probing such 
elements, this essay seeks to put such a single, critical contentious episode 
under the microscope. I do so through original interviews with participants 
in a demonstration on March 18, 2011, in the city of Daraa, the 100,000-person 
capital of a predominantly rural province of the same name. This was not 
Syrians’ f irst action inspired by the “Arab Spring.” However, it was the f irst 
street protest that was sustained suff iciently long to attract large numbers 
and generate a swelling procession over space. Ending in the revolution’s 
f irst fatalities, it propelled daily demonstrations in the Daraa region and 
hastened nationwide demonstrations after one week’s time. It is thus widely 
regarded as one of the key “sparks” lighting the national rebellion against 
Bashar al-Assad (McEvers 2012; Sterling 2012).
In unpacking how this spark itself became lit, I do not wish to imply that, 
had it not occurred, there would not have been a revolution in Syria. The very 
occurrence of revolt did not hinge on this particular day in Daraa. Nonethe-
less, this event is analytically important because it offers a window into the 
challenges and uncertainty that inhibit protest in repressive circumstances, 
especially during an early phase in which protest remains extremely rare. 
Scrutiny of how such moments transform from pre-revolutionary periods 
to revolutionary junctures can thus lay bare the processes through which 
would-be protestors overcome constraints in order to get mass mobilization 
off the ground.
Cascade models of collective action deduce the abstract processes by 
which a few early risers in protest present new information that leads 
bystanders to update their calculations of the costs and benefits of dissent, 
thereby encouraging increasing numbers to participate until a bandwagon 
generates a critical mass (Granovetter 1978; Schelling 1978; Kuran 1991; 
Marwell and Oliver 1993). Empirical scrutiny of the start of an actual protest 
cascade, in context, reminds us of the contingencies shaping these dynam-
ics. Particularly in settings in which the state is ready to quash opposition, 
f irst movers must manage to act where and when they can be seen by others. 
Second movers must decide to follow, even though the risks are signif icant, 
the prospects of making a difference are dim, and the still-small size of the 
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crowd ensures that they are unlikely to pay a reputational cost for remaining 
on the sidelines (Pearlman 2016). As an uprising grows, there can reach a 
point at which dissent is routinized and large crowds cease to be surprising. 
A return to the earliest moments can help analysts appreciate why the 
initial launch of dissent is often so surprising for participants themselves. 
It therefore encourages us to take seriously the contingency and complex 
motivations infusing individuals’ decisions to rebel, even as we enumerate 
the larger structural causes of revolution.
In taking up this approach, this study stands to make at least three contri-
butions to understanding revolts such as that in Syria and elsewhere. First, 
in illustrating how decisions or their intended outcomes might have been 
disrupted, such an investigation calls attention to the contingency shaping 
when, where, and how uprisings begin. This offers an important complement 
to explanations of the Arab revolts that privilege either background factors or 
large-scale processes such as transnational diffusion. Second, detailed study 
of actions and interactions at a specif ic juncture in time and place allows 
us to examine the relative weight of both premeditation and spontaneity 
in the development of protest. This is particularly puzzling under repres-
sive regimes, where prohibitions make prior planning both more diff icult 
and more necessary, lest an incipient challenge to authority be quashed 
before reaching fruition. Third, consideration of how individuals explain 
their choices can help us explore the microfoundations of macropolitical 
phenomena. While all social theory builds on assumptions about the bases of 
individual decision-making, empirical scrutiny of participants’ understand-
ings of their concrete choices brings us closer to identifying the actual roles 
of instrumental rationality, values, and emotions in guiding behavior.
These propositions come to the fore in the open-ended interviews that 
I conducted with Syrian refugees identif ied through snowball sampling 
during three and a half months of ethnographic f ieldwork in Jordan (2012, 
2013) and Turkey (2013), as a part of a larger project on oral histories of the 
Syrian revolt (Pearlman 2017). In this essay, I focus on the 58 testimonials 
that I collected from people from Daraa, and especially on the recollec-
tions of a much smaller number of individuals who participated in the 
March 18 protest. Open-ended interviews create space for people to provide 
information that researchers might not think to elicit in questionnaires, and 
thus can offer perspectives and local knowledge that go missing in off icial 
histories and universal theories (Patterson and Monroe 1998). Personal 
narratives, as sources that naturally put actors and action sequences at the 
forefront, offer particular leverage for tracing the agency driving develop-
ment of an event in time.
114 wendy peArlMAn 
Nevertheless, as a form of evidence, interviews must be analyzed with 
caution. Individuals’ post hoc explanations of their actions can carry 
deliberate or inadvertent rationalizations or misrepresentations, harden 
into social scripts, or assert lofty motivations rather than admit to base 
ones. Testimonials relayed in the context of an ongoing conflict also might 
be colored by the attitudes, affects, and discursive terms reigning at that 
particular juncture during which they are gathered. Even when interviews 
accurately identify choices that were made in the context of protest, they do 
not themselves fully reveal the causal dynamics that led to those particular 
choices. These are important limitations, and any researcher using this 
kind of data must be vigilant in keeping them in mind. In my work, I have 
attempted to address the complexities of f irst-hand narratives by analyzing 
them with an ethnographic sensibility, in the sense of seeking to glean the 
meaning of behavior to the actors involved (Schatz 2009, 5) I have developed 
tools to do so through my general immersion in Syrian refugee communities, 
which built on years of living in the Middle East over the past two decades. 
In using interviews to create a chronicle of events in Daraa in March 2011, 
I have also sought to maximize the accuracy by cross-checking interviews 
both against each other and against journalistic and investigatory reports 
on the same events.
Given the much-discussed failure of experts to predict the Arab uprisings 
(Gause 2011; Bellin 2014), some scholars now call for research that focuses 
less on retroactive explanation than on understanding the variability in 
human decision-making that these revolts bring to light (Goodwin 2011; 
Kurzman 2012). Following their lead, this chapter does not seek to test 
hypotheses about why the Syrian uprising began where and when it did. Nor 
does it make the claim that this event in Daraa explains the Syrian uprising. 
Rather, my more modest aim is to explore what detailed examination of the 
inception of popular protest can reveal about the motivations, decisions, 
interactions, and contingencies that shape larger shifts in collective dissent. 
Meticulous qualitative investigation of the initial steps of a revolution sheds 
light on the agential dimension of the strategy that structural causes can 
often obscure. A handful of day-by-day analyses of the Egyptian uprising 
demonstrate the value of such an approach in that case (El-Ghobashy 2011; 
Holmes 2012). Yet no such academic research exists on the Syrian revolt, 
or goes into even more depth to disaggregate the sequences of actions and 
interactions constituting a single critical day. With this aim, this essay 
proceeds in three parts. It begins with a review of relevant literature on 
both social movements in general and the Syrian uprising in particular. It 
then uses original interviews with Syrian oppositionists, corroborated by 
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a range of published written, audio, and video sources, to craft a detailed 
narrative of the lead up to and unfolding of the March 18 protest in Daraa. 
It concludes with a discussion of what this analysis indicates about the roles 
of contingency, planning, spontaneity, and a range of individual motives in 
shaping the launch of an uprising.
The Value of Scrutinizing Particular Events
A leading approach in social movement theory holds that collective chal-
lenges to authority emerge when broad socioeconomic developments 
expand the structure of political opportunities by unsettling existing power 
relations and/or increasing the leverage of marginalized populations (Mc-
Adam 1982). Excluded groups mobilize by using preexisting organizations 
and networks to recruit members and appropriating elements of culture 
and ideas to frame their visions in ways that animate support (McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald 1996).
The large body of theory and empirical analysis developing these proposi-
tions has shed invaluable light on the broad conditions under which, and 
processes through which, grievance is transformed into action. However, 
questions remain about the dynamic motivations and behaviors of the 
real individuals who decide to protest, especially when risk runs high. Any 
understanding of social phenomena such as collective dissent is incomplete 
without understanding of such micro-level decision-making. As Daniel 
Little (1998, 203) writes, “The mechanisms through which social causation 
is mediated turn on the structured circumstances of choice of intentional 
agents and nothing else.” Timur Kuran (1991, 16) agrees: “A mass uprising 
results from multitudes of individual choices to participate in a movement 
for change. There is no actor named ‘the crowd.’”
Analytical scrutiny of a particular protest event can bring to light these 
circumstances and choices. Analysis of sequences of actions, and their 
immediate effect on other actions, offers a window onto the confluences of 
contextual conditions and internal compulsions that produce the behaviors 
which, in turn, combine into collectively transformative events. This is 
valuable not only for crafting a dynamic vision of contentious processes, 
but also for building explanatory arguments. After all, every choice, as 
a moment or situation in which individuals or groups pursue one f low 
of action when they might have pursed another (Jasper 2004), carries a 
counterfactual. Pinpointed study of specif ic protest episodes pushes us to 
think about why people did what they did, how external factors did or did 
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not facilitate their realization of their intended aim, and how aggregate 
consequences might have differed had those factors been otherwise.
Empirical scrutiny of micro- and local-level processes at a specific juncture 
in space and time can make three particular contributions to understanding 
contentious processes such as those seen in the Middle East in 2011. First, 
it encourages us to appreciate the contingency inherent in revolts. Many 
explanations of the Arab uprisings focus on the broad political, economic, 
and socio-demographic trends that gradually intensif ied discontent and 
undermined regimes’ robustness (See, inter alia, Richards et al. 2013). Others 
explore the availability of new technologies for communicating information 
and organizing opposition (Lynch 2012), or the transnational diffusion 
processes that spread revolt across the region (Weyland 2012; Patel, Bunce, 
and Wolchik 2014). Scholars highlighting these elements aiding revolt are 
well aware of other factors, namely foreboding security apparatuses, that 
thwarted individuals’ willingness to act, threatened to sabotage protest 
planning, or served to suppress protests before they gained momentum. 
Ultimately, the revolts were made not only by facilitating conditions, but 
also by individuals who managed to circumvent potential disruptions due 
to their determination to protest despite risk and their reasoning about 
the most effective ways to do so. Study of their localized decisions and 
behaviors, in space and time, can identify the consequential contingency 
that infused them.
Second, analysis of a particular event pinpoints the relative roles of 
prior planning and spontaneity in the development of protest. David Snow 
and Dana Moss (2014, 1123) def ine spontaneity as “events, happenings, 
and lines of action […] which were not planned, intended, prearranged, 
or organized in advance of their occurrence.” They name several factors 
increasing the likelihood of spontaneous action, one of which is conditions 
of ambiguity, in the sense that the “scripts” that normally guide protest 
and police-protestor encounters break down or dissolve, or nonscripted 
square-offs occur. These arguments, crafted largely in reference to the 
standardization of “public order management systems” in the West, need 
to be modif ied for authoritarian environments. In Syria, reigning scripts 
dictated quiescence to the cult of personality around the president and did 
not permit public protest (Wedeen 1999). When oppositionists dared to 
protest nonetheless, they plunged into conditions that were unprecedented 
and unknowable. On the one hand, this extreme ambiguity forced protes-
tors to draw up scripts anew, which heightened the salience of spontaneous 
action. On the other, given security forces’ strict regulation of any group 
assembly and their readiness to quash all dissent, oppositionists could 
contingency And Agency in A tUrning point eVent 117
not depend on spontaneity alone. Without careful planning about timing, 
location, and tactics, a protest event was unlikely to get off the ground, 
much less be sustained long enough to attract a crowd. Deductive logic 
thus suggests that the onset of an uprising in such a setting would involve 
both planning and spontaneity. Only collection and analysis of evidence 
about actors’ motivations, decisions, and behaviors, however, can reveal 
how those elements actually interacted or coexisted, in what sequences, 
and with what consequences.
Third, scrutiny of agency during the onset of what would become a 
historic transformation offers a window into the microfoundations of ma-
cropolitical phenomena. All social explanations build on assumptions about 
the underlying bases of individual decision-making. Research on choices in 
real protest events offers evidence about those bases, and can thereby help 
us adjudicate among three competing analytical approaches to understand-
ing them. Theories that conceptualize individuals as utility-maximizers 
hold that self-interested agents obtain information, form beliefs, and then 
choose the most beneficial course of action (Elster 1999, 285). Alternatively, 
explanations that see individuals as driven by intrinsic values, identities, 
and principles suggest that people seek to fulf ill human needs for dignity, 
integrity, and self-respect, sometimes irrespective of utility for achieving 
external aims (Deci 1975; Varshney 2003). Finally, another trend in scholar-
ship insists that individual decision-making is also shaped by emotions: 
noninstrumental, subjective, evaluative experiences, which are evoked by 
external or mental events and carry both physiological changes and action 
tendencies (Frijda 1986, 4). All of these dimensions, and perhaps others, 
affect behavior (Etzioni 1986; Shamir 1990). Nonetheless, more research is 
needed to elucidate how they combine in protest situations such as those 
in the Arab uprisings and the conditions under which any one is likely to 
be especially salient (Pearlman 2013).
These points about protest dynamics apply to the Syrian case. Experts 
agree that a revolution in Syria was anything but guaranteed, yet typically 
locate that uncertainty in contradictory pushes and pulls at the macro 
level. After four decades of authoritarianism, Syrians longed for greater 
freedom, rule of law, economic opportunity, protection from an unchecked 
security apparatus, and an end to endemic corruption (George 2003; Yazbek 
2011; Ziadeh 2011; Starr 2012; Wieland 2012). Assuming the presidency after 
his father’s death in the year 2000, Bashar al-Assad oversaw neoliberal 
restructuring that heightened the conspicuous luxury for a collusive elite 
while cutting subsidies and services that further worsened living conditions 
among the bulk of the population (Aboud 2013). Mismanaged government 
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responses to drought exacerbated discontent, particularly among a rural 
population that had once benefited from the regime (International Crisis 
Group 2011; Hinnebusch and Zintl 2014).
While these factors suggested Syrians’ readiness to join fellow Arabs 
elsewhere in demanding political change, other factors predicted the 
opposite. Indeed, as protest swept other countries in the Middle East, 
many analysts and Syrians themselves judged Syria to be a “kingdom of 
silence” immune from the regional tide (Abdulhamid 2011; Bröning 2011; 
Ismail 2011, 540). Compared to other countries that saw uprisings, Syria’s 
single-party police state was more repressive, its military more infused 
with the regime, and its civil society more severely curtailed. Whereas 
Tunisia and Egypt saw most of society alienated from the government, 
Syria was an ethnic mosaic in which many members of minority sects 
supported the president, who comes from the minority Alawite sect. 
Beyond this, the regime enjoyed assets such as a popular foreign policy, 
the legacy of a welfare state, and generally high regard for a youthful head 
of state (International Crisis Group 2011; Hinnebusch and Zintl 2014). The 
same market reforms that accentuated sentiments of relative deprivation 
among the masses solidif ied the loyalty of crony capitalists (Haddad 
2012) and led many in the aff luent and middle classes to associate their 
aspirations for consumer comfort with continuation of the Assad regime 
(Wedeen 2013).
This general picture explains doubts surrounding the possibility of a 
rebellion in Syria, but attributes them to the precarious balance of forces 
favoring or disfavoring the Assad regime. Examination of localized de-
cisions and actions can reveal how this uncertainty at the macro level 
unfolded at the microlevel, where individuals’ will to rebel was met by 
their fear of repression and the presence of a strong security apparatus 
encountered the strategic maneuvers of oppositionists to avert it. These 
issues come to light in a number of studies that examine the dynamics of 
protest more specif ically. Some works consider the mix of opportunities 
and threats that motivated protestors (Leenders and Heydemann 2012) or 
the escalatory effects of repression (Droz-Vincent 2014). In several pieces, 
Reinoud Leenders researches Daraa as I do here, and asks how and why 
this particular community managed to initiate what became a nationwide 
revolt. Leenders (2012, 2013b) attributes much of Daraa’s f irst mover role to 
its dense social networks organized around clans and cross-border move-
ments for migration or smuggling. These networks generated solidarity, 
aided recruitment, facilitated framing of themes and slogans, and helped 
translate perceived opportunities into effective and sustained collective 
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action. Using the “hidden transcripts” of dissenting views that circulated 
within these networks, people in Daraa produced framing strategies that 
not only motivated protest, but also were forms of protest in themselves 
(Leenders 2013a).
Throughout this important work on the identif iable factors that in-
creased the potential for protest, Leenders and others also discuss how 
the actual occurrence of protest is infused with elements of contingency, 
unpredictability, and agency. They insist that opportunities are not given, 
but perceived and created by people who circumvent constraints, innovate 
strategy, and ultimately face risk (also see Kurzman 1996, 2004). Detailed 
descriptive analysis of a specif ic event can help us identify and trace the 
decisions and actions that make this possible. Original interviews with 
those who participated in or witnessed the f irst mass street protest in 
Daraa allow us to dissect that turning point into the many micro-turning 
points that comprised it, and thereby advance this understanding in the 
Syrian case.
The Making of a Critical Protest Event in Syria
Rebellions in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated to people all over the Mid-
dle East that what was once largely taken as an inexorable truth – that 
the region’s citizens would not rise up against their governments – was a 
contingent condition susceptible to change. Though most Syrians remained 
too afraid to articulate dissent, this newly ambiguous context emboldened 
some who harbored hope for reform. Observers thus noted some citizens 
refusing to supply bribes to off icials as usual. Others began broaching 
political topics in conversation, on the internet, and in unprecedented 
appearances of anti-regime graff iti (International Crisis Group 2011, 8-10). 
A man from Daraa described how people there started to push boundaries 
in increasingly marked ways:
The forced resignation of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia was like a 
fantasy. It was a dream. I was one of the people in Syria who had tears in 
his eyes […] We wondered: could a revolution happen in another country, 
too? Most people thought it was impossible.
Tunisia did not have as big a psychological impact as Egypt did. The 
Egyptian Revolution was only eighteen days. But there were some guys 
who didn’t sleep at night. They followed the news nonstop. All day long: 
Egypt, Egypt, Egypt.
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When it was announced that Mubarak had resigned […] Wow, I remember 
that day […] People in Syria were very happy inside. The state did not 
want to make any conflicts in the street. So people went outside, and 
they walked around and they started to talk. They talked about Egypt 
and Mubarak and said “Grace be to God.” They did not talk about Bashar. 
But they knew inside. Inside them, they wanted their own revolution, 
too. Outwardly, they just talked about Egypt. Inside they were moved, 
and had thoughts […]
Then Syrians who had migrated abroad began to write a lot [on the 
internet]. They wrote on the Syrian revolution pages about the regime’s 
crimes […] And then there began other revolutions, in Yemen and Libya, 
for example, and in Egypt it ended. And the push became even bigger 
for something to happen in Syria. (Interview with T.A., Amman, Jordan, 
September 16, 2012)
Around this time, a female doctor from a well-connected Daraa family 
was detained after a phone conversation in which she reportedly said, in 
a reference to the uprisings occurring elsewhere in the Middle East, “Let it 
happen to us, too” (Leenders 2012, 420-421). About ten days later, on March 
6, anti-regime graffiti appeared on the wall of a local school. Security forces 
came to the school and arrested some 15 children, apparently arbitrarily. 
Journalistic investigations reported that intelligence agents stormed houses 
and made more arrests for several days thereafter (McEvers 2012; Fahim and 
Saad 2013).
Elders from the families of the detained children appealed for their 
release by making a formal visit to local off icials, including the provincial 
chief of political security, Atef Najeeb, a cousin of Bashar al-Assad with 
a history of corruption (Sands, Vela, and Maayeh 2014). Najeeb’s abuse of 
power was predictable given his position in a political economy unchecked 
by rule of law. The particular provocativeness of his response to the relatives 
of the arrested children, however, was contingent. When they pleaded for 
their release, the security chief reportedly dismissed them, saying: “Forget 
your children. Go home to your wives and make more children. And if you 
do not know how, bring your wives and we will show you” (Macleod 2011; 
McEvers 2012; Sterling 2012).
The impact of these words, whether they were actually spoken as such 
or persisted as legend, cannot be underestimated. Nearly every person 
whom I met from Daraa could quote them verbatim. “Everyone in Daraa 
knows each other,” a man explained. “So everyone found out. And people 
were really angry when they learned what had happened” (interview with 
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A. Sh., Ramtha, Jordan, October 6, 2012). His wife elaborated: “We felt like 
those kids were our kids. And those women [whom Najeeb insulted] were 
just like us” (interview with U. Sh., Ramtha, Jordan, October 6, 2012). These 
references to dense social ties speak to the importance of the structure of 
social networks. Yet they also speak to what McAdam (2003, 297) refers 
to as the contingent factors that operate within networks and serve to 
animate network-based processes. In this case, networks enabled the flow of 
information, but the impact of that information on people lay in the values 
and emotions of indignation and empathy that they triggered.
While this “moral shock” reverberated in Daraa, citizens elsewhere in 
Syria were responding to other impetuses. A spontaneous demonstration 
erupted in Damascus’s commercial market when a police off icer slighted 
a merchant and a large crowd gathered to support him in an “unprec-
edented” show of def iance (Abbas 2011, 1; International Crisis Group 2011, 
9). Syrians held a handful of vigils in support of other Arab revolts. These 
grew in size from an early sit-in of about 15 people in solidarity with Egypt 
(Human Rights Watch 2011a) to a later gathering of some 200 outside the 
Libyan embassy (Williams 2011). Each protest was violently dispersed when 
security forces beat protestors. In early February, activists based outside 
Syria called for protests under the slogan “Day of Rage,” but they lacked 
connections to citizens in the country and nothing happened (Sands 2011).
The regime unbanned Facebook that month, and a new group rallied tens 
of thousands of supporters under the call for a revolution against Bashar 
al-Assad. When the group called for another “Day of Rage” for March 15, 
many more people were ready to participate. Various localities witnessed 
events, yet security personnel promptly dispersed the assemblies and ar-
rested dozens (Abouzeid 2011). The following day, a peaceful demonstration 
outside the Interior Ministry calling for the detainees’ release was again 
forcibly dispersed (Human Rights Watch 2011b). “The culture of protesting is 
not present here. They oppressed it until they killed it,” an activist lamented 
(New York Times 2011).
Back in Daraa, politically minded citizens were also increasingly eager 
to protest. “There was strong hope for change,” a young man then in his 
late teens recalled. “We, the youth, knew that if we did not rise up at this 
time, it would be impossible to rise up for another million years. We had 
to do something in Syria. We had to have demonstrations, even without 
prior planning” (interview with I. M., Irbid, Jordan, September 17, 2012). 
Others with more experience, including some of these young men’s fathers 
and uncles active in leftist opposition groups, recognized a need to plan. A 
member of that older cohort explained:
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We consulted and communicated with each other. We were all people 
who were involved in political work. It would go something like this: I 
have some political awareness. I come to talk to you. You are convinced 
that we need to do something and you commit to bringing ten people 
who you trust. Then a second person does the same, and then a third. So 
there developed a circle, a group that had the capacity to do something. 
In the beginning, this circle reached about 50 or 60 people. (Interview 
with W.T., Irbid, Jordan, August 14, 2013)
These oppositionists, along with their sons and others, secretly circulated 
a plan to hold a demonstration in front of the central court building on the 
March 15 “Day of Rage.” Would-be protestors took various precautions in 
anticipation of repression. Some sought to avoid attracting security forces’ 
attention by traveling to the site individually rather than in groups. Others, 
eager to contain the impact of any crackdown, made calculated decisions 
about who should participate. “My brother went, but he did not let anyone 
else go,” a young man explained. “That way, if just one person goes and gets 
arrested, only one person from the family is lost” (interview with C.J., Irbid, 
Jordan, August 25, 2013).
Careful premeditation notwithstanding, the demonstration’s success was 
contingent on activists’ ability to shield their plans from the knowledge of 
the intelligence services, informants, and their multiple means of surveil-
lance. Such did not come to pass, as one attendee described:
We’d spread the word very secretly, by word of mouth, person-to-person. 
One person would whisper the news to someone else; only those people 
he knew really well and trusted fully. Many people came, but the security 
forces were already there and ready. They quashed it before it even began. 
People came, saw the security forces, and left immediately. They didn’t 
even stop. So there was no demonstration. We decided that we needed to 
try again. (Interview with L.M., Amman, Jordan, August 17, 2013)
A small group met that night and decided that their next attempt to organize 
protest should take place at the mosque that Friday, March 18. “Why Friday 
prayers?” a Daraa resident asked rhetorically. “Because, in Syria, it is prohib-
ited for more than f ive people to assemble without prior security approval. 
So prayer inside the mosque is the only opportunity people have to gather” 
(interview with T.A., Amman, Jordan, September 16, 2012). The decision 
to hold a repeat demonstration at a mosque was one strategic choice. The 
next choice, of no less strategic signif icance, was which mosque. The city’s 
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main religious institution, the Omari mosque, a symbol of pride and piety 
for the entire region, regularly attracted a large crowd of worshippers. For 
the same reason, it was sure to attract a large security force presence. As 
such, activists selected a smaller house or worship: the Hamza wa Abbas 
mosque, located in the Mahata neighborhood:
Security forces watch mosques very closely. But we chose a mosque that 
had just newly been built, so security forces had not yet established any 
signif icant surveillance presence there […]
The same young people who were committed to protesting on March 15 
came out on March 18. One of the young men was in charge of starting 
it. He eventually became a martyr, God rest his soul. He was told that 
after the prayer f inished he was supposed to stand up and shout, “Allahu 
Akbar, God is Great!” The idea was that just one man would start, and 
then the other young men who were with him would stand up and repeat 
[the chant] with him.
The plan was that people would come out from Hamza wa Abbas, and a 
few people would also start chanting at Omari. Then crowds from both 
mosques would meet in a city square. The planning was very precise. We 
were living under this regime and knew not to leave any detail to chance. 
We had studied the matter carefully. We knew the surveillance situation. 
(Interview with W.T., Irbid, Jordan, August 14, 2013)
Adding to the security advantages of the mosque was the social density of 
the neighborhood in which it was located. “Everybody in Mahata knows 
everybody else,” explained one of the activists, who lived in that area. “Most 
of the people are relatives. Relations are close and the houses are very close 
together” (interview with L.M., Amman, Jordan, August 17, 2013). These 
words again pointed to the importance of social networks. Yet they also 
suggested the diversity of mechanisms through which they aid mobilization: 
here the contribution of preexisting social ties to protest did not turn on 
recruitment as much as the protection it offered from regime inf iltration. 
Apart from these benef its, selection of this particular part of town held 
other advantages that were more serendipitous: it was also the neighbor-
hood in which the school with the graff iti incident was located, and some 
family members of the arrested children, already angry and primed to 
protest, would to be at that mosque for Friday prayers, as well (interview 
with D.L., Amman, Jordan, October 9, 2012).
March 18 arrived. A man not involved in the planning described how the 
event unfolded as hoped by its planners:
124 wendy peArlMAn 
The Friday prayer ended. People greeted each other as is customary, 
saying “Salam wa Alaykoom, Salam wa Alaykoom, Peace be upon you.” 
Then one person got up and said “Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar!” He said 
it three times. Older people in the mosque started to run away! Can you 
imagine? They started running out of a door here and a door there. Two 
people started. And then another person and another person got up. 
They formed a small demonstration, of about just ten people and left 
from the mosque.
All of this happened in a short amount of time. They started chanting: 
“God, Syria, Freedom, and nothing more!” Under Bashar al-Assad, there 
was the chant, “God, Syria, Bashar, and nothing more!” So what did they 
do? They substituted the word freedom for Bashar.
People were watching from their windows and balconies. It was an amaz-
ing thing. In decades, people in Syria had never gone out into the streets 
unless to say, “Bashar al-Assad, forever!” or “Hafez al-Assad, forever!” But 
here was a demonstration not in support of the regime. And not with the 
permission of the regime. And asking for freedom. And there the barrier 
of fear began to break.
Some people didn’t participate. Many people were just standing there and 
watching, afraid. But other people were really manly and brave. They got 
on other people’s shoulders and were clapping and chanting. (Interview 
with T.A., Amman, Jordan, September 16, 2012)
While careful premeditation was crucial for getting the demonstration 
off the ground, planning ended with the idea that one man would begin 
chanting and the hope that others would follow. “The most important thing 
was that we started,” the senior oppositionist explained. “But could anyone 
know or anticipate what was going to happen after that? The answer is 
no” (interview with W.T., Irbid, Jordan, August 14, 2013). The unscripted 
context of a street demonstration opened a larger role for spontaneous 
action, which took over where that of planning ended. Confronted with 
the unprecedented sight of a street demonstration, bystanders responded 
in ways they could not have predicted in advance. Some fled, some were 
immobilized, and some jumped in. While their choices might have been 
informed by strategic reasoning about the costs and benef its of protest, 
they were also moved by values and emotions. Some were inspired by the 
collective euphoria of the chanting and clapping, or felt the need to prove 
their masculinity and courage. Others could not overcome feelings of fear. 
Still others were caught between fear of repression and an inner compulsion 
to raise their voices.
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In such highly ambiguous circumstances, bystanders negotiated confus-
ing and contradictory impetuses. One man who saw the march as it passed 
by his home, and decided to join it, reflected:
The walk from the Hamza wa Abbas Mosque to the Omari Mosque 
is maybe 30 minutes, if you’re walking slowly. Our house is along the 
way. We saw people marching. And they were chanting, “We want our 
children! Reform! Freedom!” And people came out from their houses.
We would be cowards if we didn’t march with them. At the same time, we 
were afraid. You felt like you were standing against the unknown. It was 
very, very diff icult. You knew that anything could happen. They could 
arrest you. They could kill you. They could kill your family. People were 
afraid, but at the same time, we knew that we needed to do something. 
(Interview with A.Sh., Ramtha, Jordan, October 6, 2012)
The demonstration reached Omari mosque, where many more joined the 
crowd. One of the younger activists explained that he was confident that 
most bystanders shared the basic frustrations that motivated the protest, 
but had not foreseen the degree to which they would act on them:
We expected that people would sympathize with us, but we were sur-
prised that it only took one minute for everyone to know what was going 
on when they saw us marching. People joined us and started chanting. 
People came from everywhere, from houses, streets from other mosques 
[…] And at that point, we lost control of the situation. We were not respon-
sible any more. It became a public matter. (Interview with D.L., Amman, 
Jordan, October 9, 2012)
The march grew and, within an hour or two, a crowd of several hundred 
had gathered (Macleod 2011; YouTube 2011). It stopped at the edge of the 
valley that separated the demonstration from the section of town where 
governmental institutions were located and a security deployment had 
been called to the scene. Regime off icials attempted to negotiate with the 
demonstrators and a security off icer threatened to arrest protestors. When 
this failed to disperse the crowd, they then f ired tear gas, water cannons, 
and bullets (YouTube 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011d). Two protestors, 
Hussam Ayash and Mahmoud Jawabra, were killed. A third, Ayham Al-
Hariri, died of his wounds a few days later (Human Rights Watch 2011c).
Lethal violence shocked and outraged the crowd. “I believe that was 
the tipping point,” one activist said. “After they witnessed the blood, 
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there was no going back” (interview with W.T., Irbid, Jordan, August 14, 
2013). Another agreed. “At this time, a new stage of the Syrian revolution 
started,” he reflected. “That night many people of Daraa might have gone 
home and tried to f ind another solution if the regime hadn’t f ired on the 
demonstrators and killed people” (interview with D.L., Amman, Jordan, 
October 9, 2012).
The next day, those who had been killed were laid to rest. Like Friday 
prayers, the funerals offered a rare permissible opportunity for large 
numbers to gather and voice political dissent. This funeral attracted a 
crowd several times the size of the prior day’s demonstration, and it too 
joined in impassioned chants against the regime (BBC 2011). One attendee 
explained that, far from instilling fear that deterred participation, the 
lethal violence of the previous day appeared only to convince people to 
seize what might be a once-in-a-lifetime chance to mobilize a collective 
cry for change:
We were afraid to go out. Then the chance came to us. We were not going 
to let it pass […] If we lost it, does that mean we’d never be able to go out 
again? Also, we knew that if we went back, the regime would come and 
arrest all the young people who went out the f irst day. They’d all die in 
prison.
So there was no backing out. We knew if we went back, everyone would 
die. They’ll leave no one. So there was no choice. We entered a road with 
no return. (Interview with C.J., Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2013)
Discussion and Conclusions
Though March 15 is typically regarded as the start of the Syrian rebellion 
against Bashar al-Assad, the events of March 18 in Daraa were no less 
crucial and transformative in the making of what became a nationwide 
mobilization. It is possible that, had events not unfolded as they did in 
Daraa, other events in other places might have served the same function 
in launching a revolution in Syria. The fact that these events did happen 
where and when they did, however, allows us to scrutinize that incident for 
clues about the agential dimensions of a revolution’s launch. Study of this 
case offers us a chance to disentangle the mix of foreseeable conditions, 
social interactions, and individual motivations that, against a backdrop 
of structural causes, combined to shift a critical mass of persons from 
silence to voice.
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Analysis of how this momentous shift was hastened in Syria reveals 
how the Daraa turning point was the product of myriad choices that were 
also turning points for those who made them and the community trans-
formed by their consequences. My analysis of this event does not offer a 
comprehensive portrait of all the varied dynamics at play in shaping it; 
scrutiny from other perspectives, such as those emphasizing gender or 
socioeconomic class, might produce different kinds of insight. My focus on 
agency and contingency, however, has sought to make three contributions to 
understanding rebellions in Syria and elsewhere. First, examination of the 
specif ic decisions and actions entailed in a critical protest event reveals the 
contingency shaping each step of its development. Explanations of the Arab 
uprisings that focus on political and economic structures, technological 
advances, or transnational diffusion can create the impression that popular 
uprisings were inevitable. We ought not forget the real possibility that 
the initial will to rebel might have been stymied, quashed, or derailed. In 
Daraa, what if there had been no graff iti on the school or no arrest of the 
children? What if the police forces had not insulted their families or had 
released the children more promptly?1 What if activists had gone forward 
with the March 15 demonstration outside the courthouse and all been 
arrested? What if the security apparatus, alerted by the week’s earlier calls 
for “Day of Rage,” had posted agents at the Hamza wa Abbas mosque that 
Friday and successfully deterred the demonstration or overwhelmed it 
before it attracted a bandwagon? What if the young man designated to 
begin chanting on March 18 had lost the courage to play that role, or too few 
people followed him? These and many other such questions call attention 
to the contingency that accompanied the f irst tentative events that helped 
spur a nationwide revolt. Attention to these elements captures the real 
uncertainty and hazards with which individuals coped as they undertook 
the risk of protest.
Second, careful disaggregation of a protest episode into a sequence of 
interactive decisions allows us to assess the roles of both prior intention and 
spontaneity in def ining its course. The Syrian case aff irms arguments that 
protest conditions that are ambiguous, as opposed to defined by “scripts” for 
permissible dissent, expand the role for consequential spontaneous action. 
Yet they also remind us that when this ambiguity is due to prohibition of 
dissent, spontaneous action alone is unlikely to be sufficient to transform an 
incipient initiative into large-scale collective action. Given pervasive state 
1 The children were released later that week, showing signs of torture. See Human Rights 
Watch 2011d; Sterling 2012; Fahim and Saad 2013.
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surveillance, oppositionists in Daraa brought deliberate premeditation not 
only to the task of planning protest, but also to the challenge of planning 
about how to plan. They thus made carefully calculated choices about how 
and with whom to talk about a possible demonstration, and also about where 
and when to attempt a second demonstration when the f irst was foiled. 
Without such strategic preparation, learning, and adaptation, a protest 
might never have gotten off the ground. At the same time, protest would not 
have gotten very far off the ground without the spontaneous participation of 
a much larger number of citizens not privy to such preparations. It was their 
joining en masse that transformed an incipient initiative into collective 
action with revolutionary potential. This close reading of the March 18 
protest does not aim to derive definitive conclusions about the sequencing, 
interaction, and relative salience of planning and spontaneity in uprisings 
against authoritarianism. However, it offers inductive insights of use for 
future research crafting and testing hypotheses about these dynamics.
Third, empirical scrutiny of agency brings to light the diverse bases 
on which individuals decide to participate in protest and how they do 
so. Evidence from Syria lends support to each of three main approaches 
to understanding the microfoundations of contentious collective action. 
Some citizens made choices based on strategic thinking about the rational-
ity of protest. For example, one man judged that large numbers attended 
the funeral on March 19 on the calculation that they would be punished 
regardless of whether they participated and, if there was ever a time to push 
for political change, it was then. Others acted on values and identities, such 
as manliness, courage, or a sense of obligation to join a collectivist effort. 
Beyond utility and values, emotions also motivated action. Given acute 
awareness of the regime’s capacity for repression, it is diff icult to imagine 
that Syrians who protested did not experience some degree of fear. Some 
were pulled through that fear by the euphoric collective effervescence of 
street protest. Others were pushed past it by sheer indignation in the face 
of what they perceived as humiliating insults and, even more powerfully, 
illegitimate killings. This research on Daraa thus supports those scholars 
calling for pluralization of understandings of the microfoundations of con-
tentious politics (Varshney 2003; Pearlman 2013). It encourages continued 
thinking about how different logics complement, supplement, or combine 
with each other to motivate high-risk political action.
Syria’s f irst mass street demonstration in March 2011 was hence a product 
of both long-held grievances and contingent sparks, prior planning and 
spontaneous action, and complex motivations shaped by instrumentality, 
values, and emotions. The Assad regime responded to peaceful protests 
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with violence, oppositionists gradually took up arms, the regime escalated 
its reprisals, a range of external state and nonstate players intervened, and 
a full-fledged civil war engulfed the country. Analysis of the f irst stirrings 
of this conflict reminds us that what has evolved into unspeakable horror 
began with very localized acts of political acumen and hope. They also 
entailed sacrif ice. Of the oppositionists whose words are excerpted here, 
one has since lost his life and one lost a limb. All have lost loved ones and 
struggle with the trauma of violence, forced migration, and watching their 
country tear itself apart. In this context, listening to their stories is not 
simply an invaluable source of academic knowledge about processes of social 
mobilization and political change. It is also a way to honor the human spirit 
that moves people to face risk to challenge injustice and call for freedom.
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Abstract
How did the Egyptian Revolution come about? By focusing on a particular 
set of interactions during one day, January 25, 2011, in Egypt’s second 
city, Alexandria, this chapter uses a microanalytical approach to shed 
light on the highly interactive and volatile moments when a revolution 
starts. I argue that we cannot fully grasp what happened in Alexandria 
during the f irst sequence of the Egyptian revolution (what came to be 
known as the “18 days”) if we only look at macrostructural aspects of 
protest at the national level. Building on a multiplicity of data (interviews, 
observations, digital traces, review of the press) gathered during f ieldwork 
conducted between 2011 and 2016, this research is a contribution to the 
microsociology of revolutions.
Keywords: Alexandria, Egyptian revolution, contingency, micro, protest 
milieu
“It is as simple as that: Past events will always look less random than they were.”
– Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fooled by Randomness
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Protest and Politics Workshop (The 
Graduate Center, CUNY) in New York City in April 2015. I’d like to warmly thank all the par-
ticipants of the workshop for their feedback, and, more specif ically, Luke Elliott-Negri, John 
Krinsky, and Jillian Schwedler for their invaluable inputs as discussants. I would also thank 
Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Chaymaa Hassabo and Hervé Rayner, as well as Jim Jasper and Frédéric 
Volpi, for their extremely useful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Any mistakes or 
inaccuracies are my sole responsibility.
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Late December 2010, Fleming neighborhood (Alexandria). About 30 people 
are chatting joyfully in the new headquarters of the Democratic Front 
Party while waiting for a conference to start. In the previous weeks, the 
party’s apartment has become a gathering spot for most activist groups in 
the city, regardless of their political orientation (leftists, liberals, moderate 
Islamists, and so on). The youths (most of those in attendance are less than 
30 years old) are saluting each other fondly, joking around, and taking com-
memorative pictures. There is a clear familiarity in the atmosphere. Later 
on, two socialist activists are warmly welcomed as they arrive. They have 
both just gotten out of jail after being arrested on false charges concocted 
by the police, with whom they have a proverbial personal enmity. They are 
welcomed as heroes. Indeed, their arrest had quickly become a focal point 
for rallying all the Alexandrian groups. The two recently released activists, 
and two others (a liberal and a socialist), give a talk about the political 
situation in the country, and what should be done in the weeks and months 
to come. The audience listens carefully and gravely.
Later that evening, a few distinguished guests make an appearance, 
sparking strong emotions in the group: Khaled Saïd’s mother, sister, and 
niece are here.2 Their presence is a strong symbol. Isn’t this group, after all, 
a product of the “Khaled Saïd moment”? As in other events of the previous 
weeks, an activist (also a singer and a lutenist) does a little performance, 
singing the classical militant hymns of Cheikh Imām and poet Ahmad 
Fu’ād Negm. The evening ends with the customary collective photographs, 
as well as commemorative pictures with the groups’ “heroes” (the liberated 
detainees and the martyr’s family). Then, everyone starts cleaning up the 
apartment, piling up chairs, picking up trash, and enacting, through these 
small practices, this new collective identity they promote, that of the “youth 
who really love Egypt,”3 which differentiates them from the outside world.
This tiny group, described here during one of its activities ( fa’āliyya, pl. 
fa’āliyyāt) is the core of what I call the Alexandrian Protest Milieu (APM).4 
2 Khaled Saïd was a young Alexandrian man killed by police forces in June 2010, sparking an 
unprecedented protest wave in the coastal city (Ali 2012; Ali and El-Sharnouby 2014).
3 “Shabāb biyhib masr bigad” (Youth who really love Egypt) is one of the slogans put forward 
by many of the youth groups. 
4 These analyses draw from an ongoing doctoral dissertation on contentious politics in 
Alexandria (El Chazli 2017). Research was conducted in Alexandria during several visits between 
November 2012 and February 2016. I conducted more than 50 interviews, participant observation, 
collected “digital traces,” administered a survey, and mobilized different sources such as the 
press, blogs, etc. Finally, I consulted a database of 2000+ photographs and videos of protest in 
Alexandria. Interviews as well as very detailed photos and videos were used to reconstruct 
sequences prior to 2012 such as the one described above. 
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In many respects, the APM created the material and symbolic conditions 
for the mobilizations that took place in Alexandria on January 25, 2011.5 Not 
that its members either predicted or, for many of them, even thought these 
mobilizations possible. But through their actions and their “activist work” 
(Nicourd 2009), they contributed to the emergence of a local Alexandrian 
political arena. They also helped create and circulate contentious frames, 
constructing the police as the enemy, and thus giving a vocabulary to many 
people to express their discontent (and sometimes discover this discontent). 
They were the ones who organized, on the ground, the January 25 marches 
that would end up launching the largest protest wave Egypt had known 
until then.
We cannot fully grasp what happened in Alexandria during the f irst 
sequence of the Egyptian Revolution (what came to be known as the “18 
days”) if we only look at macrostructural aspects of protest at the national 
level. What happened in Alexandria, and the way it happened, was closely 
related to the particular patterns of relations inside the APM, and also 
between the APM and other local players (including “traditional” parties 
and security agencies). By paying attention to how this milieu came to 
be, and then, on the ground, to how strategic interactions between the 
different players took place, it is possible to suggest a more empirically 
based approach to the emergent phases of protest episodes that would be 
attentive to the sequences of revolutionary conjunctures, rather than broad 
macrostructural readings of these events.
To do so, I pay close attention to a particular set of interactions during 
one day, January 25, 2011. I contend that a closer look at specif ic moments 
during a sequence is useful, as these moments can produce open-ended 
conjunctures (when “multiple futures coexist synchronically”), triggering 
“shifts in patterns of relations” (Ermakoff 2015, 110). By focusing on one day, 
we can observe and document precisely how players search “for behavioral 
cues from peers, their wait-and-see attitude, and their desire to align with 
a collective stance,” which constitute potent indicators of the “emergence 
of mutual uncertainty” (Ermakoff 2015, 100).
This approach does not position itself as a refutation of the role of “social 
structures” in explaining revolutionary conjunctures. It simply displaces our 
focus from causes to microprocesses and mechanisms. In so doing, I want 
to understand what makes up these conjunctures without resorting to what 
Rod Aya calls the “two-stage leap of faith […] from social change to griev-
ances, and from grievances to revolt, without explaining either the genesis 
5 Or, in a similar sense, an “infrastructure for collective action” (Ismaïl 2006).
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of specif ic grievances or the conversion of vague and various discontents 
into drastic but deliberate political action” (Aya 1979, 66). This approach 
recognizes the specif icity of critical conjunctures, where behavioral scripts 
and routines tend to lose their eff icacy, pushing players to rely on what their 
(immediate or imagined) reference groups do. Understanding what makes 
a crisis thus necessitates to focus on the microanalytics of the different 
players’ interactions (Ermakoff 2015).
I f irst sketch a brief genealogy of the Alexandrian Protest Milieu. Then I 
focus on how this group crystallized around a police abuse case. Third, I look 
at how activists approached the preparation of the “Day of Rage.” Fourth, I 
show how, through an iteration of concurring signs, activists starting redefin-
ing what was happening. Finally, I look at how activists were overwhelmed 
by what was going on, and how the logics of the situation soon took hold.
A Brief Genealogy of the APM
Alexandria, Egypt’s “second capital,”6 hosted various forms of activism 
throughout the twentieth century, sometimes in quite radical forms. Yet, after 
the different student protest waves of the 1960s and 1970s, and the subsequent 
rise of Islamic militancy in the 1980s and 1990s, the city seemed to lack its pre-
vious vibrant political life, following a national decline in contention and street 
politics, generally interpreted in the literature in terms of political “apathy” 
and “depoliticization” (for a critique, see Fillieule and Bennani-Chraïbi 2003).
Nationally, this political stalemate lasted until the early 2000s. Local politics 
in Alexandria had always been inscribed in the “national-institutional”7 arena. 
The main players always linked their local activities to national strategies. 
For instance, the main organized opposition force, the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB), played a pivotal role in mobilizing Alexandrians on different occasions. 
During the Second Intifada solidarity mobilizations in the early 2000s, they 
were able to mobilize tens of thousands in the city. But these efforts were part 
of the Brothers’ grand strategy. Nothing specifically Alexandrian was at stake.
During the 2000s, Alexandria witnessed a movement similar to Cairo’s, 
albeit on a smaller scale. The pro-Palestinian solidarity movement (2000-2002) 
6 Alexandria is Egypt’s second most populous city, its wealthiest, as well as its most industrial 
one (Denis 1997, 23; Soliman 2011, 94). Activists, intellectuals, and artists like to call their city 
the “second capital” (al-’āssima al-thāniya) (El Chazli 2013).
7 By “national-institutional” I refer to a spatial and legal framework, which constitutes the 
formal political institutions of the Egyptian nation-state. Due the extreme centralization of the 
Egyptian state, these political activities are mainly localized in Cairo. 
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and the anti-Iraq War movement (2003) gave birth to a new political genera-
tion, which formulated new ideas and tactics. In the mid-2000s, these different 
movements coalesced under the umbrella of the Kifāya movement, which was 
the first to federate intellectuals, artists, human rights activists, members 
of opposition parties and newly politicized youth from multiple ideological 
backgrounds (leftists, Arab-nationalists, Islamists, and liberals). However, 
Kifāya was never as large in Alexandria as it was in the capital. Tellingly, 
Alexandria activists would go to Cairo to attend protests organized there.
The period that followed saw repression and the deliberalization of the 
political sphere (Albrecht 2013; for an alternative reading, see Hassabo 2012). 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2009, rumors of Mohamed El-Baradei’s8 involve-
ment in politics were circulating but not confirmed. Only in December of 
the same year did the Nobel Peace Prize winner publicize his will to promote 
democratic change in Egypt. His return to Egypt in February 2010 would 
initiate a strong protest wave and a remobilization of the opposition arenas 
in patterns relatively similar to those of Kifāya, under the banner of a newly 
formed National Association for Change (NAC) (Hassabo 2012).
In early 2010, a group of activists founded a Popular Campaign in Support 
of Mohamed El-Baradei (PCSMB) in Alexandria. It was meant to be a grass-
roots movement, thus differing from the elitist (and rather Cairo-centric) 
functioning of the NAC. The group grew quickly by capitalizing on the 
momentum created by El-Baradei’s return to Egypt. The intense online 
campaign on the behalf of the Nobel laureate was particularly eff icient.9 
This heterogeneous group of people had one main goal: inspire as many 
people as possible to learn about El-Baradei while limiting the possibilities 
of repression. They learned from past experiences, selecting actions far 
less disruptive than those of more radical groups (e.g., simply walking in a 
shopping mall while wearing El-Baradei T-shirts).
In parallel with these dynamics, the radical left was also experiencing 
changes. The Trotskyist movement (the Revolutionary Socialists [RS]), had 
helped found a broader leftist platform, named the Popular Democratic 
Movement (Hachd), aiming at federating all the left-leaning activists in 
the northern city, without imposing the constraints of being a member of a 
clandestine organization or the stigma of being “communist.” Other leftist 
8 Mohamed El-Baradei was an Egyptian diplomat and later International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) executive and head. He is a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. 
9 Many interviewees (most notably those who weren’t previously politically active) recall 
getting in touch with the group through Facebook. Wael Ghonim, a Google executive who would 
later create the famous “We Are All Khaled Saïd” page, managed the Facebook page supporting 
El-Baradei (Ghonim 2012).
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microgroups, such as the Youth for Justice and Freedom (YJF), were also 
created during that period, as a local “franchise” of the group by the same 
name in Cairo. In any case, members of all these groups never exceeded 
50 people who knew each other, but, somehow, their relations were still 
governed by the national agenda. For instance, the RS was closely linked 
to its Cairene counterparts, focusing on their agenda of the “downtrodden 
proletariat’s struggle” (kifāh al-kādihīn), whereas the PCSMB promoted 
El-Baradei’s project of “democratic change” (al-taghyīr al-dimuqrātī) in 
coordination with his main campaigners in the capital. It was a local event 
that changed these tendencies and largely contributed to the birth of a local 
arena, governed by its own logics, where intergroup relations started gaining 
importance over the national arena, crystallizing in the APM described 
above.
Khaled Saïd and the Framing of the Police as a Public Enemy
On a humid Alexandrian summer night, two policemen ventured into a 
cybercafé in the residential neighborhood of Cleopatra and soon got into 
an altercation with a customer. The policemen dragged the young man, 
Khaled Mohamed Saïd, outside the café. If the details of what happened 
next remain unclear, the result was Saïd’s brutal death. The event, in itself, 
was anything but new. Cases of police abuse and torture had been com-
monplace in Mubarak’s Egypt (Seif El-Dawla 2009). The difference in this 
case lay elsewhere. Several players seized the event and, through their 
work, constructed it as a public case, while designating an enemy, the police 
(Ismaïl 2012).
In the days that followed, opposition leader Ayman Nūr, who was visit-
ing Alexandria on unrelated business, learned of Saïd’s misfortune and 
published a picture of the young man’s disfigured face on his Facebook page. 
Local leftist players quickly started organizing protests in Cleopatra and 
the surrounding neighborhoods. The momentum that built rapidly around 
the Khaled Saïd case, thanks especially to the online campaign launched 
by the newly created We Are All Khaled Saïd (WAAKS) Facebook page, 
encouraged local players to create something new to be able to coordinate 
on the ground. This marked the birth of what came to be called the Youth 
of the National Forces’ Bureau (maktab shabāb al-quwā al-wataniyya), also 
referred to as the Coordination Bureau (maktab el-tansī’). Most of the youth 
groups active on the ground were represented in the CB. At the time, there 
was no equivalent institutionalized intergroup coordination in Cairo.
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Between June and October 2010, the CB organized many protests, some 
many thousands strong,10 something that had never been seen in Alexandria 
other than during sporting events or regional crises (e.g., support for Gaza.) 
This collaborative experience was central in bringing the Alexandrian 
groups closer together despite their ideological backgrounds.11 The groups 
were now coordinating with each other much more than with their Cairene 
counterparts. Groups would sometimes protest with their local allies despite 
(or against) Cairo’s stance. Typically, when a member of a given political 
group was facing repression (was arrested or was facing a trial), the others 
would automatically express their solidarity.12
By the end of 2010, the majority of Alexandrian activists personally knew 
each other and were embedded in a close-knit network of friendships. 
The relatively small numbers (not more than 50 people) and the common 
experience (of preparing for protests, getting arrested together, and so on) 
were the reason that a famous Alexandrian activist used this expression to 
explain why they all were so close: “You know, Alexandria is a one bedroom 
apartment! We all know each other, it’s like a small family” (interview with 
M., August 2013, Alexandria). From that moment on, a stable (and small) 
population emerged to constitute the Alexandrian Protest Milieu.13
In the more general context of political deliberalization that seemed to 
prepare for the upcoming elections (parliamentary and presidential), the 
regime turned to more authoritarian measures (handing prison sentences 
to activists, resorting to physical violence more easily, and so on). The 
harsh repression that hit all political forces by the end of 2010 tied the 
Alexandrian groups together even more, but it also left them in a state of 
disarray and hopelessness. After the Khaled Saïd momentum, the political 
space was steadily closing. Many of them were given prison sentences and 
were continuously harassed by police forces.14 This is the context in which 
the conference, described above, was held.
10 These were the protests in the aftermaths of Khaled Said’s death. 
11 A detailed account of this protest sequence can be found in the second chapter of my 
dissertation (El Chazli 2017).
12 One leading activist recounted how he would instruct younger activists not to protest, 
following Cairo’s stance, but would go and participate individually (bi-shakl fardī) in solidarity 
with fellow Alexandrian activists (interview, January 2013).
13 Delineating the contours of this milieu was done both through interviews and through the 
consultation of hundreds of photographs and videos of the protests. Friendship relations and 
interactions (commenting, image tagging, etc.) on Facebook were also used.
14 This would affect their personal lives profoundly. In one case, an activist was suspended 
from his job. In another, state security off icers called an activist’s mother to tell her that her 
daughter, her daughter’s f iancé, and their friends would all end up in prison. 
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On January 1, 2011, at around 12:20 a.m., a huge blast shook the popular 
neighborhood of Sīdī Bishr. A bomb had just gone off in front of the Church 
of the Two Saints, during the Saint Sylvester celebration mass. More than 
20 people were killed and many more injured. In a matter of hours, angry 
protestors started rioting in the neighborhood, and the Central Security 
Forces (CSF) tried to restore order, with little success.15 In the following 
days, the APM reorganized itself and launched many online campaigns, 
declaring their solidarity with the victims, calling on people to donate 
blood, and blaming the Ministry of the Interior for the bombing. When a 
few days later a young Salaf i man was killed while being held by the State 
Investigation Bureau, as a suspect for the bombings, Alexandrian activists 
exploited the Khaled Saïd frame, pointing out the brutal police practices 
and the absence of security (El Chazli and Hassabo 2013). Simultaneously, 
mobilizations in Tunisia were beginning to get more media attention and 
interest from Egyptian activists. After Tunisian President Ben Ali f led his 
country on January 14, events unfolded rapidly in Egypt, initiating a se-
quence of intense organizing and preparation for a newly f ixed protest date, 
January 25, conveniently also known as “Police Day.” This concatenation of 
events renewed the hopes of many players in the possibility of launching 
a movement after the repression that had hit them in the previous weeks 
and months (El Chazli and Rayner 2014).
This is the broad context of January 25, full of feelings of hope and doubt 
in the possibility of change. Let us now tell the story of how these protests, 
through different local mediations, slowly developed into the greatest 
political crisis that Egypt had witnessed until then.
“The Revolution Starts on Tuesday at 2 p.m.,” or 
How to Plan the Unpredictable
The planning of the January 25 actions was the result of different (sometimes 
separate) processes. First, it sprang, as was shown, from Egyptian activists’ 
accumulated experience in mobilizing against the regime (El Chazli 2012). 
The development of street activism during the 2000s underlined its own 
strengths and limitations. Activists knew all too well how a demonstration 
usually ended, and how diff icult it was for them to attract more people. 
Moreover, activists interpreted (rightly) the extreme repression of any 
15 The initial protests were organized by Christian youth and families angry at the police, 
whom they held responsible. 
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collective form of dissent by the end of 2010 as a signal that it was time 
for them to calm things down.16 “To be honest, we were in a bad shape by 
late 2010 because of a great number of arrests. We knew that 2011 wouldn’t 
go well for us […] We received very clear messages from the security 
apparatuses […] They were basically saying that by September 2011, all 
of us would be in prison.”17 When the momentum for January 25 started 
building online and in the media, activists on the ground were concerned 
about these recent interactions with the police. They planned accordingly. 
Second, the intrusion of an unknown third party, with a huge influence, 
changed the game. Unknown at the time, the administrators of the We Are 
All Khaled Saeed (WAAKS) page played a central role in suggesting protest 
starting points, usually while anonymously coordinating with activists 
on the ground.18 Activists had to take into account the page’s tremendous 
audience when deciding what to do.19 Third, the coordination experience in 
Alexandria during the previous year, as recounted in the f irst part of this 
chapter, proved essential.20
In the continuation of the CB, the different players21 met several times 
during the days leading up to the 25th. Three broad tendencies could be 
16 After the peak of the El-Baradei and the Khaled Saïd moments, activists organized a public 
demonstration against the hereditary transmission of power from Mubarak Sr. to Mubarak Jr., a 
process that many believed to be underway. It was simultaneously organized, on September 21, 
2010, in Cairo and in Alexandria. In the latter, an enormous security dispositive was deployed 
and 37 out of the 50 people demonstrating were arrested. Even more alarming for the activists, 
the “common folk” (an-nās al-’ādiyya) were completely unresponsive to their cries for help 
(one activist kept shouting in a megaphone that if people did not come and demonstrate, the 
few demonstrators would end up in jail, yet no one came). Most activists interpreted this as a 
“bad sign,” suggesting it might be time to back down, regroup, and reorganize (interviews with 
Alexandrian activists between 2012 and 2015). 
17 Interview with a socialist activist, August 2013. Other interviewees conf irmed this. For 
instance, one recalled how during protests in late 2010 the off icers would mimic the “wait and 
see” and the throat slitting gestures.
18 The page’s main admin, Wael Ghonim, gives a detailed account of his involvement in his 
book (Ghonim 2012). Many of my interviewees conf irm Ghonim’s account, especially the fact 
that there was a minimal coordination with them, usually without the local activists knowing 
who he was. 
19 The page had more than 300,000 members on the eve of January 25 and the January 25 
“event” had been sent to more than a million Egyptians. 
20 Even if, due to the prevailing uncertainty of the situation, many players gave vague informa-
tion about their plans, or even false information. Nevertheless, when these groups starting 
meeting on the ground on the 25th, as the day was starting to “succeed,” they fully coordinated 
their action.
21 There are conflicting versions about who participated. Those who are usually cited as being 
present at least at one of the meetings are: the PCSMB (which hosted the meetings); April 6 
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distinguished in those meetings. A loose group of players (mainly the April 
6 movement, PCSMB, YFJL) were enthusiastic about the coming day, but 
thought that the usual protest sites (such as the court house)22 needed to be 
abandoned in favor of working-class districts. In contrast, political parties 
and more established groups (with older members) preferred the downtown 
option. Finally, a couple of players had their doubts about the event, for 
very different reasons. The Muslim Brotherhood Youth for instance, despite 
being present at all the meetings, f inally informed the others that they 
would not be participating.23 On the other hand, the radical left had its 
own doubts; for ideological reasons, they were unconvinced by the idea of 
a “preorganized revolution” as well as the focus on police violations instead 
of more “social” demands. They eventually decided to participate, but were 
completely surprised on the 25th:
Our greatest hopes were to initiate a cycle like Kifāya […] After Tunisia, 
we planned to launch protests in poorer areas to demand social justice, 
etc. We were discussing this with someone from PCSMB, and he suggested 
we should wait for the protests that were being called for by WAAKS […] 
We told him that our problem was that we didn’t want to mobilize only 
with respect to the police issue; we had other demands […] But the 25th 
was a real shock. We had gotten everything wrong. We had even decided 
that we wouldn’t raise the bar too high for our slogans. We thought that if 
we’d said “Down down…” no one would chant back. It was the opposite. 
We were saying our chants about minimum and maximum wage, while 
the lay people were saying “Down down…” and “No to Mubarak,” and so 
on. (Interview with a socialist activist, August 2013)
The main idea for most of the organizers was as follows: small groups of 
activists would initiate small-scale protests in different, relatively close 
locations. They’d bet on their mobilizing efforts on the previous days, as well 
as the general context (el-gaw el-’ām – i.e., the post-Tunisia effect, the online 
campaign by WAAKS), to draw people in. This had several consequences. 
movement; the Youth for Justice and Liberty (YFJL) movement; the radical left (represented by 
Hachd and/or the RS); al-Ghad Party; al-Wafd Party; al-Karama Party; youth representatives 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
22 The different groups organized many protests in late 2010 in front of the court house (in 
the Manshiyya area). The police usually harshly repressed these gatherings. 
23 Famously, the MB published on its website a few days before January 25 an article titled 
“Ten Demands to Avoid a Popular Revolution.” See. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/
details/109759. 
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On the one hand, instead of having one small protest of about 50 activists 
(or even 100 or 200) that could be easily repressed, they would have four 
or f ive groups of ten people scattered around the eastern districts. This 
meant that if one of these protests were surrounded by police forces, it 
wouldn’t be the end of the day as others could still go on. On the other hand, 
the multiplication of protest sites would force CSF squads to be scattered 
around the city. In smaller numbers, they would have a much harder time 
maintaining order, blocking access to streets, and rounding up protestors.
Every player made its own plans and tactics and at the last coordination 
meeting, held in extreme secrecy, the different groups informed each other 
of what they would be doing while withholding sensitive information, such 
as the exact starting location of the protest. And even though most groups 
ended up using similar strategies, they varied in regard to tactical details 
and in the way they prepared for the D-Day.24 Between January 20 and 25, 
the groups marketed intensely for the event. WAAKS and other militant 
Facebook pages posted off icial protest meeting points and gave out mobile 
numbers of f ield coordinators. Many people called to get more information, 
or to offer their help. The PCSMB thus decided to organize a meeting on 
the 24th with people who had called. Almost 150 people showed up. This 
important turnout encouraged the PCSMB to organize differently from 
in the past; but it also encouraged them to be cautious. Indeed, many of 
those who had shown up were previously unknown to the activists. The 
campaign decided to organize three protests to start in the eastern district. 
“No one knew the starting points of these marches except the politburo of 
the PCSMB. Even members didn’t know what would happen. We divided 
these numbers into groups of f ive, led by one person who would roughly 
know where the protest would leave from, not the exact location.” Three 
levels were instituted: demonstrations’ leaders (qā’id muzāhara), group 
heads (rās magmū’a), and protestors. The lowest level consisted of younger, 
less experienced activists as well as people who had called in the days before 
and offered their help. They would be told in the morning, by email, which 
district to head to. The group heads would step in at that point. Around 
10 a.m., they would receive an email telling them where to go and a list of 
ten phone numbers to call. Each was responsible for coordinating with his 
group of f ive to ten to meet at a place at 1:30 p.m. They would then wait for 
their group and make sure they were not followed by police forces.
24 “Every group was to organize according to its own tactics, without really telling the other. 
The only thing all of us knew is that we would be close to one another” (interview with an April 6 
movement leading activist, January 2014). 
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The idea behind this division of labor was that if one of these small groups 
fell, it wouldn’t be a handicap for the others. The demonstrations’ leaders, 
a handful of more seasoned activists, were the only ones (along with the 
politburo obviously) to know where the f inal demonstrations would start. 
Every demonstration leader would call the group heads at 1:45 p.m. to tell 
them where to meet. They would inform the group heads of their location 
and wait for them to arrive, then in a matter of seconds, they would pull 
out Egyptian flags; distribute them and start chanting and marching. All 
of these tactics had one objective: dodge the police forces.
An Iteration of Concurring Signs: A Microanalysis of an Open-
Ended Conjuncture
In a recent article, Ivan Ermakoff argues that “the clue to an understanding 
of causal disruption endogenous to social and historical processes lies in 
a systematic analysis of how factors affecting individual agency can bring 
about breaks in patterns of social relations” (Ermakoff 2015, 66). In these 
contexts, incidental happenings can become consequential by “induc[ing] 
shifts in patterns of relations” (p. 110). We must pay attention to apparently 
minor events (a street protest, like many others) and try to document how, in 
this particular situation, shifts in behavior and in stances occur, thus creat-
ing mutual uncertainty, the basis of contingency. In these moments, “scripts 
lose their behavioral relevance, and standard procedures become spinning 
wheels that offer no leverage on the situation for those who confront it” 
(ibid.). As we will see, in the early hours of January 25, 2011, activists were 
feeling a mixture of anxiety and excitement. Their previous experiences, 
that is, their dispositions, moderated their expectations (El Chazli 2012). 
Yet, as the day started to unfold, an iteration of concurring signs (situational 
clues observable by players on the ground) would reinforce the belief that 
something can happen and is happening. This process can be extrapolated 
as a hypothesis about how the f irst participants on the 25th evaluated their 
risks and slowly experienced shifts in these evaluations, inciting them to 
participate even more strongly.
On Tuesday, January 25, young Mohamed25 stood in trepidation and 
anxiety on a rather empty street in eastern Alexandria. He gazed around 
25 Interview with Mohamed, December 2012. Mohamed, born in 1990, grew up in a middle-class 
family (his father was mid-level civil servant) in the western district of Al-Qabbāry. He notes 
coming from a “politicized” home, where political Islam wasn’t appreciated even though his 
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him to see any familiar signs of police presence, but sensed none. At 11 a.m. 
Mohamed started calling the ten phone numbers that had been distributed 
to him earlier in the morning, thus following the plan established by his 
organization, the PCSMB. He was assigned to the popular neighborhood 
of Abū Kharrūf (in the northeast of Alexandria). The then-20 year old 
instructed his group to meet at 12 p.m. around the al-’Assāfra hospital.26 
“Be there at 12 sharp. At 12:05, we won’t be there,” he reminded them over 
the phone. Mohamed knew some of the ten people he called from previous 
political activities. The others had given their numbers to the PCSMB on 
the previous day. The neighborhood, Abū Kharrūf, had been “prepared” 
(mu’ahalla) for the march; on the 24th, Mohamed and others from the 
PCSMB had distributed hundreds of f lyers calling on people to participate 
in the marches. They had spoken to the “common folk” (an-nās al-’ādiyya), 
encouraged them to participate, discussed their opinions and calmed their 
fears. As anxious as he was, Mohamed was hopeful.27 Although having had 
to battle with familial constraints, he was determined to participate.28 
On the days leading up to the 25th, he actively published (self)reassuring 
messages on the necessity and possibility of change on his Facebook profile 
and on his friends.29
Mohamed led his small group to a meeting point, received minutes earlier 
from the main f ield organizer of the al-’Assāfra demonstration, Sameh.30 
brothers were sympathizers. His deceased father was a Nasserist. After a series of minor political 
experiences, he began participating steadily after the April 6, 2008, protest. He considers that 
he became “what we call a political activist after the death of Khaled Saïd.” 
26 Al-’Assāfra is a popular district on the southern side of Alexandria. Alexandria is commonly 
divided into a baharī (maritime) side and a qiblī (southern) side, that doesn’t really f it into a 
north/south division. It also tends to equate with a class divide. Abū Kharrūf is a neighborhood 
in that district. 
27 “Pairs of positive and negative emotions form ‘moral batteries’ that indicate a direction for 
action, away from the unattractive state and toward the attractive one” (Jasper 2014, 211). 
28 On January 19th, he changed his profile picture on Facebook, and we can now see him holding 
a sign stating, “I am participating on January 25 […] I am [a] free [man].” On January 20th and 
21st, his Facebook updates show his personal dilemmas. On the 20th, he writes, “My mom doesn’t 
want me to participate on January 25 […] What should I do????” The next days, he says, “I don’t 
know what to do: D:D:D after convincing mother of my participation, now my brother doesn’t 
want to go: D:D:D what should I do now????” 
29 He shares on Facebook a famous protest song by the poet Ahmad Fu’ād Negm (January 23), 
as well as statuses such as, “If I die, mother, don’t cry, I am going to die so that my homeland 
can live” or “Bread, Freedom, Human dignity” (one of the chosen slogans for the protests). On 
the next day (January 24), “Yes We Can” and “For you… For the future of your children and of 
mine… I participate on the 25th.”
30 Born in the early 1980s, Sameh went through many political experiences during the 2000-
2010 decade. From a Muslim Brotherhood background, he then oriented toward liberal/secular 
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A more seasoned activist, he was supposed to lead the demonstration 
and decide what to do next according to his evaluation of potential risks. 
Mohamed remembers, “We started walking around and people would ask 
us ‘is this the demonstration?’ [al-muzāhara] […] We began chanting around 
2 p.m. At that point, we were maybe 15-20-25 […] not more than 30 in any 
case.” To Mohamed’s amazement, the numbers grew rapidly in response to 
the chants of the small group. As soon as the demonstration was big enough, 
Sameh, Mohamed and the others began to lead to the march through the 
narrow streets and alleyways (pl. hawārī, s. hāra) of Abū Kharrūf.
Little more than a kilometer away from Sameh and Mohamed, ‘Abdel Sa-
mad31 was also getting ready to lead a demonstration from his neighborhood. 
Until 1 p.m., he stayed in his supermarket, located in his neighborhood, 
thus giving the impression that nothing was going on.32 At around 1:30, he 
started calling up group heads. All of these groups together represented 
approximately 30-40 people. Also, since he had good relations with some 
of the Muslim Brotherhood youth, about 15-20 of them decided to join him 
in the protest as participants (and not in the name of their organization). 
This demonstration was due to start in front of the ‘Abdel-Halīm Mahmūd 
Mosque, also in al-’Assāfra district. ‘Abdel Samad recalls, “As soon as we 
started walking, the ‘Down, down’ [with Hosni Mubarak] slogan started 
being chanted. People started chanting their own slogans that even we, as 
demonstration leaders, hadn’t prepared.”
A few blocks away, yet another protest was being launched almost 
simultaneously. The April 6 movement (A6M) had prepared its own dem-
onstration, without knowing it was so close to the PCSMB groups. “We 
were no more than f ive. We started chanting but for at least 45 minutes 
people were not responsive. The police started arriving and roughing us 
up, tried to arrest one of us” (interview with a leading April 6 movement 
activist, January 2014). It seemed as if it was ending before it even started, 
as usual. Nevertheless, the activists started talking to people, “‘Do you 
remember meat? Do you know how much it costs today? Even the lentils 
that you could eat, how much does it cost? Can you buy any of that for your 
son?’” (interview with a leading April 6 movement activist, January 2014). 
formations such as the El-Ghad Party and the DFP. It was later that he joined the PCSMB and 
became one of its main leaders. 
31  Born in the early 1980s, ‘Abdel Samad had a similar trajectory as Sameh, cycling through 
some of the liberal opposition parties, while being personally close to Islamists. He was one of 
the f irst coordinators of the PCSMB in Alexandria. 
32 Indeed, early in the morning, two informers from state security came by his shop and kept 
an eye on him. 
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Following up with these discussions, the activists started chanting “social 
slogans.”33 The people in the market (sū’) started to be responsive. Mean-
while, the Security seemed to have decided it was going to end the protest, 
and it prepared to engage.
Luckily for the A6M activists, at that moment, ‘Abdel Samad’s demonstra-
tion arrived from behind the CSF. “They were confused by our arrival. The 
off icers started talking to us politely, saying that we could do a sit-in but 
not to get out” (interview with ‘Abdel Samad, January 2014). But, “suddenly, 
there were 2000 of us […] The Security changed its tone, and started to 
negotiate. ‘Do not go outside, they’d say.’ But it wasn’t us anymore, the 
People were deciding” (interview with ‘Issām, January 2014). For the activ-
ists, a new player was in the street, one that they had always imagined, 
talked about, but never really seen: “the People.” And this new presence 
was exhilarating for them; it boded well for what was to come next, thus 
authorizing the activists to step over the previously established red lines. 
The Security tried to stop the demonstration by splitting the march in two, 
but failed to contain the movement and eventually had to withdraw from 
the scene. “We then reached the Gamal Abdel Nasser Avenue [one of the 
main arteries of eastern Alexandria]” (interview with ‘Issām, January 2014). 
The demonstrations were now really taking off.
As the demonstration kept growing bigger, Sameh, Mohamed, and the 
others tried to keep control over the excited crowd. Sameh was sitting 
on the shoulders of a fellow activist, wearing an Egyptian flag as a cape. 
Shouting as loudly as possible, he tried to give guidelines to the protestors, 
“Anyone of you who passes by a car, do not hit it, do not stand on it, do not 
damage any property, we are good people [nās muhtaramīn], we are a good 
people [sha’b muhtaram] [Protestors cheer, applaud and wave their little 
flags] […] Long live Egypt! [The crowd repeats] Long live Egypt! [The crowd 
repeats].” As he shouted the century-old slogan, the march started moving 
again through the narrow alleys. While they kept walking through the maze 
that is Abū Kharrūf, and more people joined the march, a rotba34 (police 
off icer) approached the apparent leaders of the march, i.e., those chanting 
the slogans. “‘Don’t leave here, the off icer said, stay [in the harāt (district)], 
it’s just for your safety.’ But obviously, it wasn’t about our safety […] He didn’t 
33 Typically, “they augmented the price of oil, they augmented the price of sugar; tomorrow 
we’ll need to sell our furniture” to be able to buy food. 
34 Rotba literally means a rank (as in lieutenant, captain, general, etc.). It is used in Egypt as 
a synonym of off icers, and more specif ically, higher-ranking off icers. The rotab (plural) are 
identif iable by their epaulets.
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know how to deal with us […] The numbers were too big. That’s why he was 
so polite” (interview with Mohamed, December 2012).
Nevertheless, at that point, they felt that their numbers were still not 
big enough, so they complied, and marched around the neighborhood, 
attracting even more people as they went. The protest was now huge. “We 
felt that he [the off icer] was scared, as if 100,000 questions were racing in 
his head. ‘Where did all these people come from? What are we going to do 
with them?’” Mohamed recalls. This time, when the off icer tried again to 
convince them to stay “inside,” and not to spill out on the main street, they 
did not comply. Sameh simply waived in disdain to the astonished off icer, 
and entered the main street. They were exhilarated by the numbers and 
by the walls trembling under their mighty chants. Taken aback, the police 
forces stood still as the march passed through, which many protestors 
interpreted as a good omen: the police were not going to shoot.
“We were now on the main street. When that happened, we saw the 
numbers for the first time […] We couldn’t see clearly before that, as we 
were in narrow alleys. The numbers were huge. Spontaneously, we found 
ourselves in tears from the sight” (interview with Mohamed, December 
2012). In these few minutes, the activists f irst redef ined the situation, “as 
we started walking, we felt that […] maybe it’s not a revolution, but it’s the 
beginning of the downfall of the regime […] it’s beginning of asking for 
rights, having demands met.” They observed their surroundings and looked 
for concurring signs: older people waving and giving victory signs (two 
f ingers forming the letter V) from their balconies; a street vendor using his 
megaphone to chant “Down with Hosni Mubarak”; people pouring out of 
buildings to march; the arrival of another protest to join forces, and so on.
Not far away, the other PCSMB group that had joined the A6M one was 
experiencing a similar trajectory. “The numbers were incredible, unbeliev-
able. We were congratulating each other, as if we had already won. But now 
what? We were calling our April 6 friends who left from Shubra in Cairo, 
telling each other about the turnout […] We were trying to f igure out where 
should we go? What would make sense in Alexandria?” While activists 
were desperately trying to keep control of the protest, they were facing this 
typical property of political crises: strategic uncertainty. As most of the 
tacit rules governing contentious politics were quickly crumbling down, 
they felt a crippling sense of confusion,
An off icer told me, “tell them to stop!” and I said “if you can’t control 
them I can’t control them either!” They weren’t able to deal with us. 
They didn’t engage, they just stared at us and let us go. When I called 
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the Operation Room,35 […] they said use your best judgment; you’re the 
one on the ground. We kept on walking without knowing where we were 
going. When we met again with security forces, they had blockaded a 
street to prevent us from going back to the Baharī side. Before I could 
even think of what we should do, people had already pushed back the 
cordon, and went through. We just followed now. (Interview with ‘Abdel 
Samad, January 2014)
Carried Away by the People
If the situation’s meaning was starting to shift, another important thing 
was happening on the ground. It was ever clearer to the activists that it was 
getting tougher to keep the demonstration “in line.” The numbers were con-
tinuing to grow. But more importantly, the activists were already exhausted. 
Not only because of the efforts they had made in the few previous hours 
(running back and forth, shouting and chanting at the top of their lungs, 
lifting each other on their shoulders, and, obviously, walking.) They were 
exhausted from the past two weeks of intense organizing, both physically 
and psychologically. “We were not sleeping […] Fear and horror at the idea 
that the day would fail […] And that the regime would unleash its wrath on us 
because of what we’ve done […] Imagine if after all of that organizing, no one 
showed up […] All of that was a great load on us, a lot of anxiety” (interview 
with Mohamed, December 2012). Now the demonstration had its own life, 
its own dynamic. The “regular people’s” chants were much more radical 
than the list decided by the WAAKS page and even by the f ield activists.
Simultaneously, news arrived that another protest – one that had started 
in the downtown district of Manshiyya – had been dealt with violently by 
the police around the Sīdī Gābir area. “We tried to halt down the march 
and started explaining what was happening. We told them that our youth 
[shabābna] was being attacked by the police in Sīdī Gābir, and what should 
we do? The f inal decision was the street’s to take. To a certain extent, our 
mission was over.” A young man shouted that the protest should go and 
“teeet”36 the police and was acclaimed by the now thousands of protestors. 
“It was like they weren’t afraid anymore,” Mohamed remembers. The march 
35 The PCSMB had created an Operation Room (OR) (ghurfat ‘amaliyyāt) composed of three 
senior activists, centralizing information and communications between the ground groups, 
and also feeding the internet with information. 
36 Mohamed simulates a bleep censor, suggesting an insult. 
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kept on going on the Corniche Avenue, f illing up one side and leaving the 
other one to traff ic. It eventually reached Sīdī Gābir.37 When they arrived, 
the authorities had cut off the electricity in the neighborhood. CSF were 
massively f iring tear gas.38 The protestors did not flee in face of the attack. 
Rather, they hid in the multiple alleyways surrounding Sīdī Gābir. People 
would regroup and start small marches, reproducing what they had just 
done (maybe for the f irst time) a few hours earlier. “This was extremely 
impressive,” recalls Mohamed, grinning. “Our people [the activists] were 
slowly leaving. Activists weren’t chanting the slogans. The people were. 
They were the ones leading the marches.”
In his account of the preparation of the January 25 marches, ‘Issām un-
derlined a central feature of street protests during the Mubarak days, “You 
know, our problem was […] since we started this experience, the security 
services [(al-amn] would end the protests […] We never had to think of how 
to end! [Laughs]” Most of the activists quickly found themselves in that 
strange dilemma; they hadn’t planned for their marches to succeed. So they 
hadn’t really planned on how the day should end. Their best-case scenario 
was to leave the alleyways and hold a main street for a few hours. “Before 
starting, we had to discuss the issue of how to end. How should we end the 
demonstration? If the turnout is low, and there is not much responsiveness 
from the people, then we should walk for an hour, and then stop. If the 
numbers reached a thousand protestors, and that was our maximal hope, we 
would try to reach 45th Street.”39 For others, such as the radical left, the idea 
was to create a momentum in a popular neighborhood that would become 
a social base for subsequent political actions (interview with a socialist 
activist, August 2013).
Activists had to improvise with little information at hand. “Obviously, 
at that point, we did not know what was going on on the other side, in 
downtown. We weren’t really communicating with them.” The scarce news 
arriving indicated that clashes were ongoing in Sīdī Gābir. This became 
their “natural” destination. Others decided to head for the governorate 
(muhāfaza) building, “because this was what represented the state in 
Alexandria.”
37 This is a 6.7 km walk (4.1 miles). The Google Maps estimate for this walk is 1h 23m. 
38 As far as timing goes, this is a f irst difference with Cairo. On the 25th, the Cairo CSF inter-
vened violently at midnight by charging on Tahrir Square. Up until that point, repression had 
been present but incidental. 
39 Interview with ‘Abdel Samad (January 2014). 45th Street is a main street of the Miami 
neighborhood in eastern Alexandria. 
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People were asking me “Where to now?” and the OR had left everything in 
my hands. They just informed me that there was another protest ahead of 
us, and one behind us. People in the crowd were suggesting destinations: 
the security services headquarters, the Muhāfaza, etc. People agreed on 
the Muhāfaza. It’s very far as you know [laughs], but we were like, why 
not? (Interview with ‘Abdel Samad, January 2014)
As soon as they got there, the power was cut off in the neighborhood, and 
the police started to f ire tear gas canisters. An activist described the sound 
of the incessant shooting and of the armored vehicles racing in the streets 
as “horrifying” (mor’ib). He then went to a café; “At that point, we decided 
that the day was over. At least for us” (interview with ‘Issām, January 2014). 
Indeed, by the evening, most of the activists were exhausted. Feeling that 
what was going on was out of their hands, they slowly left the streets and 
started regrouping in cafés and in some of their headquarters, depending 
on where they were. For the f irst time, they were seeing the “national” 
news and images of Tahrir Square. These images confirmed their feeling 
about what was going on; this was a different scale from what they were 
used to. The different groups started to communicate heavily and reflect 
on what should be their next steps. Also, many activists had been arrested 
around the city on the 25th. People were starting to gather information, 
heading to police stations, and looking for friends and colleagues who 
weren’t answering their phones or replying to text messages. The day had 
taken a strange turn for most of the participants. And as excited as they 
were, they felt distraught in the face of what might come next. Complete 
uncertainty was the main feature of the situation. They had been waiting 
for that moment for a long time, yet, in some sense, they had never really 
expected it.
Conclusion
I have focused on a few interactions that might seem tangential to a 
general explanation of “revolutions” or “political crises,” but which are 
still helpful for understanding the local social dynamics underlying 
the “revolt.” I am not suggesting that these localized interactions are 
“representative” of broader causal mechanisms, or that they constitute 
an alternative explanation to the causes of revolutions. I simply point out 
certain processes that seem to tell us more (or at least a different story) 
about how crises start, how they develop, and how they get “out of control.” 
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If what is usually considered as the causes of revolutions (frustration, 
unemployment, absence of freedoms, etc.) is observable, most analyses 
don’t really tackle how these “causes” produce a global political crisis 
in a given country at a given moment. In a way, political crises (just as 
wars, and other great events) seem to transcend their causes (Dobry 2009; 
Rayner 2005). They appear like a different class of phenomena that require 
explanations of their own. Obviously, a more profound exploration of 
these insights would require the study of a longer time frame and the 
interactions of many more players.
In accordance with what social movements studies tell us, it is obvi-
ous here that the studied collective actions are “product(s) of learned 
and historically grounded performances” (Tilly 2008, 4). The players who 
organized the January 25 actions in Alexandria shared a set of ideas, beliefs, 
repertoires, and know-how. Even when they chose to do something new, it 
was generally informed by their past experiences, notably with repression 
and “failed” previous mobilizations.
If we take into account what players think, perceive, and evaluate, it 
becomes obvious that most players (both activists and security apparatuses) 
don’t believe that these mobilizations will amount to anything. Players 
don’t plan ahead. Activists are extremely skeptical; most of them do not 
plan an “ending” for the actions they organize. The security apparatuses, 
on the other hand, don’t imagine that these mobilizations will differ from 
their previous experiences with protestors; they don’t plan an alternative 
strategy other than their usual “beat and arrest.” That is why, on the ground, 
most of the CSF squads just didn’t know what to do; they stood confused 
and generally didn’t act. In reaction, protestors were free to interpret this 
inaction in multiple ways: the police is sympathetic to their action, the 
police has its limits, the police is not as strong as it seems, etc. In any case, 
the consequences were multiple. In a chain reaction, as more people saw 
others protesting and not being repressed or beaten up, more started joining, 
and so on.
The situational decision to radicalize the demonstration on the ground 
(crossing symbolic or physical red lines) is informed by other “signs” decoded 
by activists on the ground. Other than the aforementioned case of the police, 
popular support in the street or from balconies, greater turnout than the 
usual, participation of “unusual ordinary people” (older women, people of 
different social classes, etc.) are all interpreted as signs of a shifting situation. 
“That Egypt was a society in which large numbers of people were discontent 
was widespread knowledge. But that Egypt was a society of people willing 
to act on that discontent was a surprise […] What seems to have changed 
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in January 2011 with astonishing rapidity was less people’s understanding 
of one another’s preferences than their understanding of one another’s 
practical commitment to change […] As soon as such determination was 
in evidence, demonstrations quickly snowballed” (Brown 2014, 301-302).
The story of the Egyptian revolutionary situation (tracing processes, carv-
ing up sequences) needs, in my view, to take into account this multiplicity 
of simultaneous contingent actions and interactions, which brought a mul-
titude of marginal localized action into great unanticipated consequences. 
Tracing these contingencies does not, I think, mean that we fall back on 
an “old eventful history” that obfuscates social structures and their impact 
(Hassabo and Rey 2015). These contingencies are part of the explanation 
and should be taken seriously.
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Abstract
This chapter gives an account of what we call the social actors’ “sub-
jectivation” in the Egyptian Revolution. This notion encompasses their 
emotions, their strategic calculations, their mood, and their cultural 
features. Although structural factors like the economy and politics and, 
in particular, the geopolitics of the region play an important role in 
most of the Arab societies, too often they are stressed at the expense of 
the “subjective” state of the social actors. This chapter accounts for the 
revolution on the basis of the “subjectivation” hypothesis that highlights 
the interaction between the people and elites.
Keywords: subjectivation, desubjectivation, social actor, subject, emotions
The Arab Revolutions and Subjectivation
The analysis of violence in the Egyptian Revolution gives an account of 
what we call the social actors’ “subjectivation,” encompassing their emo-
tions, their strategic calculations, their mood, and their cultural features 
(Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Although structural factors like the economy 
and politics and in particular the geopolitics of the region play an important 
role in most of the Arab societies, too often they are stressed at the expense 
of the “subjective” state of the social actors. This chapter accounts for the 
revolution on the basis of the “subjectivation” hypothesis that highlights 
the interaction between the people and elites.
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The notion of subjectivation was developed f irst in psychoanalytical 
circles in the early 1990s and then taken up by French social scientists in 
order to reintroduce the notion of the “subject” in social movements. For 
Touraine, Wieviorka, and Dubet among others who have been working on 
social movements, subjectivation is a process by which one becomes a sub-
ject capable of assuming the role of a social actor within social movements 
or outside them (Touraine, Wieviorka, and Dubet 1984). The notion intends 
to bridge the gap between the intimate and the social spheres, the public 
and the private spheres. It preserves a psychological dimension, notably by 
introducing the counterconcept of “desubjectivation” based on despair and 
the inability to assume the role of a social actor within the social framework 
(Touraine and Khosrokhavar 2000; Touraine 1997, 2013). Touraine’s view of 
subjectivation is based on a heroic conception of the subject as a person who 
dissociates herself from others and acts in an atomistic manner in order to 
fend off the domination of the social system. In this regard subjectivation is 
an act of insubordination and self-assertion within a social context marked 
by the hegemony of class, groups, and the state.
In my view, subjectivation is more related to the situation of the individual 
within a group of street protesters or in other gatherings in which a new type 
of intersubjective relationship develops that relates the individual to the 
group through emotions and makes possible a new type of social action by 
combining them with “on the spot” rationalizations and strategies that did 
not exist before their encounter. Subjectivation, in this case, is intersubjec-
tive by its very nature, in contrast to Touraine’s view. Subjectivation has 
some aff inity with empowerment; but whereas the latter insists on social 
conditions, the former is more sensitive to the psychological conditions 
of the individual. When individuals are discouraged, one might talk of 
“desubjectivation,” that is the loss of the capacity to mobilize one’s mental 
resources in order to promote social action.
Subjectivation transforms passive moods into active emotions that pro-
mote action, in particular, social protest. The origin of this transformation 
is obscure: rumors circulate that “others” have thrown themselves into 
the streets and braved the repressive forces of the state. The individual is 
hesitant at the beginning, and once in the street, the spectacle of a minority 
engaging in demonstrations encourages her to follow in their footsteps; the 
shared emotion heightened through slogans creates a collective feeling of 
shared indignation toward the government. Through subjectivation, what 
was accepted as a sad fact of life becomes unbearable due to heightened 
indignation, shared and amplif ied by the others. One young male partici-
pant to Tahrir Square told me:
Violence, sociAl Ac tors, And sUbJec tiVAtion in the egyptiAn reVolUtion 161
We all shared a deep discontent toward a regime that did not take us into 
account but we were passive, we did not react. What pushed me to do 
so was f irst the Tunisians who ousted their corrupt president and then, 
our shared feeling of indignation through the Web and, more important, 
gathering in Tahrir Square. There happened something that cannot be put 
easily in words: We became one body through shouting our rage against 
the regime. The more they tried to intimidate us, the more we became 
careless about our life. Being together gave us a sense of immunity. I 
recovered my lost dignity.1
Subjectivation is a push toward empowerment but it has a unique side, 
including the feeling of indignation. What did not seem to push toward the 
public expression of anger and outrage suddenly becomes unacceptable. The 
cause can be the “others’ action.” The “others” can be the few people who 
dared come to the street to voice their discontent, but it can also be another 
society. In the Egyptian case, Tunisia’s ability to put an end to the autocratic 
rule of Ben Ali through the Jasmin Revolution played a role: the “others” 
(Tunisians) did it, why can’t Egyptians, the standard bearers of the oldest 
civilization in the world, achieve what a tiny country was able to perform?
Subjectivation is also based on the “right” to be recognized as a subject (in 
the Egyptian case, to be a citizen), contrary to the traditional viewpoint that 
made the individual subservient to the community (the pan-Arabist nation or 
the Islamist umma in the case of Egypt). The right to express one’s discontent 
even in a country where the notion of the citizens’ rights is not institutionalized 
as in the Western countries is a new phenomenon, and to promote this status 
of citizenship the person views herself as entitled to respect and permitted to 
revolt if her government does not accept this right. There is a modern side to 
subjectivation that binds respect to the process of individuation and makes 
the dignity of the citizen the pillar of his (or her) identity. This young woman 
who took part in Tahrir Square’s movement expresses it beautifully:
I was a noncitizen, a nonhuman being in a double sense: as an Egyptian 
and as a woman. I had no dignity. I was nothing, less than nothing. In 
Tahrir Square I recovered my dignity as much as a citizen as a woman. 
The others respected me; they did not try to pinch me or rub their body 
against mine, even when we were close to each other. We found ourselves 
as moral beings. We were immoral because we were denied our being 
1 The interviews, unless otherwise stated, were conducted in Cairo in March 2011, two months 
after the overthrow of Mubarak.
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human by the regime. Once together, our aim was at the beginning to 
overthrow the pharaoh [Mubarak] and then, bit by bit, we became aware 
of our human values: we helped each other, we helped those who became 
ill, we organized cultural events, we built a new world in miniature. We 
recovered our dignity and the more the baltagia [the militia of the regime] 
tried to threaten us, the less we were afraid, because we had discovered 
a new identity. We were not violent but did not accept violence on their 
side. We tried to defend ourselves without becoming violent in a wild 
manner. We disarmed some baltagia but we did not beat them to death, 
we just made them flee or brought them to the soldiers who were close by. 
They let them go. There I felt I was a citizen, nonviolent, respectful of the 
others, even when they were so mean, like the militia. I became aware of 
myself as somebody who asked for respect and who was respected as an 
individual and as a woman. I was sexually respected, not harassed by the 
men that surrounded me as it often happens in the bus or on the street.
Here subjectivation is also remoralization and a new type of gender behavior.
Another protester, Ahad Soueif, thought that being at Tahrir Square 
enabled the participants to develop a sense of togetherness that made the 
collective action meaningful: “We had come together, as individuals, mil-
lions of us, in a great cooperative effort” (Soueif 2012). A local leader of a 
minority trade union, a worker probably in his late 30s, has a similar view 
with a specif ic reference to his origins and his social struggle:
As a worker I was a minority there. Many were younger than me and 
we were not numerous. I belong to the new Egyptian Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions [EFITU] and not the corrupt Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation [ETUF]. The others did not understand my feelings, but 
what united us was stronger than what separated us. Here I was, with my 
paltry salary, while the others looking for dignity were much better off. 
But we came to understand that whatever our claims, Mubarak had to 
go. I became closer to the movement when we found the baltagia in front 
of us. There, we forgot about our differences and came together without 
any afterthought. We fought them and there; we found our dignity as 
citizens, not as a worker or as a student, but simply as a citizen.
Subjectivation means celebrating the new togetherness so that people do 
not fall into the mundane routines of daily life as commented Israa Abdel-
Fattah, a member of the April 6 movement: “We don’t want life to go back 
to normal until Mubarak leaves” (Sherwood 2011).
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Subjectivation involves claiming to be an individualized citizen in a so-
ciety where citizenship is trampled upon by authoritarian nationalism and 
fundamentalist or radical Islamism. It opens up the assertion of the self as a 
person who participates in politics through street protests in which shared 
emotions of indignation and frontal opposition to the state become the ma-
jor means to achieve the “civil society” in a subjective manner, without the 
institutional framework that underpins an objective civil society. In brief, 
subjectivation makes it possible to be a politically recognized individual 
in a new framework of a shared community of emotions through which 
people endeavor to accomplish their desire to be a respected subject. The 
latter desires to take part in decisions concerning their collective destiny 
within a society in which this capacity is denied to the individual.
Subjectivation also relates the individual to a “would-be social move-
ment” which develops in a progressive manner through this very process 
of shared emotions and grievances in a period of effervescence created by 
putting together the activated emotions of indignation and moral demands. 
Contrary to the working-class movements in which the economic condition 
of the workers was the dominant characteristic of their association and 
protest movements, in the new social movements and particularly in the 
Egyptian Revolution, the loose association of individuals with disparate 
social conditions gave birth to collective action against the Mubarak regime. 
This was made possible through “subjectivation”: the latter compensated for 
the heterogeneous conditions of the people, creating a unity of emotions 
autonomous from their “objective” social conditions.
One important dimension of subjectivation is the loss of fear through a 
complex mechanism that has to do with the transition from passivity to 
activity and the sense of sharing the same destiny with the others. Becoming 
fearless is the beginning of the victory, as Ahmad Mahmoud puts it crudely: 
“I will come every day until he [Mubarak] leaves because now I know that 
we have won […] When we stopped being afraid, we knew we would win” 
(McGreal 2011).
Here we focus on a specif ic type of subjectivation, namely the one 
that brought about the Egyptian Revolution and which built up emotions 
through two major notions laden with strong emotions, namely nonviolence 
(selmiyah) and dignity (karamah).
Few voices were heard that had doubts about the outcome of the forth-
coming revolution. Some belonged to the Mubarak regime, but others felt 
doubts about a revolution that aimed at ousting the president without any 
concrete project, as put by this middle-class man in his 50s, a teacher at 
the university of Cairo:
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People want to get rid of Mubarak but instead of planning for the future, 
they gather at Tahrir Square, hang out, and celebrate being together. 
This is not a project for a new society. They’ve gone on a picnic to Tahrir 
Square – this is their revolution. We have a tourist economy that is already 
suffering from the unrest. I see a bleak future for these young people. 
They are idealists and who do not have the slightest idea of what politics 
is about. I am afraid for the future.
A man in his 40s, who spoke English and refused to tell me what his job 
was (he was probably a higher-up in the security forces), said: “These young 
people believe that they can put an end to the rule of the army. They have 
ousted Mubarak, but the result is chaos. I know this society. After some 
time people will ask for a strong power and the only institution there is, is 
the army. Egypt needs a pharaoh; it has been always so, since f ive thousand 
years ago.”
At the outset the Arab revolutions promoted nonviolence as a major 
motto, and they framed their emotions in order to stress their refusal to 
become violent. This attitude was not due exclusively to the new subjective 
stance of the revolutionary actors, but also to the invention during the 
last two decades of what might be called the “subjective civil sphere” or 
the “emotional civil sphere” in Egyptian society in particular and in most 
of the Arab world in general (Alexander 2011; Khosrokhavar 2015). In the 
two decades preceding the Arab uprisings, education became widespread, 
young girls became a sizeable proportion of the students, social media made 
headway, and a new “pan-Arabism” developed from below that provided a 
sense of common culture despite major differences among the new genera-
tions of Arabs (Khosrokhavar 2012).
But nonviolence and its status changed drastically during the f ive years 
after the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt in January 2011. This period has a 
history of its own. The challenge is to understand it in terms of a sociology 
of affects, emotions, and the ad hoc subjective civil sphere, with the end 
result being the return of authoritarianism and the repression of many 
social actors who had accomplished the Egyptian Revolution.
Tahrir Square was the birthplace of the Egyptian Revolution, the “topos” 
where the logic of emotions and the utopia of a new society blended into a 
dream that could be accomplished on a small scale at that place, the task 
of the revolution being its extension to all of Egypt (Khosrokhavar 2012).
Tahrir Square was of course not the entire script of the revolution, which 
also occurred in other major cities (in particular, Alexandria: see Chapter 5) 
and progressively extended to many parts of Egyptian society. But Tahrir 
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Square epitomized the revolution, a place where affects and emotions were 
framed according to the dual principles of nonviolence and dignity and a 
new “community” was built to respect them. Participants overcame fear 
of the government by taking part in the demonstrations. Going beyond 
the “awe” inspired by the state was a collective experience in many upris-
ings in the Arab world; the so-called awe of the state (haiba al dawla) had 
been a major obstacle to protest movements in a region where peaceful 
demonstrations can end up facing violence from the police or the military. 
The Egyptian Revolution also developed a “spatialized emotion center” 
in Tahrir Square, a “topos” in which the major sentiments and emotions 
crystallized in a ritualized fashion, influenced by the characteristics of that 
square and the socialization process within it, drawing on its history as the 
venue for nationalism during the Nasser era and the theater of a movement 
against British colonialism in the late nineteenth century. At Tahrir Square 
violence was excluded: no violence toward women (the complaints were 
about the behavior of the security forces outside Tahrir Square), toward 
the Christians (Copts could celebrate their rituals without any fear of being 
harassed), toward nonpracticing Muslims. As one student in his mid-20s 
said few months later:
We wanted to be the mirror of the future Egyptian society. We excluded 
violence, we tried to be kind toward each other, tolerant. Now, with 
hindsight, I think that we were too naïve. We thought we could change 
Egypt by changing our attitudes at Tahrir Square. Still, it was a wonderful 
experience for me and I developed a new way of looking at myself and 
at others.
During the occupation Tahrir Square was kept tidy (whereas many streets 
of Cairo are rather untidy, even dirty). It had a life of its own during the 
revolution proper and it had its own free hospital, cultural events, theater, 
music, and more. In the adjacent streets art exhibitions developed, mainly 
related to the revolution and its glorif ication. In this community, the feeling 
of a new life as a pure civil society, outside the realm of the repressive state, 
was experienced by the people who actively took part in it in the name of 
subjective dignity (karamah), as opposed to the indignity of state repression. 
Subjectivation was synonymous with nonviolent, responsible citizenship 
holding fast to the place and remaining there in a decent manner in order 
to denounce the Mubarak regime.
Tahrir Square, during the Revolution and for many months afterward, 
meant an alternative society to the one proposed by the repressive state. 
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In it religious differences were swept aside between the Muslims and the 
Christians (Copts) and even those who did not strongly believe in God. 
This utopian civil sphere became part of the identity of those who thought 
of the Egyptian Revolution as a radical break with the past, a rebirth of 
society under the guise of a new government that would not only represent 
them, but would be consonant with them in their heart and soul in an 
idealistic manner. Tahrir Square would be the showcase of the future 
Egyptian society; in it social relations were devoid of violence and based 
on an empowerment founded on the rejection of political authoritarianism.
This logic of sentiments at Tahrir Square became part and parcel of the 
period that witnessed the gradual separation between those who believed 
in this “effervescent community” and the rest of society, exposed to a dire 
economic situation and for whom Tahrir Square became a stumbling block 
to a “normal society.” What might be called “Tahrirization” was based on 
the difference between those who wanted to perpetuate the ideal of the 
revolution in its global aspects and those who believed that the revolution-
ary period was over and that, after Mubarak’s ouster, life should get back 
to normal.
During the Egyptian Revolution proper society, at least in large cities, was 
mostly opposed to Mubarak. Those who were not politically involved or did 
not reject Mubarak outright were either overawed by the demonstrations at 
Tahrir Square or felt somehow “ashamed” to demonstrate for the declining 
president. His fate was akin to the Shah of Iran in 1979. Even the minority 
who supported the Shah did not express it openly, either because they did 
not want to go beyond certain levels or because of the logic of “shame” in 
front of those who demonstrated massively and were exposed to repression 
by the police or the military.
This feeling of being a minority with a “nonlegitimate” claim in front of 
a government that has lost its legitimacy because it has been too repressive 
and at the same time has lost its capacity to frighten others, is part of the 
scenario that makes demonstrations in support of this type of government 
“shameful”: not because it is repressive, but due to the fact that it is not able 
to show its legitimacy by a show of force and the capacity to intimidate. 
Those who display their opposition accept risks that are not acceptable to 
the others (the proponents) and who entertain also a sentiment of guilt 
in consequence of the indirect interaction with those opponents who 
demonstrate against the powers that be and who, through their slogans, 
actions, and gestures make the others feel the burden of a guilty conscience 
riddled with implicit self-incrimination as being the indirect coauthors of 
repression.
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Sometimes, what occurs in the demonstrations in front of those who 
do not demonstrate is an “inversion scheme”: those who are protesting 
have already won legitimacy over those who do not participate in the 
protest movement and who, because they are either against it or fearful 
of it, refuse to join the protesters. They feel the pinch of guilt, shame, or at 
least powerlessness in front of the spectacle of those who demonstrate and 
dare to question the government. By overcoming fear, those who protest 
play a role in preventing those who support the government from acting 
in the public sphere through role inversion: to stand by the government 
becomes illegitimate.
Tahrir Square underwent the same processes during the heroic period of 
the revolution proper that lasted eighteen days and was prolonged for many 
weeks afterwards: legitimacy gained through the daring act of protesting, 
a feeling of impotence among those who did not share their views, and 
a capacity to embody the legitimacy of a new order to come that their 
shouting, cries, slogans, body language and community life in Tahrir Square 
vindicated. The global media, and in particular Al Jazeera’s large screen at 
Tahrir Square, convinced those who lived there that they were seen by the 
world and their legitimacy embodied a theatricality of its own through 
televisions around the world.
A new sense of “Tahrirization” comes to the fore: what made the 
demonstrators and those who lived there cling to a new identity made 
them afterwards unable to open up to a changing situation in the rest of 
Egyptian society and to perceive the eroding legitimacy of their attitudes 
and behavior patterns. The period when Tahrir Square became the symbolic 
embodiment of the Revolution was also the beginning of its decline in terms 
of empathy toward the rest of the society. The mainly young “netizens,” who 
wanted social, political and economic change, did not see the degrading 
situation of an embattled economy based in a large part on tourism that was 
receding due to the troubles and instability. They were unable to perceive 
their own gradual loss of legitimacy in the eyes of other citizens. The “real 
society” was undergoing a deep economic and political crisis, while the 
so-called Tahrir Square youth became more and more estranged from the 
daily problems of society.
What once was the theater of the majority’s will for change gradually 
became the venue where the divide became obvious: on the one hand, 
the radicalized actors of a mythicized community embodied in the youth 
of Tahrir Square, and on the other hand, a society that was undergoing 
disillusion and disenchantment with revolutionary ideals. The young 
minority were determined to preserve the ideal of a utopian community, 
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and Tahrir Square turned into a sectarian brotherhood of puritanical 
believers. The language of the Tahrir Square youth and their mindset was 
metapolitical, humanitarian or ethical. They harbored a moral attitude 
toward society, wishing to build up a close-knit community based on 
ethics rather than politics. Many decades of corrupt and populist leaders 
had induced a deep distrust toward politics as such. Contrary to classical 
revolutions, the Tahrir Square youth were not “politicized” but aimed at 
a metapolitical order that would embody morality and achieve social 
goals by virtue rather than through the new institutions and political 
parties that would emerge as a result of the overthrow of the authoritarian 
government.
The rupture of Tahrir Square youth from the rest of the society resulted 
from a degrading economy, political instability, and an opaque future, 
inducing a radical rejection of the revolutionary actors by many citizens 
who yearned for political stability and economic recovery. The military 
coup that put an end to the government was in part against the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) government that did not have any project for society 
except the progressive inf iltration of the state by the MB apparatus, and in 
part against the Tahrir Square youth who had blocked the political situation 
by their ethereal views and their intransigence toward real politics.
Fragile Affects in the Egyptian Revolution
The so-called January 25 Revolution in Egypt was decisive in making 
explicit what had been implicit in the daily life of many ordinary citizens: 
the feeling that the Mubarak government had trampled their dignity. 
This situation was expressed in a word that found wide currency in Egypt 
and beyond it, in the Arab world, namely hogra (contempt): the state 
was contemptuous of its citizens and people endured it due to their fear, 
resistance (muqawama) being felt as impossible before the revolution. 
Demonstrations, both by imitation (Tunisia sent the message through its 
revolution in December 2010) and also by a feeling of being sick and tired, 
began in Egypt. Helplessness and silent acceptance of contempt were 
overcome by the sheer social action of protesting in the public sphere. The 
demonstrations created new social ties that overcame fear. But contrary 
to the past, when surpassing fear meant exerting “legitimate violence” 
against the former regime through a logic of honor and counterhumilia-
tion, this time dignity was involved in challenging the state’s contempt. 
This notion, meaning inalienable rights of citizens who collectively 
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constitute the sovereign people, was new in the Muslim world, a new 
culture of pluralism. The notion has religious precedents. In the Quran, 
we f ind: “And indeed We have honored [‘dignif ied’: karramna, the same 
root as karam, karamah, (dignity)] the Children of Adam, and We […] have 
preferred them to many of those whom We have created with a marked 
preference” (Night Trip, verse 70). In this verse, God dignif ied Adam’s 
offspring by giving them karamah, granting them prominence over the 
other creatures.
The current meaning of karamah, the dignity of a person as a citizen, is 
related to the individuation process and the recognition of a person as a 
judicial entity and, even more, an awareness of the inviolable nature of a 
person that should be recognized in his or her inalienable rights. Human 
rights groups in the Arab world now christen themselves karamah, such as 
the Alkarama for Human Rights, which denounced and publicized infringe-
ments on human rights.
Dignity can be distinguished from traditional honor, which was 
constantly brandished in the nationalist and Islamist movements in the 
twentieth century and by autocratic governments claiming that their honor 
was trampled upon by Western imperialism (nationalists), by the Crusaders 
(Islamists), and by internal enemies (both nationalists and Islamists). Honor 
is closely related to sexuality and metaphoric male ascendancy, assumed 
by the government in societies whose “honor” (namus, irdh, denoting the 
sexual integrity of women) has to be preserved by the state against internal 
and external devilish adversaries. Arab dictatorships mobilized this sense 
of threatened honor in order to deny dignity to their citizens.
The Egyptian Revolution at its inception replaced the logic of honor with 
that of dignity. Honor is, in its nationalist and Islamist embodiment, prone 
to see violence as necessary for the accomplishment of the community’s 
goals and even desirable. Dignity is intent on preserving peace by avoiding 
violence. Honor entails dishonor as an irretrievable consequence if the 
offended honor is not followed by violence. The recurring theme in the 
movements of 2011 was selmiyah (peacefulness, nonviolence) rather than 
the Islamist cry for vengeance, inciting the people to seek revenge in order 
to preserve their national or religious honor.
The expressions related to honor and face actually exist in Arabic (and 
Persian) and are not mere idiomatic English translations. Dignity avoids 
the face-saving or face-losing dichotomy, opting for a painful face-to-face 
meeting with the opponent or seductive nonviolence toward the enemy, not 
fearing to be dishonored by showing one’s flexibility and reflexivity. Honor 
in its face-losing and face-saving versions is incommensurable with dignity 
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as an attitude based on the autonomy of the individual and mutual respect, 
especially between the government and the “governed” (Khosrokhavar 2012).
Another feature of honor is that it responds to humiliation through a 
violent counterhumiliating posture, in need of an aggressive crescendo 
to prove to oneself one’s capacity for “saving face.” The humiliation issue 
is of the utmost signif icance. Dignity does not mean that humiliation is 
not felt; it signif ies that one is able to master humiliation and not allow 
the logic of wounded honor to take hold of one for the sake of revenge 
(Scheff 1994).
Dignity makes possible empathy with others, not only those who belong 
to the same society, but distant others, through genuine feeling of related-
ness through the bond of sheer humanity, which is a public sphere extended 
to the world in a symbolic way. That is what happened in the f irst months of 
the revolution in Tahrir Square. Islamist movements in Egypt wanted world 
public opinion to witness their strength and determination. A middle-aged 
Salaf ist told me:
What we want is to be taken into account. For me, these people at Tahrir 
Square are miscreants, they are not genuine Muslims. I do not believe 
that the West has sympathy toward us. They are secular; this is their 
religion. What we want is a Muslim society and they don’t want it. My 
view is that we should show strength. People at Tahrir Square act as if 
they were the entire Egypt.
At Tahrir Square, people believed that they could share with world public 
opinion their own saga and benefit from the world’s sympathy. Socialization 
at Tahrir Square created in a fragile manner the prerequisite for an open 
society based on “home-grown” values related to the Arab language (poetry, 
music, painting playing with the Arabic characters) and democracy, this 
time not as an imported item from the West but as an ingredient in Egyptian 
identity.
Subjectivation meant acting according to emotions in a predicament 
marked by the hostility of external forces and the necessity to build up 
a new “togetherness” based on mutual respect: women, religious minori-
ties, and secular people were respected, and enthusiasm for a new society 
was blended with the concrete necessities of daily life in a manner that 
preserved togetherness for many weeks. Subjectivation made it possible to 
cope with a hostile environment outside the community and to preserve 
the coherence of the new “would-be community” in a manner that put the 
ideal side by side with the real. Tensions were neutralized through irony and 
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the moments of inaction were f illed with music, theater, reading poems and 
organizing the concrete life of the community (providing medicine to those 
who had health problems, organizing meals, taking care of those who slept 
there at night). At Tahrir Square, as Charles Tripp puts it “Foodstalls had 
sprung up, as had medical stations, debating circles, tents and shelters for 
those who stayed there the night – one labelled ‘Freedom Motel’ in Arabic 
and English” (Tripp 2013).
Violence as a Sign of Antagonistic Subjectivities
After the revolution, street violence in different forms spread to many 
Egyptian towns and cities, an almost daily experience for many revolu-
tionaries. The MB did not show any real capacity to cope with a tense 
post-revolutionary predicament where expectations were high and the 
capacity of the political system and the economy to cope with them were 
at the edge.
During the revolution proper (January 2011), violence was lived as coming 
from the Mubarak regime and when the militia (baltagia) attacked people, 
people defended themselves, sometimes using “counterviolence” but not 
taking the initiative to exert violence. The mood was toward irony, dialogue 
and affective consensus to oust Mubarak. The nature of violence changed 
during the period when the army took power in order to prepare for the elec-
tions. Violence against the Copts but also army violence (or inaction) against 
those who were violent, the mob, the remnants of the old regime ( fulul) 
became a reality of daily life in contrast to the ideals of nonviolence during 
the January 25 Revolution. After the election of Morsi, violence became 
more pervasive, primordially not quantitatively but qualitatively, through 
the disappointment and even despair of the people, particularly the Tahrir 
Square people or those who had shared their utopia throughout Egypt. In 
all these processes the subjectivation of violence played a major role: the 
election of Morsi and the daily demonstrations and protest movements in 
many parts of Egypt that brought tourism to a halt progressively put an 
end to the feeling of violence as a transitory phenomenon. For many people 
it became a proof that the revolution had gone wrong. A member of the 
Tamarrod movement that put an end to Morsi’s presidency in conjunction 
with the army and many other prominent people (Ahmed al-Tayyeb the 
head of the Al Azhar, the Coptic Pope Tawadros, the Salaf i Nur Party) said 
of the large demonstrations that put an end to Morsi’s reign by a popular 
army putsch:
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During the [January 25] Revolution we believed that the departure of 
Mubarak would put an end to violence and chaos. Then the army as-
sured the transition up to the elections under Marshal Tantawi. Morsi 
was elected and he tried to “brotherize” [ikhwanah] Egyptian society by 
putting his people into the major posts in the state. He was seeking to 
put an end to diversity by imposing Muslim Brotherhood. They did not 
even know how to govern and violence and disorder became paramount. 
They had to go for the order to be restored. Otherwise Egypt would not 
have survived and violence would have spread to all aspects of our daily 
life. (Interview, Cairo, January 2014)
Violence can also be understood as a show of “body politics” where no 
negotiated solution or institutionalized politics is in sight. In Egypt this 
body politics became a daily experience between the army, the Tahrir 
Square youth, the MB supporters, and the security forces. Ideology plays a 
lesser role than “street politics” grounded in hatred of each other and social 
tension caused by the incompatibility between moods, emotions and their 
articulation to the logic of interests: the opposition to the Morsi government 
became an “existential” dimension of those who believed that the MB was 
trying to swallow, even devour society and impose its version of Islam on 
the body social. Dignity was inflamed as opposition to Morsi by large parts 
of Egyptian society, giving rise to the protest movement Tamarrod a few 
months before the military coup, backed by a large part of the Egyptian 
society, at least in major cities.
Violence against Women
Women’s fate was related to the changing situation in the Egyptian 
Revolution. Moods and emotions were consistent at the outset between 
men and women but a rift opened after Morsi’s election and the cooling 
of the initial enthusiasm. On the whole, during the effervescent period at 
Tahrir Square in Cairo and to a lesser degree in Alexandria, the effusive 
atmosphere covered up gendered differences, at least among secular youth. 
Emotions by women and toward them by men can show the change within 
the “moodology” of the Egyptian Revolution, as a limited case for a more 
general “moodology” inspired by a sociology of emotions and social action. 
In Egypt, Asma Mahfouz became one of the few street leaders, a group that 
included primarily men even before the protest movement that led to the 
overthrow of Mubarak in January 2011. During the revolution she was active 
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and was regarded as a protest leader at least as much as she was perceived as 
a woman first. The fact that many men accepted her prominence tells much 
about the changes the mood brought about by the revolution. However, 
this change was as fragile as the “moods” that were part and parcel of it. 
Once the subjectivation process was brought to a halt, the blurring of lines 
between men and women was also questioned.
Up to the overthrow of Mubarak’s autocratic government, protest was 
dominated by the “Tahrir Square youth” type of revolutionary: egalitarian, 
mostly secular and socially tolerant. Muslims showed their tolerance by 
celebrating their prayers next to the Christians, who were celebrating theirs. 
Women more or less mingled with men and their mood was that of egalitar-
ian social actors defending a view of the “self” and “others” based on an 
implicit gender equality. They shared with men the same aspiration toward 
a democratic regime, and during this period everyone’s preoccupation was 
how to deal with a threatening authoritarian regime.
In the second period, from the overthrow of Mubarak to the military 
coup, there was a dramatic change: the Salaf is seriously threatened the 
emancipation of women. The latter’s number in the parliament dwindled 
in Egypt to less than 2 percent in the November 2011 elections. These are 
of course two distinct processes, one is about grassroots social pressure, 
the other one about electoral representation, but the incapacity to bridge 
subjectivation to political representation is well illustrated by them.
The gap between the two periods and the marginalization of most of the 
revolutionary actors in the ensuing political process induced the disarray of 
the “Tahrir Square youth” type of agents, including women. The democratic 
dimension of the Egyptian Revolution was overshadowed by the emergence 
of new actors and by the marginalization of the “revolutionary youth” who 
pushed toward opening up the mores and the recognition of women’s rights 
as full-fledged citizens. The frustration led in Egypt to the military coup, 
with the assistance and approval (at least at the beginning) of part of the 
Tahrir Square youth, secular women being their staunch supporters.
The Tahrir Square youth’s lack of political organization pushed them 
toward the sidelines after the ousting of both former regimes. They were 
marginalized by the fundamentalist (Salaf i) and Islamist (Muslim Broth-
erhood) actors, who were far more organized and able to mobilize their 
social basis for the polls. The scattered votes of the secular and progressive 
revolutionaries and their inability to voice their views in a unif ied manner 
through new political parties made them vulnerable, women being the 
most fragile social actors among them. Tahrir Square youth were inclined 
to reject politics as “f ilthy” and they preferred moral attitudes to political 
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ones. Revolutionary women shared these characteristics to an even higher 
degree. They were less preoccupied with their own lot than with that of the 
revolution proper and they did not care about creating new types of social 
organizations that would defend them as women from the Islamist political 
organizations. The result was the marginalization of revolutionary men 
and women in the second period of the Arab revolutions. The army as an 
institution had an antifeminist attitude and did not defend women against 
traditionalists who rejected their claims for equality. A feminist told me in 
March 2013, few months before the overthrow of Morsi:
We have had three enemies: the MB, the Salaf is and the army. They 
hate us for different reasons. The army is against us because we put into 
question the patriarchal order that supports them and to which they 
owe their clout. They do everything to humiliate us, they believe that we 
are prostitutes, that we question the social order and, therefore, that we 
are subversive. They also believe that we are part of a conspiracy by the 
West to undermine their power and the proof is that we are supported 
by the international media. I believe that shaking the patriarchal family 
and order will shake their supremacy and at least in that respect they 
are right. But many women do not understand our actions and side with 
traditionalists. This is our drama.
Secular authoritarian governments in the region had introduced legal norms 
that assured women more equality in families, inheritance, and divorce, 
making polygamy more diff icult. But this was done by the governments, 
not by women as social actors. When it came to defend the January 25 
Revolution, with few notable exceptions, women did not make feminist 
claims, mostly in order not to weaken a fragile revolutionary movement 
but partly due to their own lack of commitment to feminism, regarded as 
a Western attitude.
The division between “Islamist feminists” and “secular feminists” also 
undermined the cause of women. The Morsi government used this dis-
sension to undercut women’s action: when secular women asked for equal 
rights, the Islamists brandished the complementary gender rights that were 
in many cases a disguised form of inequality. But Islamist women argued 
that the complementary issue made change less brutal and men were thus 
less afraid since it was expressed through an Islamic idiom. In Egypt, secular 
women contributed to the military coup against the Morsi government, 
securing a kind of legal equality with men through the new constitution. 
But the advent of the military was a bad omen for independent political 
Violence, sociAl Ac tors, And sUbJec tiVAtion in the egyptiAn reVolUtion 175
organizations, the women’s cause becoming marginalized in the face of 
the formidable repression that paralyzed civil society.
Women were present not only as foot soldiers, but also as leading f igures 
(Naib 2011). Organizationally, however, they were weak and had no say 
in political matters, due to their lack of close ties with political parties 
that might defend their cause. Individually strong, collectively weak, the 
new generation of women was at best fragile in the political aftermath of 
the Arab Spring, although they were highly visible and conscious of their 
revolutionary role in bringing down autocracy in the initial street protests.
The scarcity of women as eff icient activists in the Arab world in general 
and Egypt in particular (with the exception of Tunisia), is related to patri-
archal prejudices, but also to their own inability to build up prominence 
within political structures and parties. Political leaders do not view them 
as assets to defend (Al-Malki 2012), since they have not been collectively 
active within associations and political groupings on the political scene. 
The number of women in the parliament dwindled after the revolution, 
and women felt they were losing their gains in legal equality at the hands 
of the Islamists. Still, there were a few exceptions and a beginning of self-
awareness that might bear its fruits in the future (Eriksen 2011).
Violence against women began before the overthrow of the old regime. 
Women were molested by the regime’s thugs (baltajiya), the army submitted 
them to virginity tests (Ortiz 2011), and female journalists were mistreated 
in order to intimidate them, be they from the diaspora or from Egypt. In 
June 2011, the popular writer Mona Eltahawy brought the issue to light as 
part of a strategy by the military to prevent women from participating 
in protest. The case of Samira Ibrahim, the 25-year-old Egyptian human 
rights activist, became widely known after she f iled a legal case against the 
military. In reaction to the violence against them, women demonstrated, 
in particular in Cairo, close to Tahrir Square, against military rule and the 
harsh treatment of female protesters by the security forces. Many men 
joined them on December 20, 2011 (Johnson and Harding 2011).
In the eyes of the feminist Andrea Khalil,
In the context of the Arab Spring, popular pressures have been applied to 
the new governments by a wide range of groups of women whose opinions 
are redef ining how constitutional and legal language treats gender in 
newly debated def initions of national identity. This shift in the women’s 
rights question from state-def ined action to atomized forms of cyber 
activism and street action is characteristic of the broader shifts in North 
African popular politics that culminated in the Arab Spring. (Khalil 2014)
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This mode of subjectivation, like the one of the Tahrir Square people, had 
a large impact at the beginning of the revolution. But once Mubarak was 
removed, it could not be a substitute for politics. Subjectivity was locked in 
a confined space like Tahrir Square, leaving the political f ield to the others. 
It became synonymous with depoliticization.
After the revolution, Salaf is pushed to exclude women from the public 
sphere. Women Salaf is became involved in promoting Sharia (Islamic law) 
and putting pressure on those women who asked for gender equality, tacitly 
approving violence against activist women. In the mobilization by Tamar-
rod and the opposition political parties against Morsi’s presidency in 2013, 
women played a signif icant role, but they were unable to convert this into 
political clout. They were overawed by the global movement against Morsi, 
partly divided between Islamists and secular, dependent on their families, 
and unable to build up autonomous feminist groups with the exception of 
small groups of secular women.
Another factor favoring violence against women was their massive ap-
pearance in the public sphere during the Arab revolutions. Since Salaf is 
and traditionalists became politicized as well and sought to operate in 
the same public sphere, their f irst acts of self-vindication were violence 
against women who “dared” dispute their primacy by breaking down the 
barriers with men. Their violence took varied forms, physical, psychological, 
and moral. The army too, was keen to send women back to their homes in 
order to violently dispute with men the hegemony in the public sphere. 
Women activists were troublemakers who disputed the gender frontiers 
and therefore challenged male tradition.
Postrevolutionary male actors, with the exception of the Tahrir Square 
youth, usually embraced the reassignment of women to a less visible place, 
so as to exclusively occupy for themselves the public sphere and give their 
hegemony a symbolic basis. In Egypt, virginity tests against women, their 
rape, their mistreatment during and after the demonstrations, all these 
actions had a common denominator: pushing women back into the private 
sphere and restoring the old order, threatened by women’s meteoric emer-
gence in Tahrir Square.
All in all, in the “subjective civil sphere” that was built at Tahrir Square, 
women acted individually and no explicit feminist attitude emerged that 
could have been institutionalized. They were regarded by the military as 
wanton and by the Islamists as lewd, having spent time at Tahrir Square, 
sometimes unaccompanied by a male relative. They were also taken for 
transgressors as long as they stayed in the public sphere, their long participa-
tion signaling their unreliability as submissive females.
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Subjectivities of Governmental Violence
Accurately or not, secular people in Egypt believed they were the main 
actors of the revolutionary wave that overthrew the Mubarak regime. This 
perception was challenged when they lost the f irst parliamentary elections 
to the Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and, to a lesser degree, the Salafis), 
in November 2011 and January 2012.
The Freedom and Justice Party (affiliated with the MB) obtained 37.5 per-
cent of the votes, the Al-Nour Party (Salaf is) 27.8 percent, and the rest 
was split among numerous political parties, some belonging to the secular 
revolutionary trend. The feeling of “symbolic violence” was strong from the 
moment the Muslim Brotherhood held the majority in parliament and was 
further intensif ied with the election of Morsi as president. After Morsi’s 
proposal for a new constitution which from a secular viewpoint betrayed 
the revolution’s ideals, violence against MB became one of the constant 
features of street protests. In Alexandria, at the end of March 2013, demon-
strations protested against the government’s crackdown on freedom and 
mistreatment of opposition activists. In Sidi Gabi, a district in Alexandria, 
the clashes ended with the two sides throwing Molotov cocktails and stones 
at each other. On the evening of Friday, March 29, 2013, dozens of protesters 
skirmished with security forces at the MB headquarters in Zagazig district 
of Alexandria. Protesters marched to the building, but a large number of 
MB sympathizers and members were stationed there to protect it.
The movement against President Morsi and the MB radicalized gradually. 
Also on March 29, a small number of activists marched from Tahrir Square 
to the High Court in the late afternoon, demanding the fall of Morsi, the 
dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the dismissal of Prosecutor 
General Talaat Abdallah. At the High Court, altercations broke out when 
some protesters began chanting for army rule: “The army is ours, the su-
preme guide [of the MB] is not.” Other demonstrators objected to the chants.
Central Security Forces were deployed to the High Court’s main lobby 
in mid- afternoon, reinforcing the already heavy security presence in place 
since the morning. Hundreds of demonstrators continued to flock to the 
area, assembling in front of the prosecutor general’s off ice in the court 
complex. Dozens of protesters had gathered outside the High Court earlier 
on Friday afternoon in preparation for a protest they called, “We are not to be 
intimidated.” They chanted, “We will not go, he [Morsi] shall go,” “The people 
want to bring down the regime,” “I am not a coward, I am not a [Muslim] 
Brother,” “Morsi, leave!” and “Secular, secular – we do not want a Brother-
hood [state]” (Egypt Independent 2013). Thus opposition to the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, President Morsi, and the Islamists by secular forces blended 
into a single protest movement that ended up with a huge demonstration in 
July 2013 and gave the opportunity to the army to mount its military coup.
Representatives of twelve youth groups met on Tuesday, March 26, 2013, 
at the Youth for Justice and Liberty movement headquarters to discuss 
their Friday plans. They announced that they would perform Friday prayers 
outside the prosecutor general’s off ice at the High Court in Cairo. They 
demanded the dismissal of Prosecutor General Talaat Abdallah, Justice 
Minister Ahmed Mekki, and Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim, after 
Abdallah issued arrest warrants for f ive activists accused of inciting clashes 
near the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Moqattam the week before. 
They also called for the public prosecutor to summon Brotherhood members 
involved in violent incidents around Moqattam and the Ettehadiya President 
Palace, and accused the judiciary of bias and unfairness. Radicalization of 
the secular and leftist political parties demanding an end to the president’s 
rule and their direct confrontation with the security forces in the name of 
the revolutionary ideals frequently ended in physical violence.
Violence became the expression of post-revolutionary impatience and 
radicalism: impatience with the slowness of change, with the nonresponsive 
attitude of the MB hierarchy and government, with the economic downturn, 
mainly due to the political instability and social unrest that frightened the tour-
ists. A conspiracy vision of social and political relations became paramount. 
The uncompromising attitude of the Morsi government was largely shared by 
the political opposition, the government nominating the members of the MB, 
since the others refused to accept the posts. Lack of mutual confidence due to 
the long periods of authoritarian regimes in Egypt but also, in consequence of 
revolutionary radicalization, made street violence almost inevitable (in par-
ticular by groups like the Ultras, made up of football fans, and the Black Bloc, 
an organization with extreme left leanings). The frontal opposition between 
the secular and the religious added up to the conflict: each side suspected the 
other of following hidden agendas. At the first anniversary of the January 25 
Revolution, the rupture between the two worldviews was consummated: the 
time of compromise was over, street violence was becoming common currency, 
and active disobedience toward the government by the bureaucracy, a fait 
accompli. Mutual disrespect made toleration impossible, each case giving 
added arguments for each side to vehemently reject the other. Disrespect for 
the “rules” became an almost permanent feature of the demonstrations, as 
security forces acted more or less arbitrarily toward them, bouncing between 
the sheer absence of police forces and the disproportionate repression of the 
protesters. The contrast with the mood at Tahrir Square is immense.
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Conclusion
One major goal of the Egyptian Revolution was peacefulness or lack of 
violence (selmiyah). After the revolution, the combination of the Islamists’ 
electoral victories and the inability of the new political actors to reach a 
compromise resulted in mutual distrust and demonization, culminating in 
a military coup. There was a growing sense of impatience with the political 
stalemate, and Morsi’s inept and sometimes arrogant style of government 
pushed the opposition toward radicalization. A new attitude among many 
opposition groups prevailed, regarding violence against the government as 
legitimate. Some revolutionary youth engaged in street violence that became 
endemic in some cities. Violence became even bloodier with the military 
coup, with the prospect of a peaceful transition to democracy dimming 
after the overthrow of the f irst democratically elected president, Morsi.
At the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution, almost everywhere dignity 
of the citizen (karamah) and nonviolence (selmiyah) were the two insepara-
ble notions distinguishing it from the nationalist and Islamist uprisings of 
the past. But dignity and nonviolence were part of the new subjectivation 
process that was based on affects, moods, feelings and emotions. All of 
these ingredients are vital to a social movement but they also are fragile 
by nature. The evolution of the Egyptian Revolution challenged the dignity 
of the citizen, with violence emerging as the only appropriate response to 
the MB government’s repression and ineptitude. The Morsi government was 
insensitive to consensus. The revolutionary youths’ impatience was also 
detrimental to the preservation of dignity since it promoted violent street 
action that in turn undermined toleration and politics according to the 
supremacy of the law. Dignity was divorced from nonviolence, disrupting 
social dialogue. The military coup opened a chasm between dignity and 
nonviolence, each side begrudging the other’s violence. The “dignity revolu-
tion” in Egypt ended tragically, the major notions around which they evolved 
being challenged by the street violence and the coup d’état (Tripp 2013).
Revolutions are venues for social and economic struggles. But they are also 
the theater for moods, emotions, heightened subjectivity – in one word, sub-
jectivation. Violence developed out of the clash between many groups, but via 
impatience, effervescence, the revolutionary temperament and intransigence, 
as well as partisan and sectarian interests (the MB, the Salafis, the army, the 
Tahrir Square youth, and so on). What was decisive in this revolution was 
much less economic issues for the new social actors at Tahrir Square (they had 
their significance, though for those who suffered economic hardship through 
social instability, resulting in the decrease in tourists) than subjectivation 
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issues based on the denial of dignity and state violence that refused genuine 
citizenship status based on political rights to the new generations. By hold-
ing to the logic of subjectivation without taking into account the social and 
economic hardship resulting from the political crisis, the people of Tahrir 
Square became blind toward the aspirations of society at large (more economic 
and political stability, even at the cost of political freedom). The emotions 
and antagonism toward the opponents made the Tahrir Square youth and 
the others irreconcilable, the f inal solution being a popular military coup 
that brought back authoritarianism even more repressive than Mubarak’s.
After five years of turmoil and repression, violence against the activists by 
the military and the government that took power after the military coup in 
July 2013 has become a daily experience for many netizens who restrict their 
activities to social media and who f ind themselves abroad, in prison, or in 
political quarantine. In a disillusioned society where mobilization has lost 
its appeal, the return to embittered fear and apathy has gained momentum 
and state repression has become the worst in decades. At the same time, it 
is a period of deep crisis for the Muslim Brotherhood, exposed to the most 
violent repression in its history. Social media have become the venue through 
which resistance to the military regime keeps going. In order to have another 
political uprising, a new generation is needed to invent new ways of acting 
socially and politically in order to shake off political repression.
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Near the shore of the Khaleej, outside a conference hall, I lingered after din-
ner with a group of Arab professionals. They had come from across the region, 
some for the week and some for good. They read multiple daily newspapers 
and could lecture confidently on political economy and modern Arab history.
Naturally, conversation turned to the so-called Arab Spring. “We Arabs 
will not put up with corruption and mismanagement forever,” one of my 
companions said. I am paraphrasing from memory. “Look at the poverty. 
Look at the inequality. Look at the waste of natural resources, of human 
resources. Eventually, we had to say: Enough!”
“But there is just as much waste and corruption in Algeria and Jordan as in 
Tunisia and Egypt,” another companion countered. Algeria and Jordan had 
relatively small-scale protests in 2011 that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
and King Abdullah weathered easily, while Tunisia and Egypt experienced 
mass uprisings that ousted presidents Zine El-Abdine Ben Ali and Hosni 
Mubarak. “Ben Ali and Mubarak fell because France and the United States 
wanted them out, but Bouteflika and Abdullah made deals with the West 
and were allowed to stay in power.”
In my experience in the Middle East, reference to Western machinations 
is normally a conversation-stopper. But this evening, another companion 
took exception. “Tahrir Square wasn’t a Western conspiracy,” she said, refer-
ring to the mass sit-in in Cairo. “All that America did for us was to invent 
Facebook and Twitter, which Egyptians used to make Tahrir Square on their 
own, to organize food and medics and reinforcements.”
Although these were not social scientists by training, their conversation 
was as social-scientif ic as any I’ve overheard at academic conferences. 
Without scholarly citations, these “lay” social scientists juxtaposed theories 
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of socioeconomic and political grievances, international pressures, and new 
media effects. They could elaborate, when pressed, with evidence from their 
core cases and extrapolate to contrasting cases within the region. They were 
intimidatingly well-informed about the daily course of events and political 
alliances and betrayals.
As debate ran into the night, I began to see a consensus, notwithstanding 
their theoretical differences: the uprisings of the Arab Spring were both 
inevitable and doomed. They had to happen, and they had to fail.
Many full-time social scientists have come to similar conclusions. The 
Arab Spring has generated a small industry of post facto just-so accounts. 
Even when couched in the language of probabilities, social-scientif ic 
causality and explanation tease us with hints of determinism. Like other 
revolutions, the Arab Spring rose and fell “because.” Indeed, many social 
scientists see the quest for “becauses” as their primary mission.
Social scientists are particularly drawn to explain surprisingly shiny ob-
jects, but we are not the only ones. A half-century ago, ethnomethodologist 
Harold Garfinkel (1967) proposed that making sense of difficult, unexpected 
behavior is one of the main tasks of social interaction. Similarly, Judith 
Butler (1999) argued that gender nonconformism attracts special scrutiny 
and judgment as a violation of the expectation of dominant gender norms. 
At the macrolevel, too, Hendrik Vollmer (2013) suggests that disruptions 
prompt movements to contain and normalize the unanticipated. Most social 
scientists are human, too, and we get professional brownie points for bring-
ing the wildest-looking phenomena into the comforting corral of “because.”
I’ve been skeptical of this explanatory mission for some time. It seems to me 
that some moments are less easily tamed than others by social science’s causal 
models. Revolutions and other forms of nonroutine behavior, in particular, 
disrupt prior patterns of interaction, erasing the causal inferences that apply 
to routine action (with apologies for self-citation, readers who are interested 
in this argument can find fuller versions in Kurzman, 2004a, 2004b).
Let me be clear – I am not saying that all human behavior is inexplicable. 
A colleague once challenged me to set scope conditions: If revolutions cannot 
be tamed by causal models, what else did I imagine was unpredictable? Isn’t 
rush hour traff ic fairly predictable, for example? I agree – I dread rush hour 
traffic as much as the next person, and that dread is based on a causal model 
that presumes a certain predictability. My point is that the predictability 
of some human behavior does not imply the predictability of all human 
behavior. I do not know where the scope conditions lie, but I suggest that 
those boundaries are fascinating to study: at what points do behaviors 
become “unruly”?
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By “unruly,” I mean collective actions that do not obey the rules of social 
behavior, and that do not obey the rules of social science (with apologies to 
Bartley [2014], from whom I borrowed the terms “ruliness”/“unruliness” but 
not his definitions). It is unruly to stand in front of armored personnel carriers 
and demand that the commander in chief resign? It is unruly to hold up a 
sign demanding freedom, in a place where people who have held up signs 
demanding freedom often lose their freedom as a result? These actions are 
not necessarily raucous or disruptive – although they may be – but they are 
unruly in the sense that they violate the norms of routine behavior. To the 
extent that such actions also flout the expectations of social-scientif ic mod-
els, they are unruly in a second sense: they appear at moments the models 
did not predict, they spread in places the models treated as unlikely, and they 
disappear just as updated models are developed to predict them retroactively.
The Arab Spring was unruly in both senses. It erupted in def iance of 
authoritarian political systems that had suppressed and manipulated politi-
cal mobilization for a generation or more, and it shocked social-scientif ic 
experts who considered these systems relatively stable. Arab publics were 
never perfectly quiescent, and the Arab Spring had its roots in the region’s 
long-standing traditions of protest (Chalcraft 2016; Thompson 2013) – but 
these protests were definitely against the rules. They appeared sporadically 
and were repressed harshly. The uprisings of the Arab Spring were unruly in 
the second sense as well – they did not f it the patterns that social-scientif ic 
theories led us to expect. They did not occur in countries with especially high 
usage of new media technologies, or in places where inequality was the most 
severe, or in societies with the greatest youth unemployment, to pick several 
potential theories (a variety of data sources are reviewed in Kurzman 2012).
Lay social science, like my conversation by the Khaleej, may allow itself 
to grab at evidence that f its its theories, and to push aside evidence that 
disconfirms them. Professional social science, by contrast, makes a commit-
ment to examine data more systematically. The data may involve numbers 
or texts or f ieldwork, but regardless of form the evidence brings us closer 
to our subjects. My experience with all of these forms of evidence is that 
the more data we analyze and the closer we get to our subjects, the more 
unruly they come to seem. Individual trajectories stand out more clearly 
against general patterns. “Deviant cases” (a pejorative-sounding phrase in 
comparative-historical analysis) and “outliers” (a dismissive-sounding term 
in statistical analysis) come into focus. Especially in times of turmoil, it gets 
harder to generalize about large-scale processes when you are familiar with 
the variety of smaller-scale experiences. Inevitably, social science shepherds 
the evidence into a meaningful narrative. All humans do this, faced with a 
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potentially paralyzing overabundance of sensory information (Feyerabend 
1999). But let us not lose our sense of wonder at the unruliness that attracted 
our attention in the f irst place.
Another contribution that professional social science offers to well-
informed lay social science, I think, is to study the production and repro-
duction of institutions. Lay social science generally takes institutions for 
granted – it uses terms like “state” and “nation” as unproblematically real, 
while much of the social science that I appreciate the most explores how 
these come to be experienced as real, and how that experience makes us 
act as though they were real, and in so doing makes them real.
Race provides a crucial example of this process. “Race” as we understand 
it today was invented in the eighteenth century – previously, the term could 
refer to any group of people claiming common descent and cultural solidar-
ity, such as the Germanic race or the Gallic race. In the eighteenth century, 
however, Europeans began to claim that they constituted a single race, 
alongside Africans, Americans, Asians, and – according to Karl Linnaeus 
(Linnaei 1758, 21-22), one of the inventors of biological taxonomy – the feral 
and monstrous human races. Europeans came to call themselves Cauca-
sians, because they considered the people of the Caucasus to be the most 
beautiful people in the world (Painter 2010, 72-90). This new conception of 
race was epically unruly – both in the sense that it provoked widespread 
resistance and had to be repeatedly enforced through the application of 
violence, and in the sense that it was incapable of accounting for evidence 
that, for most characteristics, humans varied more within each race than 
between them (Montagu 1942). Much of contemporary social science now 
treats race as an institution, not a biological category, and explores how 
this institution is reproduced, challenged, appropriated, and otherwise 
manipulated – denaturalizing a concept that lay social science too often 
treats as inherent and inevitable. Similar transformations have occurred 
in the study of the state, which is increasingly viewed as a multitude of 
arenas rather than a singular entity (Abrams 1988; Duyvendak and Jasper 
2015); the nation, which is now viewed as a project rather than a people 
(Anderson 2006; Yuval-Davis 1997); and many other institutions. Unruly 
action, if widespread enough, may gel over time into “ruly” institutions.
The chapters in this volume illustrate this contribution. Instead of treat-
ing human experience as a product of large-scale institutional causes, they 
examine how individual experience mediates and produces the phenomena 
that come to be labeled as causes.
This intervention begins in the introduction by James Jasper and Frédéric 
Volpi, who challenge the concept of “groups.” Lay social science, and much of 
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professional social science, treat groups as givens. Those approaches often 
explain behavior by membership in a group, the interests of the group, 
the resources or other characteristics of the group. For routine behaviors, 
when groups are stable and group membership is nonproblematic, such 
explanations may work. But in moments of protest and change, groups 
themselves may be the subject of conflict and negotiation. To capture the 
fluidity of collective identity, Jasper and Volpi replace the concept of groups 
with an alternative vocabulary of collective “players” (Duyvendak and 
Jasper 2015; Jasper and Duyvendak 2015). Players are “constantly shifting, 
dissolving, and recombining,” in this view, echoing studies from decades ago 
that viewed collective identity as the product of mobilization rather than 
an explanation for mobilization (Melucci 1989; Gamson 1991). Players still 
risk being reif ied the way groups are often reif ied – we may refer to them 
by collective labels, as though they were single actors. But the new term 
highlights how players play – how they strategically engage other players, 
sometimes playing by the rules, sometimes breaking the rules. Through the 
concept of players, along with the allied concept of arenas, Jasper and Volpi 
offer new organizing principles for the f ield of social movement studies, 
refusing to reduce people to institutional determinants.
The subsequent chapters deconstruct other structural explanations. 
Causal models of diffusion are scrutinized in John Chalcraft’s chapter on 
Arab “pirating” of models for revolt, for example. Chalcraft does not treat 
diffusion as automatic spillover or demonstration effects or political learn-
ing, which hide individual agency behind generic processes. Instead, he 
highlights the effort that some activists put into the consideration of which 
models to follow, debates over whether which of those models might apply 
locally, and what sorts of local alterations might be appropriate. His own 
appropriation of the concept of “piracy” signals a move closer to the lived 
experience of diffusion, and how that experience matters for diffusion.
Along different lines, Jillian Schwedler’s chapter on rituals of protest 
in Jordan asks what to make of small demonstrations that did not “mat-
ter” in terms of public opinion or political change. She suggests that these 
protests may matter in a different sense, in that they may illustrate the 
rituals of encounter between state off icials and their activist opponents, 
the oppositional identities that activists develop, and – more broadly – the 
persistence of protest that is not necessarily calculated to produce policy 
or regime change, contrary to rational-choice images of activists’ strategic 
motivations. Schwedler locates herself at the protest: where she walked, 
among, in front of, or behind the activists and the security forces, shows 
how calmly ritualistic these encounters had become, and how different 
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protest felt when the baltagiyya militia was summoned, creating a more 
menacing atmosphere. Her methodological transparency allows us to follow 
the researcher as she engages with her subjects of study.
Wendy Pearlman’s chapter focuses on another moment of change: the first 
days of what would later be called the Syrian uprising of 2011. The activists 
quoted in Pearlman’s chapter tell us what it felt like (the fear, the excitement), 
how these feelings reflected the contours of state control (which buildings and 
which people were considered safe enough for risky conversations), and how 
those contours could reform in an instant when enough of one’s neighbors 
decided they would not be intimidated by the prospect of coercion. From this 
perspective, state violence is not an abstract cause of obedience or revolt; it is a 
set of practices and threats that Syrians accepted, and then stopped accepting.
That moment of disobedience, when people stop accepting the institu-
tions they have lived with for years, is shocking. We see the shock most 
clearly in Youssef El Chazli’s chapter on activists in Alexandria, Egypt. On 
the morning of January 25, 2011, El Chazli writes, these activists – several 
dozen in all – had no idea that the demonstrations they had planned would 
draw hundreds of thousands of participants. “The numbers were incredible, 
unbelievable,” one activist recalled. “We found ourselves in tears from the 
sight,” another said. Their “maximal hope” had been to attract a thousand 
protestors, and they did not know what to do with the massive numbers 
that materialized. The crowds pushed passed police barriers, took up rude 
chants, and battled tear gas even after many activists had left the scene to 
regroup at a café. El Chazli does not argue that activist organization was 
unimportant – only that it did not “cause” the Egyptian uprising. It does not 
explain why hundreds of thousands of Egyptians suddenly decided to join 
in, which they had not done at the activists’ previous protests.
Farhad Khosrokhavar’s chapter examines the “effervescent community” 
that was forged among protesters in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt. Contrary to 
cheery visions of cosmopolitan youth demanding liberties that they saw their 
peers enjoying in Europe and North America, Khosrokhavar argues that the 
emergent solidarity of Tahrir distanced elite protesters from their Egyptian 
compatriots. Activists claimed moral superiority over less-well-off communi-
ties that did not participate as actively in the uprising, Khosrokhavar suggests, 
and did not address their concerns about economic degradation and political 
instability. This divide reflected long-standing class divisions in Egyptian 
society, but was activated and dramatized through the act of protest itself.
These studies offer glimpses into the breakdown of old institutions, 
although “breakdown” sounds too impersonal. More than that, they offer 
glimpses into the breakdown of causal reasoning: activist organization and 
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state violence and protest ritual and diffusion are not “causes” or “explana-
tions” in the social-scientif ic sense but rather aspects of the institutional 
environment that obsessed protesters and potential protesters. Their im-
portance lies in how they were interpreted, and how those interpretations 
could shift.
Of course, revolutions don’t change everything. Even at moments of 
maximal confusion and deinstitutionalization, when the future seems 
entirely up in the air, revolutionaries may tie their shoelaces the way they’ve 
always done. They may buy bread where they’ve always bought it and obey 
traff ic signals and engage in much of their usual participation in the large-
scale institutions that encompass their lives.
Most of the population is never directly engaged in the upheaval. Most 
people keep going to work, if they can, even if it means making special plans 
to avoid the sites of protest. Some of the population may be actively opposed 
to the revolution, looking to undermine it through their own protests or 
violence or other means. At the same time, global capitalism and geopolitics 
continue to seek advantages. All is not chaos.
So the question is not whether institutions all fail, but which ones. And 
that can’t be known in the abstract, but only in the moment, through the 
ways in which people abandon some routines in order to protect others, or 
vice versa. The chapter by Frédéric Volpi in this volume offers an example 
of this process. The Salafis in Tunisia were a coalition comprised largely of 
activists who were willing to maintain the current political order, at least for 
the moment, in order to change popular values and particular government 
policies. They did not seek a total break with the past, but a selective one. 
Within the coalition, also, were revolutionaries who were willing to consider 
violence. They had a different set of calculations: breaking with their past 
(nonviolent) political practice would allow them to maintain their ideologi-
cal purity and trigger a clash that they expected to usher in a new set of 
institutions. In Tunisia, as Volpi describes, the militants assassinated political 
f igures and the entire coalition was banned. Elsewhere, by contrast, Salafis 
have refrained from violence (at least thus far) to pursue a more cautious 
strategy of incremental change, even if it that means painful compromises.
In early February 2011, I had my laptop open at a mandatory administra-
tive meeting at my university in the United States, watching a live-stream 
of President Hosni Mubarak’s speech on Egyptian television. Listening on 
earbuds and trying to ignore the meeting around me, I waited for Mubarak 
to acknowledge the massive protests against him and resign. The televi-
sion feed had a split-screen for much of the speech, one side close in on 
Mubarak and the other side zoomed out on Tahrir Square, where thousands 
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of protesters were also watching the speech. As Mubarak kept talking, it 
became clear that he was not planning to resign.
It occurred to me that the history of Egypt at that moment depended on 
the decision-making of one deluded old man, who was gabbing away in front 
of a television camera while I watched. If he resigned, the history books would 
say that massive protests drove him from power in just over two weeks. If he 
refused to resign, then – who knew? (As it turned out, another old man – one 
of Mubarak’s cronies – announced the president’s resignation the next day.) 
On the other side of the split screen, I wondered about the response from 
the crowd in Tahrir Square, and from other Egyptians watching or listening 
to Mubarak’s speech around the country. If anybody at Tahrir Square had 
responded with rage and pulled out a gun, or brought a bomb and set it off, 
we would have an entirely different narrative of the upheaval – no longer 
an unarmed movement but a violent insurrection, possibly even a terrorist 
campaign. All it would take is a small group to change the language we use 
for the entire mass event, in keeping with the one-drop definition of political 
violence. Nonviolence takes a village, but violence only takes a cell.
Contrasting paths, and the grand causal theories that social science 
stakes on the outcomes, rest on the actions of small groups whose minds 
are not typical of the population at large – most people wouldn’t dream of 
setting off explosives or ordering thugs to beat people up, as the regime’s 
top off icials did, but those decisions matter tremendously for our accounts. 
To understand the divergent trajectories of protest, in Egypt and elsewhere, 
we must be prepared to operate at multiple scales at once: at the mass scale, 
to understand how institutions are produced by hundreds of thousands or 
more; at the intermediate scale, to understand how hundreds or thousands 
of people mobilize on behalf of particular goals and strategies; and at the 
micro scale, where a handful of individuals may throw off everybody else’s 
plans with a dramatic intervention.
Social scientists who privilege the mass scale may dismiss small-scale 
disruptions as statistical noise in the signal, but for the people living through 
these periods of unrest, they may be the signal itself. These small-scale 
perturbations can come to def ine the historic moment. They may be the 
iconic feature that people latch on to as they work out which institutions 
are f inished and which ones remain intact.
That, to me, is the value of this volume. It draws us into the experience of 
the Arab Spring, in all its hope and pain, taking the uncertainties of the mo-
ment as its object of study. The social-scientif ic lens of the researcher does 
not displace the lay social-science of the researched, who are also trying to 
make sense of the institutional changes they are party to, willingly or not.
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